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INTRODUCTION 
Kieran A. Kennedy, Director, 
The Economic and Social Research Institute 
From its inception 25 years ago, the ESRI has been 
engaged in short-term macroeconomic forecasting. In-
deed one of the first published papers was entitled Short-
term Economic Forecasting and its Application to Ireland. 
Si nee 1968, the Institute has been producing a regular 
Quarterly Economic Commentary (QEC). The QEC con-
tains a review of current economic developments at 
home and abroad, a forecast for the year ahead, and an 
assessment of the major short-term policy issues. Judg-
ing by the amount of attention it receives in the press, 
the QEC has become the lnstitute's best known 
pu bi ication. 
For some years past, however, we have been conscious 
of the need to supplement the QEC with a longer-term 
perspective. The economic problems facing the nation 
- such as the level of unemployment and the condition 
of the public finances - are on such a scale that only 
marginal changes can be effected in the course of a single 
year. Since the problems can only be solved over time, 
it is essential to have a longer time perspective. To say 
this, however, is not at all to say that the problems can 
be put on the long finger. The fact is that a longer-term 
perspective helps us to identify whether short-term ac-
tions are sensible or not, and can therefore give more 
purpose and coherence to short-term policies. 
With this in mind, the Institute over the past decade 
has published a number of medium-term 
macroeconomic policy analyses. These include Irish 
Economic Policy: A Review of Major Issues (edited by 
B. R. Dowling and J. Durkan) in 1978; The Irish Economy: 
Policy and Performance 1972-1981 (by P. Bacon, 
J. Durkan and J. O'Leary) in 1982; and Employment and 
Unemployment Policy for Ireland (edited by D. Conniffe 
and K. A. Kennedy) in 1984. We now feel that the time 
has come to launch a regular annual publication devoted 
to the medium-term outlook for the economy. The pre-
sent paper, Medium-Term Outlook 1986-1990, is the first 
volume in what we intend to be a continuing annual 
series. 
The chief author and editor of Medium-Term Outlook, 
Dr Peter Bacon, is no stranger to medium-term economic 
analysis and forecasting. As Director of the National Plan-
vii 
ning Board (on secondment from ESRlt he was deeply 
involved in all aspects of preparing the Board's major 
report, Proposal for Plan 1984-87. His earlier experience 
in the Department of Finance and at the OECD in Paris 
equipped him with a thorough knowledge of the opera-
tion of the Irish and the major world economies. 
While the central core of the Medium-Term Outlook 
is devoted to the economy as a whole, it is also our in-
tention to include special articles on specific sectors or 
issues that can be considered best in a medium-term con-
text. The present volume contains two such articles 
relating to key aspects of our two most important trading 
sectors, agriculture and manufacturing. The first, by Pro-
fessor Robert O'Connor, assesses the European Commis-
sion's proposals for changes in the Common Agricultural 
Policy. The second, by Dr. Eoin O'Malley, examines the 
performance and prospects of foreign-owned industry in 
Ireland. 
We hope that this volume will be of use, not only to 
those responsible for economic policy, but also to a 
much wider audience. Certainly, from the number of en-
quiries we receive at the Institute from business about 
the outlook over the next five years, it is clear to us that 
there is a great demand for the kind of projections con-
tained in this volume. Indeed it would be strange if it 
were otherwise, since any business that wants to survive 
and grow must plan ahead. And the more uncertain the 
outlook, the more a firm must take that uncertainty into 
account. 
The projections contained in this volume are not put 
forward as predictions of what will happen, and should 
not be used as such. Rather they provide a framework 
to help the policy maker and the business planner to 
develop more coherent strategies for coping with future 
uncertainties. At present, there is almost a complete 
absence of such a framework at national level. The pro-
jections in the Government's Plan, Building on Reality, 
are now out of date in important respects, and in any 
event they only cover the period up to 1987. We are con-
fident, therefore, that the present volume will fill an im-
portant gap in the efforts of all those concerned to plan 
a better future. 

SUMMARY 
The first half of the decade of the 1980s, taken as a 
whole, was a period of appalling economic performance 
in Ireland. On average there was little growth in national 
output. Employment fell and unemployment rose from 
10 per cent of the labour force to 16 per cent; those who 
retained employment also experienced a sharp drop in 
their living standards, especially in the early years of the 
decade. In addition, the already serious imbalances in 
the public finances and the balance of payments, coming 
into the decade, got worse before improvements began 
to come about. By 1982 the public sector borrowing 
requirement (PSBR) was equal to 20 per cent of national 
output and the deficit on the balance of payments had 
expanded to almost 15 per cent in the previous year. 
Since then rapid adjustment has occurred to the balance 
of payments deficit and by 1985 it had fallen to 3 per 
cent of GNP. The imbalance in the public finances has 
been much more intractable. By 1985 it stood at 15% 
per cent of GNP, about 8114 per cent being accounted 
for by the deficit on current spending. 
This set of events was brought about by numerous 
factors. Some of them were beyond the control of Irish 
economic policy makers: it was inevitable that a 
recession would follow the second oil price shock of 
1979/80. There were also inescapable adverse 
consequences for I re land of the rising trend in the value 
of the US dollar and real interest rates internationally 
during the two and a half years or so to the Spring of 
1985. But these effects would have been substantially 
smaller if appropriate action had been taken domestically 
from the late 1970s to avert and control public sector 
borrowing. Instead problems have been corn pounded: 
right through the 1980s to date there have been 
inadequate steps taken to overcome the public finance 
imbalance. In part this reflects a preoccupation with 
short-term effects. In part also it is the result of failure 
- by all concerned with economic policy formation -
to identify, articulate and implement macro- or micro-
policies that would promote self reliant growth and 
minimise the effects of fiscal deflation. 
The next five years are likely to present more fortunate 
economic circumstances. There are indications already 
that growth in the international economy will be more 
balanced and possibly even stronger in the second half 
of the decade compared with the first. The belated 
tendency for the US dollar to fall and for real interest rates 
internationally to ease creates the prospect that the 
economic policies of major countries will be shifted to 
positions which would promote this outcome and yet 
avoid a resurgence of inflation. In summary, the changes 
that, in our view, would be required internationally for 
this to happen are that a more accommodating stance 
of monetary policy be adopted in Europe. This would 
reduce real interest rates and with some relaxing of the 
fiscal stance would provide needed stimulus to the 
European countries; that at the same time US budget 
policy redress the growing fiscal deficit that has emerged 
there thus enabling a further easing in monetary 
conditions in the US. In Japan the main problem would 
seem to be not to raise growth but to have it less 
dependent on foreign demand. Accordingly, an easing 
of fiscal policy and a tightening of monetary policy -
to raise the value of the Yen would seem to be an 
appropriate change in the context of maintaining and 
strengthening economic growth in the industrial world. 
There are, of course, huge uncertainties regarding the 
speed and extent with which such changes will occur 
but there are grounds for believing that this is the 
direction that is most likely. Compared with the first half 
of the 1980s the next five years are expected to be 
characterised in the OECD area by: 
• more balanced growth and faster expansion of 
world trade; 
• stable and low inflation of under 4 per cent per 
annum; 
• lower real interest rates; 
• a lower value of the US dollar on average 
compared with the first half of the decade. 
If these conditions prevail internationally there would be 
greater scope for manoeuvre at home. However, in the 
"benchmark" scenario for Ireland it has been assumed 
that: 
• the fiscal targets contained in the Government 
Plan, will not be fully achieved by 1987. In that 
year a PSBR of over 12Y2 per cent of GNP is 
assumed, about half of which is attributable to 
the Exchequer's current budget; 
• the fiscal stance is continued unaltered for a 
further two years after 1987 by which time the 
PSBR is equivalent to 10 per cent of GNP; 
• other macro-economic and sectoral policies are 
oriented more to the achievement of faster 
growth. 
The main features of the scenario based on these 
assumptions are shown in Table A. 
This scenario portrays the economy gradually returning 
to balance, in many respects, during the next five years: 
there is a renewal of economic growth; a stable rate of 
inflation, which is low by previous experience and 
comparable to that expected in trading partners; a 
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TABLE A: Main Features of Benchmark Projection 
7 980- 7 985 7 985- 7 990 
Average 
Change in GNP at Constant 1980 Factor 
Cost% 2% 
Change in Total Employment % -1 1/2 
Unemployment (as % of Labour Force) 131/2 17% 
Change in Consumer Prices % 11% 41/2 
Change in Real Household Incomes % -2 2 
PSBR (as % of GNP) 18 111/i 
Of which: Current Budget Deficit 71/i 5% 
Current Balance of Payments 
(as % of GNP) -81/i 
modest growth in living standards; equilibrium in the 
balance of payments and a tendency for the national debt 
to stop growing faster than national output. Yet there are 
important respects in which adjustment is disappointingly 
incomplete. By the end of the decade the rate of 
unemployment is even higher than now. Public sector 
borrowing is still equivalent to over 9 per cent of GNP 
- a magnitude which some would regard as intolerably 
high. And by the end of the decade living standards are 
about the same as they were 10 years earlier. 
We have explored some possibilities for achieving a 
better outcome than that described above. It is 
concluded that a speedier adjustment of the public 
finance imbalance along with concerted and determined 
application of sectoral and micro policies would leave 
the economy on a faster growth path by the end of the 
decade and in a stronger position to provide employment 
opportunities going into the next decade. However, a 
more sluggish adjustment would leave the economy on 
a slower growth path and little real prospect of making 
inroads on the level of unemployment by the 1990s, even 
though in the short term output and employment 
performances would be stronger. The prospect that oil 
prices could fall sharply to well below $20 a barrel over 
the next year or so cannot be dismissed. This possibility 
has been examined briefly and while such an eventuality 
would not be without problems, it could offer the 
prospect of bringing about a more concerted and positive 
stance in the industrial economies of the world. The 
effects of this would be more important for Ireland than 
the direct impact of the change in oil prices. They might 
indeed be sufficient to enable domestic policy to establish 
both a sustainable position in the public finances and 
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7986 7987 7988 7989 7990 
21/2 2% 3 3 3 
-1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 % 
17 171/i 18 181/i 181/2 
41/i 4 4 31/2 3 
2 1 31/2 2 1 
14 121/i 11 10 9 114 
71/2 61/i 51/2 5 41/i 
-2% -11/i rn 11/2 2 
a reversal of the upward trend in unemployment by the 
end of the decade. 
However, there are also downside risks attached to the 
projected developments in the international economy. 
These relate principally to the speed of adjustment of US 
fiscal policy and the response of European economic 
policy to these changes. It is possible that the pace of 
adjustment will be much slower than is projected or that 
European economic policies would respond less 
positively. In that case real interest rates would fail to 
fall and world trade would not expand. This would 
remove two major sources of stimulus to the Irish 
economy. Accordingly, it would be quite unwise to 
assume that developments in the international economy 
might relieve the responsibility which domestic policies 
must assume in adjusting the imbalances faced by the 
Irish economy. 
In Part I we review the main developments in the inter-
national economy in the past five years and examine, 
in a general way, the prospective scenarios to the end 
of the decade. In Part II we turn to the domestic economy 
and examine how international developments and 
policies at home have shaped the economic performance 
of the past five years. From this we go on to develop a 
medium-term scenario for the economy, embracing 
prospects for growth of national output, employment, 
the development of income and expenditure and the 
evolution of the public finances and balance of payments 
up to the end of the decade. In Part Ill we discuss some 
variants to the main set of projections based on some 
alternative paths of adjustment to the public finances and 
different circumstances in the international economy. 
Finally some concluding remarks are presented. 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 
1. Introduction 
This Part assesses developments and medium-term 
prospects in the international economy. Because of the 
small size of the domestic economy conditions at home 
are to a very considerable degree influenced by what 
happens in the rest of the world. We focus on a number 
of aspects: the imbalances that have accompanied the 
international recovery from the last recession are 
described in Section 2. In Section 3 we examine the 
prospects and requirements for achieving adjustment 
within industrial countries. Sections 4 and 5 are con-
cerned respectively with the outlook for oi I and other 
commodity prices and the debt problem of the (LDCs). 
Finally in Section 6 we present aspects of a medium term 
scenario for the global economy which are thought most 
relevant to the medium-term prospects for the Irish 
economy. 
2. Imbalances In Economic Recovery 
The dominant feature of the economic recovery which 
has been under way in OECD countries now for the past 
three or more years is its uneven pattern and the growing 
imbalances which have accompanied it. The predomin-
ant objective in most industrialised countries after the 
second oil price shock was to contain and reduce 
inflation pressures. In this respect considerable and 
widespread progress has been achieved (Table 1.1 ). 
However, the price performance of major European 
economies taken together remains somewhat weaker 
than either the US or Japan, although that of the Federal 
Republic of Germany is comparable with either of the 
former two countries. In addition, the speed and extent 
of the slowdown in inflation which has been achieved 
is far greater than occurred following the earlier recession 
of 1974/75. 
TABLE 1.1: Private Consumption Deflators in Selected 
Countries and Groups of Countries, 1982-1986 
(Per Cent Change from Previous Year) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
United States 5.9 3.7 3.2 3V2 4 
Japan 2.7 1.6 2.1 2Vi 1 V2 
4 major Europeans* 9.6 7.4 6.1 5% 4Vi 
IRE LAND 16.0 8.3 8.5 5V2 4V2 
Total OECD 7.4 5.4 5.0 4314 4V2 
*Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy. 
Sources: Economic Outlook, December 1985, Paris OECD. 
National Income & Expenditure, 7983 & 7984, Stationery 
Office, Dublin, 1985. 
Quarterly Economic Commentary, December 1985, ESRI, 
Dublin. 
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Tight demand management policies, with a pronoun-
ced emphasis in most countries on quantitative monetary 
targets, appear to have been the predominant policy 
actions which have brought about the reduction in 
inflation. Allied to the concern with controlling inflation 
has been an aim to reduce fiscal imbalances and, in some 
cases, the relative share of the public sector in the 
economy. However, in this respect, progress has been 
considerably more modest. Indeed there is a major 
divergence in the fiscal stance of the US, where there 
has been an expansion in the budget deficit from 2 per 
cent of GNP in fiscal year 1981 to nearly 5 per cent in 
fiscal year 1984 and a rapid accumulation of public debt, 
compared with other countries (Table 1.2). 
TABLE 1.2: Changes in Structural Budget Balances in Selected 
OECD Countries• in 1982-1986 (as a Percentage of Nominal 
GNP/GDP) 
United Cer- United 
Year States Japan many France Kingdom Italy 
1982 -0.9 +0.3 +1.2 -0.6 + 1.5 +0.6 
1983 -0.7 +0.6 + 1.3 +0.2 -1.3 +1.7 
1984 -0.7 +0.5 +0.5 + 1.2 -0.4 -0.2 
1985 -0.3 +0.8 +0.5 +0.0 +0.2 +0.1 
1986 +0.1 +0.8 0 +0.3 -0.5 +0.5 
a. A positive sign denotes a move to restriction. 
Source: Economic Outlook, December 1985, Paris OECD. 
This divergence is, to some extent at least, responsible 
for disparities in economic performance and other 
imbalances that characterise the international economy 
at present. 
Growth of real GNP in Europe has been sluggish 
compared with either the US or Japan (Table 1.3). 
Moreover, the limited expansion which has taken place 
has relied primarily on the buoyancy of the US economy. 
TABLE 1.3: Growth of Real GNP in Selected Countries and 
Groups of Countries, 1982-1986 
(Per Cent Change from Previous Year) 
1982 1983 1984 7985 1986 
United States -2.1 3.7 6.8 2Vi 2314 
Japan 3.3 3.4 5.8 5 3V2 
4 Major Europeans 0.6 1.3 2.3 2% 2V2 
IRELAND -2.3 0.5 2.5 1 2% 
Total OECD -0.3 2.7 4.9 2314 2314 
Sources: Economic Outlook, December 1985, Paris OECD; 
National Income and Expenditure, 7983 and 7984 Stationery 
Office, Dublin; 1985. 
Quarterly Economic Commentary, December, 1985, ESRI 
Dublin. 
4 
Domestic demand within Europe has been virtually 
stagnant. In 1984 exports contributed half of the total 
increase in demand in Europe. 
The slow growth in demand and output in Europe has 
been translated into high and rising unemployment. 
Unemployment rates presently range from 9 per cent to 
13 per cent in the four major European countries and 
reach almost 20 per cent in some of the smaller 
economies. The unemployment record has deteriorated 
compared with the US (Table 1.4) which historically had 
the higher rate of unemployment. Furthermore, with the 
strong growth of output in the US, unemployment there 
has dropped, whereas in Europe the weak recovery has 
been insufficient to prevent unemployment from 
continuously rising. 
TABLE 1.4: Employment• and Unemploymentb in Selected 
Countries and Croups of Countries 1982-1986 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
United States: 
Employment -0.9 1.3 
Unemployment 9.7 9.6 
Japan: 
Employment 1.0 1.7 
Unemployment 2.4 2.6 
4 Major Europeans: 
Employment -1.0 -0.7 
Unemployment 8.7 9.5 
IRELAND:c 
Employment 0.2 -2.0 
Unemployment 11.4 14.1 
Total OECD: 
Employment -0.6 0.5 
Unemployment 8.3 8.8 
a Per cent change from previous year. 
































Economic Review and Outlook, Summer 1985, Stationery 
Office, Dublin. 
Quarterly Economic Commentary, December, 1985, ESRI, 
Dublin. 
Another profound imbalance, related to the disparity 
in growth performance, is the deterioration in the US 
balance of payments position (Table 1.5). The widening 
deficit has had some positive aspects: it has offset 
domestic capacity constraints and consequential inflation 
pressures that would have hampered expansion; it has 
also provided a much needed boost to world demand. 
However, the present trend is untenable. Because of the 
current large imbalance between US imports and exports 
the growth of exports would from now on have to be 
significantly faster than that of imports merely to prevent 
the deficit from widening further. The OECD have 
estimated that a continuation until 1990 of the US deficit 
on current account on its current scale of 2V2 to 3 per 
cent of GNP would imply net US foreign debt of the order 
of 15 per cent of GNP. This would, at prevailing interest 
rates, require a surplus on trade and non-factor services 
of about 1 V2 per cent of GNP thereafter merely to cover 
MEDIUM-TERM OUTLOOK: 1986 - 1990 
interest payments, even if the current account was in 
balance. 
TABLE 1.5: Current Balances in Selected Countries and 
Croups of Countries 1982-1986 
($ Billion) 
7982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
United States 
Japan 
4 Major Europeans 
-7.4 -41.6 -101.0 -128 
7.6 20.8 35.0 48 
-4.5 4.1 3.3 91/2 




What is somewhat surprising is that a process of 
adjustment to reverse the trend in the US balance of 
payments position did not begin sooner. The most 
obvious potential adjustment would have been for the 
US exchange rate to weaken in the face of a widening 
deficit on current account; however, until the Spring of 
1985, the opposite was the case. High relative real 
interest rates in the US and associated strong inward 
capital flows were the proximate causes for the 
continuing widening of the current account deficit. 
However, there is not a dominant explanation of why 
real interest rates remained so high for so long. One view 
is that the magnitude of the budget deficit is responsible, 
another is that they are a reflection of high rates of return 
on real investment in the US and the generally favourable 
performance of the economy in terms of high growth and 
low inflation. For whatever reason the upward trend in 
the dollar and real interest rates from the beginning of 
1983 u nti I the Spring of 1985 had deflationary 
repercussions in Europe and resulted in serious financial 
and economic problems in many less developed 
countries. 
3. Prospects for Adjustment 
In evaluating the prospects for continuing adjustment 
and growth, several judgements must be entered into in 
respect of the developments that have been described 
above. These principally concern (i) the role of fiscal 
demand in the US and world growth performance, (ii) 
the future trend of the US dollar and interest rates and 
(iii) the extent to which weak labour market cpnditions 
in Europe are the result of institutional rigidities. 
It is a fact that economic recovery has been strongest 
in the US, where fiscal stimulus has been most 
pronounced. In Europe, where the fiscal stance has been 
restrained, domestic demand has remained weak. It is 
very tempting to conclude from this that a switch in the 
emphasis of fiscal policy outside the US would remedy 
the fundamental imbalance in performance that has been 
observed in the first half of the decade. However, this 
view does overlook a number of other factors and 
complexities. In the first place it is not the case that the 
whole of the difference in output growth between the 
US and Europe can be explained by conventional 
budgetary stimulus; lower inflation and a more moderate 
growth in real labour costs, associated with especially 
strong real wage moderation in the US private services 
sector rates fell in the eight years to 1982 compared 
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 
with large increases in Europe - have also probably 
contributed to faster US growth compared to Europe. In 
our view a relatively more stimulatory fiscal stance in the 
US has contributed to the stronger growth of the US, but 
its effectiveness has been significantly enhanced by a 
number of other more favourable macro-economic and 
structural conditions operating in the US economy. 
While the growth performances of the US rests on 
more than fiscal stimulation its durability is no more 
assured for this and is threatened by the trend in the 
current balance of payments. The reductions which have 
been occurring in the value of the dollar si nee the Spring 
of 1985, if sustained, offer the greatest prospect for 
creating conditions that would enable a more even 
distribution of growth to be brought about in industria-
lised countries and a reversal of the unsustainable US 
balance of payments position. Monetary policy in Euro-
pean countries has, until about the final quarter of 1985, 
been constrained by the weakness of their curriences 
against the US dollar. Interest rates have thus been kept 
higher than might have been considered desirable from 
a domestic perspective. European countries have now 
acquired some freedom to choose between lower 
interest rates and exchange rate appreciation. The fact 
that initially exchange rates moved more than interest 
rates was to be expected. However, if the fall in the dollar 
continues, then the scope for a more significant fall in 
European interest rates will emerge strongly. 
A third important issue is the extent to which 
institutional and structural factors have aggravated the 
effects of recession on unemployment in Europe. Of their 
nature these factors tend not to be quantifiable and for 
this reason relationships are more difficult to establish 
and define. However, the factors that are alleged to 
impede faster employment creation in Europe compared 
with the US include: employment protection legislation; 
inflexible work arrangements and labour force 
immobility; government policies that raise the cost of 
employing labour and excessive growth in real labour 
costs and excessive levels of taxation. Thus, even if it is 
accepted that such factors may have played some role 
in the relative deterioration of labour market conditions 
in Europe, it is doubtful that redressing these alone would 
lead to a revival of growth. Domestic demand in Europe 
is deficient. Moreover, for the past three or more years 
now, policies in Europe have been supposedly directed 
at "improving the fundamentals" - increasing profits 
and profitability while raising labour market performance 
in a variety of ways so as to both increase the incentive 
to employ labour and make recovery less inflation prone. 
If significant progress has not yet been achieved in this 
regard, it indicates either that the instruments of policy 
are ineffectual or that the responsiveness of these 
problems to policy stimuli is extremely slow and will 
continue in that way. 
A summary can now be drawn of the policy positions 
from which the major countries and groups of industrial 
countries are operating. And the directions of change that 
would, in our view, be needed to sustain growth and 
reduce the imbalances that have to date accompanied 
the recovery from recession. These changes are that US 
fiscal policy address the growing public finance 
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imbalance that has emerged there thus further easing 
monetary conditions in the US. Such a move seems likely 
in view of the fact that the US Senate and House of 
Congress have each adopted "balanced budget" bills. 
If enacted, such legislation would require the President 
to take such measures as were necessary to balance the 
federal budget by fiscal year 1991. At the same time a 
more accommodating stance of monetary policy in 
Europe would reduce real interest rates, moreover there 
would be scope also for relaxing fiscal policy to provide 
a needed boost to domestic demand. In Japan the main 
problem would seem to be not to raise growth but to 
make it less dependent on foreign demand. Accordingly, 
an easing of fiscal policy and a tightening of monetary 
policy to raise the value of the Yen would seem to be 
an appropriate change in the context of renewing 
balanced growth in the industrial world. 
4. Oil Prices and Non-Oil Commodity Prices 
The medium-term economic prospects of industrial 
countries will depend not only on the appropriateness 
and consistency of policies pursued by these countries 
but also on developments in the economies of the newly 
industrialising countries (NICs) and less developed 
countries (LDCs) and on the terms of trade with them. 
A matter of primary concern is the medium-term 
outlook for oil prices. There has been a definite waning 
in the strength of OPEC in the past five years and with 
it the world oil price structure which centred around its 
price regulating mechanism. Three factors probably 
explain the dilution of OPEC power. First, the economic 
recovery of the past three years has been accompanied 
by a much more parsimonious rise in the demand for 
oil than was the case, for example, after the first oil price 
crisis. This is the result of substitution and conservation 
measures having been developed and applied now for 
many years. Second, non-OPEC oil production has been 
growing persistently, capturing much of the growth in 
demand which has taken place. Finally, internal financial 
pressures within OPEC member countries, resulting from 
these developments, have led to growing strains on the 
organisation's capacity to maintain a level of output 
consistent with its price target. The medium-term outlook 
is that oil consumption will continue growing slowly, 
even with a modest acceleration in the growth of 
economic activity in OECD countries. The increase in 
non-OPEC supplies will probably taper-off by the end of 
the decade. In both the US and the United Kingdom 
output is expected to flatten soon and then decline. In 
Mexico, the country with the largest proven oil reserves 
outside OPEC, production growth is likely to remain 
weak because of export limits and financial difficulties 
with developing further capacity. 
In these circumstances it seems likely that real oil prices 
will decline over the next number of years. Over one-
third of current OPEC capacity is idle, equal to about 20 
per cent of 1984 (non-communist) world consumption. 
And this will be raised further with the completion of the 
Iraq pipelines through Turkey and Saudi Arabia expected 
sometime in 1986. It is very much more difficult to 
foresee the extent and pattern of decline which seems 
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likely to occur; in particular whether a steady fall in the 
dollar price of oil may be expected over a number of 
years or whether a precipitous drop might occur in the 
short-term future. The implications for industrial countries 
of these alternatives will be considered later. 
Non-oil commodity prices, measured in US dollars, 
increased in 1983 and 1984, after falling sharply in the 
previous two years. In 1985 commodity prices are likely 
to have fallen again. By 1986 supply adjustments for both 
agricultural commodites and metals are expected to have 
reached a stage that will stabilise real commodity prices. 
Thereafter, prices in domestic currency may rise in line 
with world manufactured export prices. 
5. The LDC Debt Problem 
A final important aspect of international economic 
development concerns the debt problem of less devel-
oped countries. This, of course, is not a one-way process 
and is influenced by policies pursued by industrial 
countries, as well as influencing developments in these 
countries. During the past two years a number of major 
debtor countries especially Mexico and Brazil - have 
made significant progress towards resolving their 
problems. Improvements in trade and current account 
positions have enabled some of them to earn sufficient 
foreign exchange to meet debt service costs without 
incurring new loans. There are, of course, large 
economies which continue to suffer major problems. For 
example, in Argentina, the Phillipines and Nigeria little 
progress has been achieved in applying policies that 
would enable a sustainable debt position to emerge. 
However, commercial banks, by slowing the growth of 
their lending to LDCs and by building up their capital 
and reserves have succeeded in reducing their loan-to-
capital ratios from the peak levels of 1982. The 
experience of the past two years suggests strongly that 
the strategy being pursued in respect of LDC debt 
problems is succeeding and the threat to the international 
financial system that was being felt two years ago is 
waning. With the renewal of economic growth in the 
industrial world in the past two years and, more recently, 
moderating interest rates, those borrowing countries that 
have adopted export-oriented adjustment policies are 
experiencing substantial gains. Nothwithstanding 
progress to date it seems likely that further restriction of 
domestic demand in LDCs will be required if debt-export 
ratios are to reach more tolerable levels, even if interest 
rates and the dollar ease back. The only possibility for 
growth in these countries seems to lie with increasing 
the supply of ex portables and the demand for them from 
industrial countries. However, doubts must remain as to 
whether the domestic authorities will be able to sustain 
the appropriate restrictive stance with respect to 
domestic demand for long enough. 
6. The Medium-Term Outlook 
The discussion to date provides a context within which 
projections for the medium-term development of 
international economic activity can be considered. 
Integrated medium-term assessments for the international 
economy are undertaken primarily by large international 
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agencies. This section examines results of medium-term 
scenarios undertaken by the IMF, 1 and published in its 
World Development Report, of April 1985 (and 
supplement of October 1985) in the light of issues raised 
in earlier sections, and in terms of variables most likely 
to influence the development of the Irish economy over 
the next five years. 
The "baseline" scenario is constructed on the basis of 
policies for individual countries regarded as "most likely" 
to be applied by the IMF. In summary the main 
assumptions are that in the United States fiscal measures 
implemented over the period 1986-88 will have the 
effect, by 1990, of lowering the federal government 
deficit relative to current services estimates by 1 per cent 
of GNP in that year. This outcome would represent 
approximately a half-way house in the achievement of 
the administration's proposals. Monetary policy is 
expected to be consistent with the avoidance of an 
acceleration in the underlying rate of inflation. For the 
other major industrial countries it is assumed that further 
fiscal deflation over the period 1987-90 would equal 
approximately 1 per cent of GNP. No significant further 
reduction in the rate of growth of monetary aggregates 
is expected after 1986. It is also assumed that industrial 
countries will continue to seek improvements in the 
functioning of markets. However, no significant change 
in trend productivity is expected. Some further shift in 
income shares in Europe away from wages is expected 
to result in some improvement in employment prospects. 
Owing to the debt problem of LDCs continued fiscal 
restriction is envisaged for the remainder of the decade. 
The expected outcome for industrial countries of these 
policy settings is summarised in Table 1.6. Some 
continuing absorption of economic slack is expected. 
However, this would be concentrated outside the US and 
Japan where unemployment rates would remain almost 
unchanged, but might be sufficient to reduce unemploy-
ment in other OECD countries, taken together, by 1 
percentage point. The IMF express the view that since 
the further fiscal retrenchment that is projected for 
European countries involves relatively small contractions 
some acceleration of growth rates may be expected. We 
would have some doubts about this being the case. 
However, it is our view that further retrenchment in 
Europe is unlikely. Indeed some relaxation of fiscal policy 
seems likely. In these circumstances we believe that the 
outcome would be as the IMF suggests. In addition some 
of the recent improvements in profitability that have 
occurred in Europe should encourage expansion of 
economic activity in the second half of the decade. 
Inflation is expected to level off at about 3% per cent 
for the remainder of the decade. However, some change 
in the pattern may occur with some small acceleration 
in the US as the value of the dollar falls, offset by further 
reductions in the rate of inflation in Europe. Real interest 
rates have remained extraordinarily high by reference to 
earlier experience and there is no single convincing 
explanation for what has happened. As regards the 
1. A more general assessment of medium-term prospects is contained 
in the National Institute Economic Review, November 1985. There 
appears to be little difference between the two assessments. 
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factors that are thought to have contributed to this 
lingering inflationary expectations, fiscal deficits, and the 
effects of certain taxation changes on the propensity to 
invest in the US - it is expected that pressure from these 
in the second half of the 1980s will be weaker compared 
with the first half. But they are still expected to be above 
the historical trend at the end of the decade; in fact, 
about half way between that and the levels recorded in 
1983-84. As regards exchange rate developments the 
assumption contained in the !MF scenario is that there 
will be a real depreciation of the US and Canadian dollars 
of 5 per cent per annum during 1987-90. 
In addition to the "baseline" scenario the !MF Report 
considers a number of variants. The most interesting from 
an Irish perspective are those based on "better" and 
"worse" policies in industrial countries. (These scenarios 
in general involve movements towards more (less) 
desirable positions respectively in terms of Table 1.6 
above). Compared with the baseline "better" involves 
more fiscal restraint in the US and systematic implemen-
tation of structural policies in other industrial countries. 
Specifically it is assumed that in the US cuts in 
Government expenditure in 1986-88 result in a fall in the 
budget deficit (relative to current services projections) 
TABLE 1.6: Industrial Countries' Medium-Term Prospects 
7982 
OUTPUT GROWTH 
Industrial Countries -0.2 
of which: United States -2.1 
GNP DEFLATOR 
Industrial Countries 7.2 
of which: United States 6.0 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
Seven Major Industrial Countries 7.9 
of which: United States 9.7 
U.S. DOLLAR 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 12.5 
INTEREST RATES (three month LIBOR)* 
Real terms 6.0 
Nominal terms 13.2 
WORLD TRADE 
Volume -2.5 
Unit Value (in US dollars) -3.9 
*London Inter-Bank Offer Rate. 
Source: World Economic Outlook, April 1985, and October 1985 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 
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of about 21/2 per cent of GNP. Half the reduction is 
effected in 1986 and the rest is phased over 1987-88. The 
major economic benefits arise from a substantial decline 
in real interest rates resulting in higher and more stable 
output growth (See Table 1.7). By contrast "worse" 
policies assume that no significant measures are adopted 
to correct the fiscal imbalance in the US. According to 
this scenario the US deficit would rise from $200 billion 
in 1985 to $358 billion in 1990 (6 per cent of GNP). 
Furthermore, it is assumed that no furthe·r progress is 
made towards implementing policies to reduce structural 
unemployment. Under this scenario the combination of 
monetary restraint and additional fiscal expansion in the 
US produces further increases in real interest rates and 
a sharp downturn in US economic activity. This is 
reflected in deteriorating economic performance in 
Europe. In summary, this scenario involves a higher and 
more variable level of interest rates in industrial countries, 
less stable economic policies and sharp recession in the 
US that is transmitted to other industrial countries and 
which also has adverse consequences for the developing 
countries. A summary of these variants relative to the 
baseline scenario is contained in Table 1.7. 
7987-90 
7983 7984 7985 7986 Average 
Per Cent Change 
2.6 4.9 2.8 3.1 3.1 
3.7 6.8 2.6 3.3 2.9 
4.9 4.1 3.9 3.7 3.7 
3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 4.5 
As Per Cent of Labour Force 
8.3 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.2 
9.6 7.5 7.3 7.1 6.9 
Per Cent Change 
3.9 8.3 4.5 -1.7 -4.1 
Per Cent 
5.8 7.2 4.5 4.1 3.5 
9.6 10.8 9.5 8.4 7.3 
Per Cent Change 
2.3 8.5 3.5 4.3 5.3 
-4.6 -1.9 -2.0 4.8 7.5 
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TABLE 1.7: Summary of Alternative Medium-Term Scenarios for Industrial Economies 





Measures to reduce US 
structural fiscal deficit by 1 
per cent of GNP; in other 
countries, to reduce structural 
fiscal deficit by a further 
1 per cent of GDP 
Structural policies that slightly 
decrease unemployment in 
Europe but do not raise trend 
productivity growth 
"Better Policies" in 
Industrial Countries 
"Worse Policies" in 
Industrial Countries 
Measures to reduce ratio of USNo measures to correct fiscal 
fiscal deficit to GDP by 2V2 imbalance in the United 
per cent; sharper reduction States, Canada, France or Italy 
in Canada; other countries 
same as base Ii ne 
Structural policies that are No progress on structural 
more successful in reducing policies to reduce 
unemployment and enhancing unemployment in Europe 
productivity growth in Europe 
Protection No change in present policy Liberalization of import Tighter import restrictions, 
stance, except elimination of restrictions, resulting in V2 resulting in V2 percentage 
voluntary restraints on exports percentage point rise in export point fall in export volumes of 
of Japanese automobiles to thevolumes of developing developing countries 
United States countries 
Policies in developing 
countries, 1986-90 
Average ratio of fiscal deficit Half that of 1982-84 average 
to GDP 
Average annual rate of credit Reduced by more than half 
expansion from 1982-84 rates 
Real effective exchange rates No change after 1985 
Average real interest rates High by historical standards; 
no change after 1985 
Economic variables in (In per cent) 
industrial countries 
Average rate of growth of real 
GNP, 1987-90 3.1 
Average real interest 1987-90 
rates (3 months LIBOR) 3.9 
Changes in real effective 5 per cent depreciation 
exchange rate of the US per annum 
dollar vis-a-vis European 
currencies and Japanese Yen, 
1987-90 
GNP deflator 1987-90 3.7 per year 
Other variables in world (Average annual change, 
economy 1987-90, in per cent) 
World prices of manufactures 
(in US dollars) 7.5 
Terms of trade of non-oil 
primary commodities 0.1 
Same policies as baseline 
Same policies as baseline 
Same policies as baseline 
Same policies as baseline 
(In per cent) 
3.5 
3.5 
5 per cent depreciation 
per annum 
3.7 per year 
(Average annual change, 
1987-90, in per cent) 
7.5 
0.4 
Source: World Economic Outlook, April and October 1985, IMF, Washington, DC 
Same policies as baseline 
Same policies as baseline 
Same policies as baseline 
Same policies as baseline 
(In per cent) 
2.0 
5.0 
18.5 per cent depreciation 
in 1987, no change in 1988-90 
3.6 in 1987, 3.1 in 1988, 3.6 
in 1989, 4.5 in 1990 
(Average annual change, 
1987-90, in per cent) 
7.0 
-2.8 
II. THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY TO 1990: 
A MEDIUM-TERM SCENARIO 
1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this Part is to develop a medium-
term scenario for the Irish economy embracing prospects 
for growth of national output (Section 6), employment 
(Section 7) and developments of income and 
expenditures (Section 8), up to the end of this decade. 
A number of steps are undertaken in preparing this 
scenario. First, the overall performance of the economy 
during the first five years of the decade in terms of GNP 
growth is described and developments in the main 
economic sectors are discussed (Section 2). Next the 
various influences on the economy of developments in 
the international economy (Section 3) and of domestic 
policies (Section 4) during this time are described and 
an attempt is made to evaluate their significance. It will 
be apparent that the conclusions reached in these latter 
sections must be tentative and in many cases the 
quantitative significance of specific effects can only be 
judged very imprecisely. However, it is felt that this 
analysis is necessary at least in order to identify and 
highlight changes that might be expected to occur as 
regards the future implementation of policy, which is 
discussed in Section 5, and to provide a context within 
which the assessment of medium-term prospects for the 
international economy (Part I) might be expected to 
impinge on domestic economic prospects. A detailed set 
of tables underpinning the scenario is contained in Annex 
1. This has been compiled to illustrate consistency within 
the overall framework and is not presented as a forecast 
of individual variables or components. In evaluating and 
discussing the future implementation of policies (Section 
5) the predominant focus is with macro-economic issues. 
It is hoped to pay greater attention to the role and 
significance that might be played by sectoral policies in 
future issues. 
2. Review of Output Growth 1980-1985 
In the context of developing medium-term projections 
it is more appropriate to begin from an assessment of 
output and the factors which could be expected to 
influence its development rather than from an 
examination of components of expenditure. A broad 
sectoral classification of output growth (Table 2.1) shows 
that in aggregate there has been on average virtually no 
growth during the first half of this decade. This contrasts 
sharply with the 1970s when GNP expanded at an annual 
rate of about 3Vz per cent in each of the two halves of 
the decade. 
The collapse reflects a sharp slowdown in the output 
of most of the main economic sectors and a continuation 
of the acceleration in net factor payments abroad. This 
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latter item, comprising principally payments of interest 
on foreign public debt and payments of profits, 
dividends, royalties and other interest abroad, had 
already increased sharply in the second half of the 1970s, 
sufficiently to negate the acceleration which occured in 
the growth of domestic product at that time. Only in the 
agricultural sector was growth in the first half of the 
1980s, on average, higher than in the previous five years. 
In industry the average annual rate of expansion slowed 
to less than half of what it was in the 1975-1980 period. 
In the services sectors the slowdown was even more 
pronou need. 
The pattern of growth within the past five years has 
not been consistently weak. In fact it is quite similar to 
that in other countries (see Table 1.3). A trough in 
economic activity was reached here in 1982 when GNP 
declined by 21/4 per cent; this corresponds also to the 
bottom of the cycle in the OECD area as a whole; the 
subsequent recovery to 1984 involved a turnabout in 
GNP of about 4V2, the same magnitude as other 
countries. However, the rate of growth of GNP has 
generally been lower than elsewhere, this appears to be 
related to the growth in net factor payments here: 
recovery in growth of GDP was comparable with the 
experience of the OECD area as a whole as was the 
slowing down in activity again in 1985. 
Just as the pattern of the aggregate rate of growth has 
not been homogenous over the past five years neither 
has the experience of individual sectors which comprise 
the aggregate been closely similar. There were sharp 
fluctuations around the average rate of output growth 
in agriculture, (including forestry and fishing) of 3V2 per 
cent, ranging from an increase of 12% per cent in 1982 
to an estimated decline of 4 V2 per cent in 1981 . Growth 
of output in industry slowed down from the beginning 
of the decade and declined by 1 V2 per cent in 1982. After 
that there was accelerating growth to 71/4 per cent in 
1984. However, this was not maintained in 1985 when 
output is estimated to have expanded by 3 per cent. 
Among the services sectors the pattern of output growth 
has been more uniformly weak. A shallow cycle seems 
to have occurred in the distribution, transport and 
communication sector and the "other services" sector. 
However, there is no indication that these sectors are 
moving towards the vitality which they showed during 
the 1970s. In Public Administration the pattern has been 
one of growing weakness; largely the effect of the 
budgetary stance. When the various experiences of the 
sectors are combined, the overall effect, in terms of GDP 
growth, was 11/4 per cent during each of the first three 
years of the decade. In 1984 there was a sharp pick-up 
to 4% per cent but again in 1985 growth fell to about 
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2 per cent. Because of increases in net factor payments 
GNP growth was even lower than that for GDP, it 
showed falls of 2\4 and 1 V2 per cent respectively in 1982 
and 1983 and the recovery in 1984 amounted to 2V2 per 
cent. In 1985 GNP on an output basis rose by only V2 
per cent. 
3. Influences of the International Economy 
In this section and in the next an attempt is made to 
isolate the major factors that have shaped the pattern of 
activity described in the previous section. A number of 
channels of influence can be identified between the 
international economy and the domestic one: 
(i) financial influences associated with international 
interest rate and exchange rate movements; 
(ii) foreign investment flows; 
(iii) fluctuations in international trade associated with 
changes in demand in Ireland's trading partners; 
(iv) institutional factors arising principally through the 
effects of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC 
on Irish agriculture. 
While these influences may be easily identified their 
quantitative significance would be extremely difficult to 
establish at any point in time. Moreover, the consequ-
ences of a combination of these influences interacting 
with each other could be greater than the sum of indivi-
dual effects taken in isolation. And the effects also in-
fluence domestic policy so that to some extent the an-
alytical dichotomy used here is in practice artificial. 
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Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Movements 
The significance of interest and exchange rate 
influences, let it be said is far from clear. However, the 
magnitude of a number of features - involving changes 
in real interest rates and currency values in the past 
several years points to a potentially considerable 
influence on domestic economic activity. High and rising 
real interest rates would be expected to adversely 
influence certain categories of expenditure, notably 
consumers' expenditure on durable goods, physical 
capital formation and residential investment. Indeed all 
of these categories of expenditure have fallen in the past 
five years and as a consequence output has been cut 
back, particularly that of building and construction (see 
Table 2.2). However, it is not possible to allocate a 
precise proportion of the reduction to the effect of higher 
real interest rates as compared with other influences such 
as depressed demand resulting from falling real incomes 
and deflationary fiscal policies. Another consequence of 
the upward trend in real interest rates that marked most 
of the past five years has been the effect of retarding 
progress in reducing the imbalance in the public 
finances; indirectly the result has been additional 
pressure to raise taxes and reduce public expenditure. 
Even at their present level real interest rates impose a 
considerable obstacle to achieving a speedy adjustment 
to the public finances. Additionally they have resulted 
in rising net factor payments abroad and a consequent 
rising in the balance of payments deficit above what it 
would be. 
TABLE 2.1: Growth in Output by Sector of Origin 1970-1985 (Per Cent) 
7970-75 7975-80 7980-85 7987 7982 7983 7934e 1985e 
Average 
Agricl.'.llture, Forestry and Fishing 5.7 -1.2 3.5 -4.5 12.7 1.3 12V2 -2Vz 
Industry 3.1 6.4 2.9 2.7 -1.5 3.2 7% 3 
Distribution, Transport and 
Communication 3.5 5.1 0.3 0.8 -2.8 -3.1 V2 
Public Administration and Defence 5.2 4.5 0.5 2.8 2.2 0.5 0 -V2 
Other Domestic Services 4.5 5.0 1.9 2.3 2.5 0.5 1 3,4 2V, 
GDP at constant (1980) factor cost 4.1 4.5 2.1 1.5 1.2 1.0 4314 2 
Net Factor Flows with Rest of World 1 (-0.5) (-1.2) (-2.0) (-0.9) (-3.5) (-1.5) (-23,4) (-1V,) 
GNP at Constant (1980) Factor Cost 3.6 3.5 0.2 0.6 -2.3 -0.5 2V2 V, 
1. Per cent contribution to GNP at factor cost. 
Note: Gross National Product (GNP) at constant factor cost differs from GNP at constant market prices. The difference is taxes on expenditure 
less subsidies. Moreover the estimates for GNP at constant market prices measured from output data differ from GNP measured from 
expenditure data and growth rates extracted from these different measures of GNP also vary; short-term forecasts generally are based on 
GNP at constant market prices measured from expenditure data. 
7979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Growth rates in: 
GNP at constant factor cost 
(output data) 3.9 2.3 0.6 -2.3 -0.5 
GNP at constant market prices 
(output data) 3.3 0.8 0.8 -2.8 -1.2 
GNP at constant market prices 
(expenditure data) 2.7 2.7 1.8 -2.3 -1.4 
Source: National Income & Expenditure 1983 and 1984, Stationery Office, Dublin (1985). Estimates for 1984 and 1985•. 
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TABLE 2.2: Growth of Industrial Cross Output 1980-1985 
7980 
Category Gross Output at 
factor prices 
£ million 
Electricity, Gas & Water 217 
Building & Construction 830 
Transportable Goods Industries 2,064.7 









7982 7983 7934e 198Se 
Per cent change 
3.2 1.9 -3.5 10 
-6.6 -15.5 -8.3 - 4 \4 
0.1 6.8 13.2 4 
-1.1 0.5 7.2 3 
Source: National Accounts ESA, 1984 Eurostat, Luxembourg 1984. Estimates for 1984 and 1985. 
The rise of the dollar until the Spring of 1985 is perhaps 
the most noted feature of foreign exchange markets in 
the past two years or so. However, other significant 
changes have been under way. Figure 2.1 shows Ireland's 
real trade weighted exchange rate index and movements 
against major currencies and currency groups. This index 
takes into account the effects of relative inflation rates 
as well as changes in nominal exchange rates. In 
aggregate the index indicates a real appreciation of some 
17 per cent between the first half of 1980 and the second 
half of 1985. However, most of the rise occurred from 
the second half of 1981 and was concentrated in the 
following two years. In effect this means that in Ireland 
relative price performance or the profitability of domestic 
production is falling. 1 Examination of the trend against 
major currencies in the index suggests that matters might 
be worse than indicated by the aggregate index. There 
has been a consistent real appreciation against EMS 
currencies since the commencement of the exchange 
rate regime; since the first half of 1980 the rise has been 
close to 30 per cent. Competitive gains which were made 
up to the first half of 1981, against sterling - there was 
a real depreciation of 20 per cent - probably offset the 
effects of losses on EMS markets. However, since that 
date there has been a real appreciation against sterling 
too amounting to one-third by the first half of 1985. 
Against the US dollar there have been competitive gains 
resulting from the general tendency for a real 
depreciation to occur, amounting to about 15 per cent 
in the five years up to the first half of 1985. Since then 
the pattern has been narrowing. However, we have 
doubts about the extent of the net benefit to the economy 
resulting from the appreciation of the dollar against the 
Irish currency. The reasons for these doubts lie in the 
fact that there are other channels through which the 
dollar can influence activity besides export profitability. 
One of these channels is the effect of nominal exchange 
rate changes on domestic prices. While a significantly 
higher proportion of imports is denominated in sterling 
than the dollar, an important basic commodity input 
oil is denominated in that currency. Although data are 
not available to sustain the view, it is possible that the 
final effect on domestic prices of oil price changes, due 
to the strengthening of the dollar for much of the last 
five years may be quite important. Additionally there is 
the nature of Ireland's export trade with the US. It is 
1. See note to Figure 2.1 for an explanation. 
FIGURE 2.1: Real Trade Weighted Exchange Rate Index 
1980-1985 (Ql 1979 = 100) 

















Note: The index shows what has happened to the international 
purchasing power of the Irish pound compared with the 
domestic purchasing power of the Irish pound. A rising index 
means that the international purchasing power of the Irish pound 
is greater than the domestic purchasing power. In other words 
that Irish price performance is deteriorating. In constructing this 
index consumer prices have been used to adjust nominal 
exchange rate indices. 
Source: Quarterly Bulletin, Central Bank of Ireland 
Main Economic Indicators, Paris OECD. 
heavily concentrated in chemicals. Together with office 
machinery and data processing and electronic 
equipment, these three categories account for a third of 
merchandise export trade with the US. However, many 
of the firms engaged were highly profitable before the 
depreciation against the dollar. Moreover the demand 
for these products is probably not determined primarily 
by price and in any event the domestic cost content of 
the output of the industries is low so that the net addition 
to profitability (measured in dollar terms) from exchange 
rate movements is probably quite small. All this is to say 
that whatever the positive effects on growth of the 
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economy from the appreciation of the US dollar these 
are likely to be reduced by negative influences and 
greatly outweighed by the effects of other exchange rate 
changes over the past five years. 
Foreign Investment Flows and Fluctuations in 
International Demand 
There is a relationship between the development of 
OECD imports and Ireland's industrial exports and 
output, although this is not entirely clear from the short 
sample presented in Table 2.3. In any event, industrial 
export growth has generally outstripped the growth in 
world trade in manufactures and cannot be explained 
in terms of international demand factors alone. The 
growth in market share which has occurred in most years 
comes principally through the addition of more and more 
capacity to supply foreign markets. An important element 
in this expansion has been foreign investment in Ireland. 
Over the past five years the pattern of this investment 
too has been sharply influenced by conditions in the 
international economy. The importance of this source 
of growth in manufacturing output can be highlighted 
(Figure 2.2) by examining the contribution of various 
industrial sectors to manufacturing output. For example, 
of the cumulative growth in manufacturing output of 34 
per cent since 1980, 17V2 percentage points have been 
contributed by the chemicals sector and 15114 per cent 
by the metals and engineering branch (especially office 
machinery and data processing equipment). The food 
sector contributed only 4 percentage points to the 
cumulative growth while the rest of manufacturing 
experienced a cumulative decline in output. These 
growth sectors are closely related to the sectors involved 
in the bulk of new foreign investment projects and their 
rapid expansion in 1983 and 1984 was probably the 
result of the high levels of foreign investment relative to 
GNP which occurred earlier in the decade (see Table 
2.3). Any assessment of medium-term prospects for 
industrial export growth would have to take account of 
this aspect of the influence of international developments 
on the Irish economy. A detailed account of the trend 
determinants and prospects for foreign investment is 
contained in a special article to this issue. 
The CAP and Agricultural Output 
As regards the agricultural sector, particularly severe 
problems' confronting the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) of the European Community, have meant a sharp 
MEDIUM-TERM OUTLOOK: 1986 - 1990 
FIGURE 2.2: Growth in manufacturing output: 
Contribution from industrial sectors 1980-1985 














Source: Monthly Index of Industrial Production, CSO Dublin. 
reduction in the profit margins from agricultural 
production. Since 1983, CAP expenditure has been at 
the limit of the "own resources", now comprising 1.4 
per cent of Community VAT receipts. Ad hoe measures 
to avoid financial collapse of the policy have involved 
a reduction in price support and a tendency towards 
quota restrictions in certain products. One effect of these 
pressures has been that the internal terms of trade for 
agricultural products (i.e., the relationship between 
output and input prices) have mov.ed sharply against 
producers since 1983 (Table 2.4). Another has been to 
curtail output, especially of milk. The effect of growing 
uncertainties regarding the CAP have been compounded 
by the continuance of domestic factors that have 
TABLE 2.3: Foreign Trade in Manufactures and Industrial Output Growth 1980-1985 (Per Cent Change) 
Average 
7980-
7985 7980 7987 7982 7983 7984 7985 
Total OECD Imports Manufactures, Volume 5.4 3.3 1.2 -0.8 7.0 15.3 7\4 
UK Imports Manufactures, Volume 6.6 -0.9 1.5 8.4 12.0 10.5 8314 
I re land's Industrial Exports 12.6 14.9 10.6 9.0 15.2 20 61,4 
Transportable Goods Industries Output 3.9 -1.2 1.6 0.1 6.8 13.2 4 
Foreign fixed asset investment in Industry in Ireland 
(as per cent of GNP) 1.8 3.1 3.0 1.6 0.5 1.4 1.3 
Sources: Economic Outlook, OECD, Paris. National Income and Expenditure, Stationery Office, Dublin. IDA, Annual Report, Dublin 1984. 
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TABLE 2.4: Output, Inputs and Income in Agriculture, 1980-1985 
7980 7987 7982 7983 7984 7985° 
Gross Agricultural Output (£ Million) 1,710.8 1,986.4 2,280.1 2,553.9 2,834.8 2,738 
Volume Index (1980 = 100) 100 99.7 106.0 109.4 118.7 118.1 
Price Index (1980 = 100) 100 116.5 125.8 136.5 139.6 135.6 
Total Inputs of Materials and Services (£ Million) 760 919.1 1,011.4 1,157.1 1,260.7 1,311.1 
Volume Index (1980 = 100) 100 105.6 105.2 111.0 110.6 112.7 
Price Index (1980 = 100) 100 114.5 126.5 137.2 150.0 153.2 
Gross Agricultural Product at Factor Cost1 (£ Million) 942.9 1,086.0 1,312.2 1,470.7 1,682.3 1,565.8 
Volume Index (1980 = 100) 100 94.8 106.0 106.9 120.0 113.7 
Price Index (1980 = 100) 100 121.5 131.3 145.9 148.7 145.8 
Terms of Trade (1980 = 100) 100 103.1 102.5 100.4 96 91.3 
Income from Self Employment2 (£ Million) 663.5 785.8 975.9 1,113.2 1,303.8 1,173.5 
1. Equals Gross Agricultural Output less inputs of materials and services plus subsidies less agricultural levies. 
2. Equals Gross Agricultural Product at factor cost less depreciation and wages and salary payments. 
Source: Estimated Output, Input and Income in Agriculture 7980-1984, CSO July 1985. 
Own estimate for 1985. 
militated against the achievement of long-term growth 
in Irish agriculture. Over the past five years growth of 
output in agriculture has fluctuated - as it is wont to 
do. Especially favourable weather conditions operated 
in 1982 and again in 1984 boosting crop production and 
milk output (in 1982). In 1·984 cattle output also rose very 
sharply. The policy issues arising from the need to reform 
the CAP are discussed at length in the special article on 
that subject. Specific assumptions regarding the CAP in 
the second half of the 1980s are discussed below. 
In conclusion it appears that the various channels 
through which the international economy influences the 
domestic economy have acted negatively on Irish 
economic growth during the first half of the decade. It 
also seems to us unlikely that the full consequences of 
the downturn in foreign investment, that occurred in 
earlier years have yet been felt and future growth in 
industrial output may be restricted as a result. As regards 
the agricultural sector, while the vagaries of Irish weather 
may be a more important determinant of output than the 
CAP there can be little doubt that the scope for growth 
in agricultural output within the framework of the CAP 
as it has been evolving in most recent years is extremely 
limited. 
4. Influences of Domestic Policies 
While external factors have had a significant influence 
on the course of economic growth in the past five years 
there is little doubt that the role of domestic policies and 
other developments at home have been of great 
importance. A primary policy concern over the past five 
years has been to gain control over widening imbalances 
in the public finances and to reduce these. Different 
aspects of the problem have been focused on from time 
to time: from the magnitude of current budget deficits 
to the scale of total borrowing by the public sector; the 
size and growth of the national debt; the proportion of 
the debt denominated in foreign currencies; the cost of 
debt service or foreign debt service. Regardless of which 
aspect is examined the pattern over the past five years 
is one of continuous deterioration up to about two years 
ago and of virtual standstill or limited progress since (see 
Table 2.5). 
The several aspects of the public finances out Ii ned 
above are, of course, inextricably interrelated. Moreover, 
there is an internal dynamic relationship in the process 
of borrowing and debt accumulation which, once 
established, becomes mutually reinforcing and 
TABLE 2.5: Summary of Public Finances, 1980-1985 (As per cent of GNP) 
7980 7987 7982 7983 7984 7985 
Current Budget Deficit 6.0 7.4 8.0 7.1 7.1 8.2 
Exchequer Borrowing for Capital Purposes 7.5 8.5 7.8 5.9 5.4 4.8 
Borrowing by State-Sponsored Bodies and Local 
Authorities1 3.8 4.4 4.2 3.9 3.9 2.7 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) 17.3 20.3 20.0 16.9 16.4 15.7 
£ Million 1,558 2,205 2,466 2,277 2,400 2,457 
National Debt Outstanding at December2 76.8 83.6 93.1 105.7 114.0 120.0 
External Public Debt outstanding at December 33.2 44.4 53.2 63.2 65.7 69.8 
of which Exchequer 24.5 35.0 42.9 51.8 54.0 57.8 
State-Sponsored Bodies 8.7 9.4 10.3 11.4 11.7 12.0 
Interest Payments Abroad on Public Debt. £ Million 233 370 648 743 891 950 
As a per cent of GNP 2.5 3.3 4.9 5.1 5.5 5.5 
1. Does not include borrowing for current purposes. 
2. Excludes liabilities under the Telecommunications Capital Acts and other capitalised liabilities associated with the local Loans Fund which 
are contained in the National Debt Statement of the Finance Accounts. 
Sources: Quarterly Bulletin, Central Bank of Ireland, Finance Accounts, Stationery Office, Dublin. 
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progressively more difficult to overcome. Of course it is 
not known what debt/GNP ratios are sustainable, nor is 
there any well determined relationship between the 
debt/GNP ratio and the rate of interest on Government 
debt. However, there is no dispute that continuous rapid 
upward movement in the debt/GNP ratio is not 
sustainable. As a working hypothesis the aim of a 
stabilised debt/GNP ratio can be adopted as a minimum 
target for the public finances. 
If a stable or stabilised debt/GNP ratio is to be achieved 
conditions must be established in respect of borrowing. 
These depend upon the relationship between interest 
rates on Government borrowing and the rate of change 
in GNP. Of course GNP growth will (in turn) be 
influenced by the uses to which borrowed funds are put 
and the manner in which public spending is financed. 
If a constant debt/GNP ratio is to be achieved and 
maintained then borrowing must equal interest payments 
if the interest rate on Government borrowing equals the 
rate of change of nominal GNP; if the interest rate 
exceeds the change in GNP, borrowing must be less than 
interest payments; if the rate of interest is lower than the 
rate of change in GNP, borrowing may exceed interest 
payments. 1 
The relationship between GNP growth and the implicit 
real interest rate2 paid on Government debt since the 
beginning of the decade is depicted in Figure 2.3. In both 
1980 and 1981 even though GNP growth was weak it 
exceeded the real rate of interest on Government debt, 
which was substantially negative in these two years. 
However, since then the real interest rate has risen 
continuously and became substantially positive in 1984 
and 1985, whereas economic growth has been much 
slower to develop. 
The relationship between the PSBR and national debt 
interest payments since 1980 is shown in Figure 2.4. 
Since the beginning of the decade there has been a 
tendency for the PSBR to converge towards the 
magnitude of debt interest payments. However, the 
process has been slow. In 1985 it remains substantially 
incomplete even though a PSBR of less than the 
magnitude of interest payments would be required to 
stabilise the debt/GNP ratio. The reduction which has 
occurred in the PSBR arises both from a fall in public 
capital spending (net of resources) from 13 per cent of 
GNP in 1981 to 8 per cent in 1985 and from an increasing 
surplus on current (non-interest) expenditure amounting 
to 3.5 per cent in 1985 compared with balance in both 
1980 and 1981. 
The evolution of the public finances has consequences 
for economic activity which need careful discussion 
before assessing the medium-term prospects. There are 
several channels through which growth may be affected: 
(i) demand influences; 
(ii) resource allocative effects; 
(iii) supply factors and 
(iv) financial and monetary aspects. 
1. See Annex 2 for an elucidation. 
2. That is the nominal interest rate deflated by the GNP deflator. 
It is assumed that the rate of interest net of tax is not significantly 
different from the gross rate of interest. 
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While it is possible in theory to recognise separately these 
channels, in practice it is extremely difficult and in any 
case some changes will have multiple effects. 
Demand Influences 
Even though progress has been slow in terms of 
stabilising the debt/GNP ratio there has been a 
withdrawal of fiscal demand (excluding debt interest). 1 
Between 1981 and 1985 this amounted to 8.7 percentage 
points of GNP, over 2 per cent per annum, in these four 
years. The reduction in stimulus comprised a fall 
equivalent to about 5 percentage points of GNP in 
respect of borrowing for capital spending and 3 V2 
percentage points in respect of borrowing for current 
spending (excluding interest payments). In the context 
of considering demand consequences the distribution of 
the reduction in stimulus is relevant to the extent that 
a different multiplier may attach to particular types of 
expenditure or taxation. Econometric evidence suggests 
that the multiplier in respect of expenditure on building 
and construction is significantly above that for other 
forms of investment, which may be quite low (about 0.7 
and 0.1 respectively). This along with the composition 
of the decline in public capital spending suggests that 
less than half of the fiscal contraction of 5 percentage 
points of GNP attributable to capital spending might have 
FIGURE 2.3: Real interest rates, growth rates and 
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Sources: Budgets (various years); Finance Accounts (various years). 
1. Interest payments on domestically denominated debt probably 
have some influence on demand. However, much of the uptake of 
borrowing is by institutions such as pension funds and banks. It is 
unclear in what precise way demand would be effected as a result of 
higher interest payments to such institutions. It is possible, for example, 
that interest income has simply been reinvested in order to contribute 
towards the real value of financial assets. In these circumstances the 
link with demand would be tenuous. For the purposes of the exercise 
being undertaken here it is assumed that ignoring these debt interest 
payments will not significantly bias the results. 
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FIGURE 2.4: Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
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1. Equals gross capital spending minus surplus on non-interest current 
account. 
Sources: Budget Statements (various years), National Income & 
Expenditure, Stationery Office, Dublin. 
actually found its way into GNP. Of the emerging surplus 
on current spending (excluding debt interest payments) 
amounting to 3V2 percentage points of GNP in 1985, 
about 3 percentage points are accounted for by an 
increase in the tax ratio (from 32.9 per cent of GNP to 
36 per cent). Once again leakages in the form of reduced 
imports, or savings, would reduce the effect on demand 
that this had to perhaps 1 V2 to. 2 per cent of GNP. 
The overall conclusion is that the consequences of 
withdrawal of fiscal demand since 1981 may have 
reduced growth in GNP by perhaps 4 per cent over the 
period, around % per cent per annum. A corrollary is 
that the reduction in stimulus has had a substantial effect 
in reducing the current balance of payments deficit by 
reducing imports. 
Resource Allocative Effects 
Tentative though estimates of the demand 
consequences of fiscal policy on GNP growth must be, 
the quantification of its effects through other channels 
is even more hazardous. An area that has received 
increasing attention - at least in public discussion -
involves the effect on growth of misallocations, thought 
to be associated with fiscal policy. A possible important 
distortion arises from the effect that a rising burden of 
personal taxation has on wages viewed as a cost to 
employers and as income to the employees. Since 1980 
(see Figure 2.5) there has been a continuation in the 
divergence between real non-agricultural labour costs 
and real disposable income per employee which was 
observed for most of the 1970s. There is I ittle doubt that 
employees attempt to gain compensation for increases 
in the taxation burden through higher wages. There is 
greater uncertainity about the extent to which they 
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FIGURE 2.5: Real Labour Costs and Real Income per 
non-agricultural employees 1980-1985 
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FIGURE 2.6: Competitiveness & Capacity Output 































Source: Constructed from material contained in A Medium-Term 
Analysis of Fiscal Policy (Paper 122) ESRI. 
succeed in avoiding the burden or of the ultimate 
consequences in terms of factor substitution. However, 
there is evidence that deteriorations in competitiveness 
- measured predominantly in terms of relative wage 
variables - lead to losses in capacity output (Bradley, 
1985). Figure 2.6 shows what has happened to one 
measure of competitiveness - which has been found to 
be statistically related to output growth - over the past 
five years and the effect that this in turn would be 
expected to have on capacity output. It appears that any 
upward pressure on wage costs arising from attempts to 
avoid the growing burd.en of taxation have been more 
than offset by other factors, especially productivity 
16 
growth - whether autonomous or induced - to leave 
this indicator of competitiveness, on an improving course 
over the past five yers. 1 There are other ways in which 
taxation changes may have influenced growth: for 
example, it has been alleged that changes in marginal 
tax rates (in conjunction with social welfare changes) 
have resulted in disincentives to enterprise. There may 
be some point in this argument but establishing it 
empirically is another matter. Another argument is that 
the tax system has discriminated against the use of labour 
and favoured the use of capital. However, this argument 
relates to the mix of inputs used to produce a given 
output and not to the level of output itself. 2 On balance 
it appears to us that distortions and misallocations 
associated with economic policies in the past five years 
may have made matters worse than they might otherwise 
have been. However, they do not contribute significantly 
to the explanation of why growth has been lower in the 
first half of the 1980s compared with the second half of 
the 'seventies. 
Supply Factors 
Borrowing for capital purposes constitutes a substantial 
part of the PSBR. An important question relates to the 
effects these programmes of spending have had on 
output growth through augmenting the productive 
capacity or supply of output of the economy. The pattern 
of public capital spending over the last decade (see Figure 
2.7) shows "economic" investment (mainly in industry 
which accounts for three-quarters of spending under this 
1. See above for a discussion of the composition of the exchange 
rate changes, and some possible manifestations of this on com-
petitiveness. 
2. There may be a considerable secondary effect on output growth 
through lower demand multipliers associated with an altered factor mix. 
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head) rising steadily during the second half of the 1970s 
then stabilising before falling from about 1982. 
Investment in //productive// infrastructure (roads, sanitary 
services, energy telecommunications) began increasing 
rapidly from 1978 to 1982, and has been falling since 
then. Spending on "social" infrastructure (housing, 
education, hospitals, etc.) has followed a similar pattern 
but the rate of expansion was not as rapid as in the former 
category. The question is how have these trends affected 
growth? In particular, do the changes that have occurred 
between the second half of the 'seventies and the first 
half of the 'eighties amount to a better or worse set of 
conditions from the point of view of growth? A definitive 
answer is not possible although clearly the composition 
of the changes to date - in which sectoral economic 
investments have fallen most strongly - would suggest 
a deterioration. As regards capital spending on industry, 
a number of features are depicted in Figure 2.8. Fixed 
investment and IDA grant commitments in industry are 
shown along with the contribution that manufacturing 
industry has made to both GDP and GNP for the last ten 
years. During the second half of the 1970s fixed 
investment in Industry averaged 6Y2 per cent of GNP per 
annum; grant commitments of the IDA in respect of this 
investment amounted to just over 2 per cent per annum 
on average. The contribution of manufacturing industry 
to GDP growth over the period was just over 6 
percentage points in total but rising factor payments 
abroad reduced the contribution to GNP to 311,; 
percentage points. In the first half of the 1980s grant 
commitments have, on average, been the same as in the 
previous five years; the rate of fixed investment has fallen 
to 511,; per cent of GNP on average. Nevertheless, the 
contribution of manufacturing industry to GDP remains 
unchanged at about 6 per cent. However, the 
contribution to GNP growth is much reduced to 1 Y2 
FIGURE 2.7: Index of the Volume of Public Capital Programme Expenditure 1975-1985 (base 1980 = 100) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 19ll2 
Note: Sectoral Economic Investment - Agriculture, Industry, Tourism, Fisheries & Forestry. 
Productive Infrastructure - Energy, Transport, Roads, Sanitary Services, Telecommunications 
Social Infrastructure - Housing, Education, Hospitals, etc. 
Source: Public Capital Programme 1985, Stationery Office, Dublin. 
I 9B3 19B4 1985 
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percentage points for the period 1980-1985. The causes 
of the increase in factor payments abroad is uncertain; 
but a highly significant proportion of them are 
attributable to industry. For whatever reason the effect 
of the increase in payments that has occurred is 
equivalent to a sharp reduction in the growth of supply 
associated with public investment in industry and/or a 
lowering of the national rate of return thought to be 
associated with public investment in manufacturing 
industry in the 1970s. Accordingly, in addition to the fall 
in the scale of public "economic" investment that has 
been occurring in the past five years, there may, in 
addition, be a lower rate of return to the economy upon 
such investments in recent years. 
The link between investment in 11productive 11 
infrastructure and output growth would be expected to 
be indirect and emerge as a result of raising the 
competitiveness or efficiency of the industrial and 
marketable services sector. It is indeed possible to 
envisage that investments in energy generation, 
telecommunications and roads could improve efficiency 
and competitiveness by raising the quality of service, the 
speed of service and the cost that clients have to pay 
compared with competitors in other countries. It appears 
from the limited available indicators that the cost of 
services such as electricity, telephone and postal charges 
rose relative to prices generally and relative to charges 
FIGURE 2.8: Fixed Investment, IDA Grant 
Commitments & the Contribution of Industry to GNP 
Growth 1975-1985 
1975-1980 1980-1985 
Sources: Annual Reports, IDA, Dublin. National Income and 
Expenditure, Stationery Office, Dublin. 
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in countries with which Irish producers are competing, 
at least up to 1984.1 Against this improvements do 
appear to have been made to the quality of certain 
services and other services might well have collapsed 
without the investments that were undertaken. 
Moreover, it is possible that the lag between investment 
spending and reductions in costs or improvements in 
efficiency is such that the benefit of these investments 
remain to be realised sometime in the future. However, 
in the meantime, costs have risen and services have been 
slow to improve; the net effect of many of these 
programmes on growth must be in doubt. 
As regards expenditure on items of ''social" 
infrastructure the channels by which they influence 
growth are rather amorphous: clearly an unhoused, 
unhealthy and ignorant workforce will be much less 
productive than one that is not suffering from these 
deficiencies; consequently there is a link between these 
expenditures and economic growth. In addition these 
services provide enhanced welfare to recipients in other 
(more direct ways) than their capacity to raise the 
productive economic potential of the population. 
Borrowings for such purposes amount to capitalised 
transfers which are consumed over time; a corollary, 
however, is that unless a stream of taxes is established 
when these borrowings are spent that is equal to the 
interest on the loans then debts rise as a proportion of 
GNP. This point is easily illustrated by the example of 
public authority housing. The interest cost of borrowing 
for this form of spending has far exceeded the rental 
income received on the housing stock. In effect, the 
Exchequer is transferring capital resources to the 
occupants of public authority houses which will be 
consumed over time. However, no matching transfer is 
being exacted from the rest of the community to pay for 
the benefit. As a result debt and debt interest payments 
as a proportion of GNP tend to rise. 
The conclusion of this brief review is that the effects 
of public capital spending, financed mainly from 
borrowing, on raising the supply of economic output in 
the past five years may have been small and possibly 
lower than in the previous five years. It appears that the 
contribution to GNP from investment in industry has 
fallen between the two five-year periods; that rapid 
growth of investments in energy, transport and 
telecommunications may not have been accompanied 
by sufficient competitive or efficiency gains by industry 
or other internationally trading sectors; that investment 
in social infrastructure is likely to have been financed in 
a manner that ensures that debts and debt servicing rise 
in proportion to output growth. 
Financial and Monetary Aspects 
A fourth channel by which policy has influenced 
economic growth is through the financial and monetary 
aspects of Government financing. A rising proportion of 
public borrowing has come from external sources. In 
1980 less than one-third of the national debt was 
1. See Proposals for Plans, National Planning Board, April 1984, pp. 
162-163. 
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denominated in foreign currencies; in 1985 the 
proportion is about one half. The interest payments on 
foreign borrowings involve a transfer of resources away 
from Ireland to overseas. Since a growing proportion of 
public sector borrowing in recent years has been raised 
externally (and in general the Irish pound has become 
weaker againstthe currencies in which borrowings were 
made) the extent of this external transfer measured in 
Irish pounds has increased and become an important 
element in directly reducing GNP growth (Table 2.6). 
The manner of financing public sector borrowing has 
had other consequences which might indirectly have 
influenced growth. Over three-quarters of annual public 
sector borrowing in the past five years or so has been 
financed by credit creation (see Table 2.7). Up to 1984 
this has occurred through direct foreign borrowing by 
the public sector, the initial counterpart of which is an 
increase in credit balances in Irish pounds. At the same 
time the domestic banking system has extended credit 
to the pu bi ic sector and to the private sector. The net 
effect has been a massive growth in domestic credit 
MEDIUM-TERM OUTLOOK: 1986 - 1990 
expansion (DCE). This increase in money balances leads 
economic agents to one or more of the following re-
sponses: 
(a) continue to hold the larger balances; 
(b) use the increased balances to buy existing domestic 
or foreign assets, e.g., houses, land, stocks and shares 
or Government securities in Ireland or abroad; 
(c) use the increased balances to reduce existing debt 
or create new assets (i.e., invest) at home or abroad; 
(d) use the increased balances to purchase more current 
goods and services either from Irish or foreign 
producers. 
The demand for money balances ((a) above) tends to rise 
broadly in line with the value of GNP. If DCE rises faster 
than this (b), (c) and (d) above will be used to reduce 
money balances to the desired level. This has occurred 
though the relative importance of the various channels 
has changed from time to time. If (b) is followed, the 
result can be inflation in the prices of domestic assets 
TABLE 2.6: Effect of Foreign Debt Interest Payments on GNP Growth 1980-1985 
7980 7987 7982 7983 7984 
Change in GNP at Constant Market Prices 2.7 1.8 -2.3 -1.5 2.3 
Public Debt Interest Payments Abroad. Contribution 
to Change in GNP -0.9 -1.0 -2.0 -0.3 -0.7 
Source: National Income and Expenditure; Stationery Office, Dublin. 
TABLE 2.7: Public Sector Borrowing, Domestic Credit Expansion, and the Balance of Payments 1980-1985 
£ Million 
7980 7987 7982 7983 7984 
1. Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR)1 1,558 2,205 2,466 2,277 2,400 
2. Less Non-Monetary financing2 371 280 587 733 542 
3 = (1-2) Monetary Financing of PSBR 1,187 1,925 1,879 1,544 1,858 
of which: foreign (905) (1,332) (1,267) (968) (767) 
Domestic banking system (282) (593) (612) (576) (1,091) 
4. Plus change in Government Deposits with Central 
Bank3 42 8 -56 -36 25 
5. Change in commercial bank lending to private 
sector 681 597 295 437 182 
6 = (3 + 4 + 5) Domestic Credit Expansion (DCE) 
(Government accounts basis) 1,868 2,552 2,174 1,945 2,065 
Adj. 146 -18 -113 83 43 
6(a). DCE (banking statistics basis) 2,014 2,534 2,061 2,028 2,108 
7. Less: change in net non-monetary liabilities of 
banks 135 60 -41 346 220 
8. Change in M3 895 1,033 900 406 776 
9 = (6a-7-8) equals basic balance of payments4 -981 -1,441 -1,430 -1,276 -1,112 
of which 
current balance of payments -1,037 -1,595 -1,316 -925 -837 
private non-bank capital flows (and balance of 
payments residual) +530 + 154 -114 -351 -275 
Notes: 1 Does not include borrowing for current purposes by State-sponsored bodies. 
2 Sales of securities and uptake of small savings from the domestic non-bank public. 


















4 Defined as current balance of payments plus net private capital flows of the non-bank sector/industry balance of payments residual. 
Source: Quarterly Bulletin, Central Bank of Ireland, Dublin. 
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that are not internationally traded, such as houses and 
land. That happened in 1978-79. When (d) is chosen, 
the excess credit can be used to finance expenditure on 
imported goods and services, thereby widening the 
current balance of payments deficit. However, another 
important effect has on occasions been downward 
pressure on domestic interest rates as a result of the 
excess supply of domestic credit. But if interest rates start 
to fall, foreign financial and real assets appear 
increasingly attractive relative to domestic ones at 
existing exchange rates. The consequence is outflows, 
despite exchange controls, which ease the downward 
pressure on domestic interest rates. The corn bi nation of 
excess domestic credit creation and the pegged exchange 
rate can operate to encourage outflows which appear 
in the capital account of the balance of payments. The 
process of financing the PSBR to a large degree by foreign 
borrowing may have given an incentive to private agents 
to accumulate foreign assets. The net result would be that 
the public sector is left with growing external liabilities 
which it must service, but the private sector acquires 
foreign assets, the return from which may never augment 
Irish output. 
It may be, of course, that altering the pattern of 
financing from abroad to home might have resulted in 
exactly the same outcome in terms of lower GNP growth. 
Increased domestic borrowing financed in a non-
monetary way (i.e., by sales of securities to the domestic 
non-bank public) could have resulted in rising interest 
rates at home. However, if they rose there would either 
be an increase in private capital inflows, in which case 
the effect on interest rates would be short lived, or a 
reduction in private expenditures that are sensitive to 
interest rate changes. In this latter case there would be 
a displacement of private expenditure (either on 
consumption or investment) and lower growth. The 
extent to which private capital inflows would occur in 
the face of upward pressures on domestic interest rates 
would be primarily determined by the view taken by 
private agents (both inside and outside Ireland) on the 
appropriateness and sustainability of the exchange rate. 
If no risk of a depreciation of the Irish pound relative to 
other currencies were perceived, borrowing externally 
to avoid the increasing cost of borrowing domestically 
would take place presumably. If an exchange risk was 
perceived, borrowing abroad would not occur and 
domestic interest rates would rise and private 
expenditure would be less buoyant. This would occur 
up to the point where the gap between domestic interest 
rates and foreign interest rates is deemed wide enough 
to compensate for the exchange risk. Accordingly, it is 
not possible to say with certainty that following a different 
pattern of financing of the PSBR would have led to any 
difference in the growth performance. However, the fact 
remains that an alternative pattern of financing could 
have offered the possibility at least of achieving faster 
growth if fears about the exchange rate could be allayed. 
5. Future Implementation of Policy 
The discussion in the previous section described four 
channels through which domestic macro-economic 
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policy operated. In constructing a medium-term scenario 
consideration needs to be given to how policy will 
operate through these various channels in the future. It 
is assumed for the present that implementation of policy 
will occur against the background of the "baseline" 
scenario for the international economy described in Part 
I (see Table 1.6 for summary). As regards demand it is 
implicit in current government policies that there will be 
further deflation up to 1987. However, in our view it is 
not expected that the fiscal targets contained in the 
Government Plan will be fully achieved by 1987. It is 
expected that the targets for net capital spending will be 
reached but that by 1987 the current budget deficit wi II 
be about 6 per cent of GNP compared with the intended 
5 per cent. The slippage is expected to uccur mainly in 
respect of tax revenues, which fell significantly short of 
target in 1985. Tax revenue as a per cent of GNP is 
expected to show some further slight tendency to fall up 
to 1987 by which date it is likely to be less than 35 per 
cent of GNP, compared with 353.4 per cent in 1985. Non-
pay current expenditure is projected to remain 
unchanged in volume terms up to 1987. Pay in the public 
service is expected to rise by about 4 Y2 per cent per 
annum in 1986 and 1987. By 1987 the PSBR is expected 
to be equal to 12Y2 per cent of GNP compared with 153.4 
per cent in 1985. Borrowing above that required for debt 
interest payments would amount of 2 per cent of GNP 
compared with 4 per cent in 1985. However, it is not 
expected that the position reached in 1987 would be 
adequate to stabilise the debt/GNP ratio. 1 In this 
baseline scenario it is assumed that the policy stance is 
continued unaltered for a further two years after 1987 
by which time the PSBR is reduced to 10 per cent of 
GNP: The reduction in borrowing over and above that 
required to meet interest payments amounts to 4 
percentage points of GNP between 1985 and 1989, 
approximately half the rate of deflation, as measured by 
this indicator, that occurred in the previous four-year 
period. After 1989 it is expected that scope might exist 
for an expansion in borrowing without giving rise to 
instability of the debt/GNP ratio. In the context of the 
scenario to 1990 being developed here it is not assumed 
that this scope is exercised in 1990. As with the deflation 
from 1981-1985 not all of the projected fall in fiscal 
demand will be translated into a reduction in GNP. It 
is unlikely that the demand consequences of the 
reduction envisaged in the PSBR would reduce GNP in 
the '1985-1989 period by more than 2 per cent in total. 
An assumption that is made regarding the reduction 
in borrowing in the 1985-1989 period, which contrasts 
markedly with the past five years, is that adjustment to 
the current budget deficit takes place as a Jesuit of 
reductions in spending, as a per cent of GNP, rather than 
increases in taxes as a per cent of GNP. A consequence 
of this is that the growth in non-agricultural pay cost and 
income respectively follow a similar path. This is unlike 
the early part of the 1980s (see Figure 2.4) and much of 
the 'seventies when there was a strong tendency for real 
1. The interest rates at which borrowing is expected to take place 
is shown in Figure 2.10. For a discussion of the conditions required 
to stabilise the debt/GNP ratio see pp. 14 above, and Annex 2. 
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FIGURE 2.9: Public Sector Borrowing, 1985-1990 
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labour costs to rise and, at the same time, real incomes 
to fall. It is thought that this new trend will lead to an 
easing in wage cost pressures, annual increases in pay 
rates (in the non-agricultural economy) are expected to 
come down from 6 per cent in 1986 to about 4 per cent 
by the end of the decade. These rates of increase are 
about half the average annual rate of-increase in pay per 
person in the first half of the 1980s. The extent to which 
this will be reflected in improved competitiveness will 
to some considerable degree depend upon exchange rate 
movements. The past five years (see Figure 2.1) were in 
general characterised by an appreciation of the real 
effective exchange rate index as inflation here more than 
offset the effects of nominal exchange rate depreciations. 
It is not expected that this trend will continue. Rather 
the expectation is that the real effective index for the Irish 
pound will remain about constant: the fall that has 
already occurred in the value of the dollar is expected 
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to be accompanied by a strengthening in other major 
currencies in Europe relative to the Irish pound in the 
coming years. Sterling will probably weaken in nominal 
terms; if so, inflation there is likely to accelerate so that 
in real terns there may not be an appreciation against 
sterling. On balance these expected movements will not 
give impetus to domestic inflation, on the contrary they 
might even ease such pressures. In conjunction with the 
assumed pattern of budget adjustments inflation here 
should proceed in line with that in other EMS countries. 
In conclusion, assumed exchange rate developments 
along with the assumed pattern of budget adjustment are 
expected to result in a more favourable development in 
pay costs relative to those abroad in the period to 1990 
than in the first half of this decade. This does not 
necessarily mean that unit pay costs will rise less rapidly 
again compared with competitor countries in the years 
ahead, more likely a continuation in the recent pattern 
of unit costs developments might be maintained with a 
higher level of employment. 
A critical issue for future growth concerns supply side 
effects from improvements in competitiveness and 
efficiency associated with public capital spending already 
undertaken or under way. The volume of capital 
spending on all main categories is projected to fall for 
the remainder of the decade. Major programmes of 
expenditure in the field of productive infrastructure will 
have been completed, for example, in the areas of 
energy, telecommunications and transport; although 
other areas will continue to grow, e.g., roads. But in the 
second half of the 1980s wi 11 the real cost of electricity, 
gas, telephone, telex, postal charges and public transport 
fall compared with the first half? Will the cost of road 
freight in terms of time spent conveying goods have 
fallen? It is feared that these reductions may not happen 
or will not occur on a sufficiently large scale and 
consequently the possibility Of a significant positive 
supply response emerging may be precluded. More 
unfortunately, perhaps, is that there appears to be little 
hope of raising the return on State investment in industry 
in terms of achieving higher value added retained in 
Ireland over the time horizon being considered here. For 
the next five years then no major improvement is 
foreseen in the low rate of supply response to public 
capital spending of recent years. 
The expected pattern of financing of prospective PSBRs 
is set out in Table 2.8. It shows the share of non-monetary 
financing rising from 35 per cent of borrowing in 1985 
to 63 per cent by 1990. This increase involves only a 
slight rise in the ratio of purchases of securities to interest 
receipts from investments in securities. The effect of this 
would be to reduce DCE sharply in the years up to 1990. 
While private sector credit is expected to revive in the 
coming years total credit creation is expected to be rather 
less excessive relative to the growth in the demand for 
money than in the first half of the decade (see Table 2. 7). 
A reduction in the basic balance of payments (see Table 
2.7 for definition) from about £1,050 million in 1985 to 
about zero at the end of the decade would be expected 
to be associated with this slowing down. However, it is 
rather difficult to say how this might break down as 
between the current and capital accounts. 
THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY TO 1990: A MEDIUM-TERM SCENARIO 
The implications that these trend in financial markets 
(along with the effects of exchange rate assumptions) 
would have for the growth and distribution of the 
national debt and national debt interest payments are 
shown in Figure 2.10. By 1990 the debt would comprise 
a foreign currency component of about 37 per cent 
compared with 48 per cent in 1985. A major implication 
of this (along with the fal I in interest rates) would be that 
foreign debt interest payments by the Exchequer fall 
modestly up to 1990. The corollary would be that 
domestic interest payments rise sharply providing cash 
flow that could finance the growth of projected non-
monetary financing while enabling interest rates to follow 
the direction shown in Figure 2 .10. The direct 
implications which this pattern of foreign debt service 
payments would have for GNP growth compared with 
the first half of the decade is shown in Table 2.9. By 
contrast with the first half of the 1980s, when foreign 
public debt interest payments contributed a fall of 1 per 
cent per annum to GNP, in the second half, as a whole, 
they could be marginally positive as regards GNP growth. 




that might be expanded. However, constraints in the 
supply of calves, associated with the standstill in the dairy 
sector, will limit the pace of expansion. A slowdown in 
the growth in gross agricultural product (that is the value 
added by the agricultural sector) over the next five years 
seems inevitable. The projection for the sector is that the 
annual average rate of expansion will be about 11/2 per 
cent, compared with 21/2 per cent per annum in the first 
five years of the decade. Needless to say, the uncertain 
FIGURE 2.10: National Debt and interest payments on 
















A discussion of possible changes to the Common Agri-
cultural Policy of the EEC is contained in a special article 
to this volume. On the basis of that assessment it would 
appear that the scope for expanding agricultural output 
is extremely limited. Milk production accounted for 
almot 90 per cent of the increase that occurred in 
agricultural output between 1975 and 1983. However, 
further growth will be limited by the milk quota and there 
is little prospect that a comparable substitute can be 
found in the next five years. The principal prospect for 
growth appears to be sheep production, but this accounts 
for only 31/2 per cent of total output so an extraordinarily 
rapid increase would be needed to make a significant 
contribution to growth in the sector. Cattle production 




1985 1986 1987 
TABLE 2.8: Public Sector Borrowing, Domestic Credit Expansion and the Balance of Payments, 1985-1990 
£ million 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR) 2,457 2,375 2,265 2,155 2,100 
of which: 
Monetary financing 1,406 1,375 1,115 855 800 
DCE (Banking Statistics) 1,498 1,336 1,100 907 930 
Change in M3 (%) 400(4%%) 500(51/2%) 500(51/2%) 600(6%) 650(6114%) 
Basic balance of payments -1,048 -736 -506 -157 -105 
of which: current balance -498 -449 -206 243 345 
TABLE 2.9: Effects of Prospective Foreign Debt Interest Payments on GNP Growth 1985-1990 
1980-1985 1985-1990 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Annual Average 
GNP growth 0.5 3 21/2 3114 31/2 
Public debt interest payments abroad (contribution to 
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TABLE 2.10: Output, Inputs and Income in Agriculture, 1985-1990 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Gross Agricultural Output (£ million) 2,737 2,882 2,940 3,050 3,185 3,300 
Volume Index (1980 = 100) 118 120 121 123 124 126 
Price Index (1980 = 100) 135.6 138 142 145 150 153 
Total Inputs of Materials and Services (£ million) 1,311 1,255 1,275 1,340 1,395 1,460 
Volume Index (1980 = 100) 112.7 114 112 113 114 115 
Price Index (1980 = 100) 153.2 145 150 156 162 168 
Gross Agricultural Product at Factor Costi 
(£ million) 1,566 1,702 1,795 1,845 1,927 1,980 
Volume Index (1980 = 100) 114 115 118 120.5 121.4 124 
Price Index (1980 = 100) 146 157 161 162 168 169 
Income from Self Employment2 (£ million) 1,176 1,300 1,385 1,428 1,500 1,540 
1. Equals Gross Agricultural Output less inputs of materials and services plus subsidies less agricultural levies. 
2. Equals Gross Agricultural Output at factor cost less depreciation and wages and salary payments. 
pattern of Irish weather will continue to result in the 
volatile pattern of growth; accordingly, the exact 
distribution of growth presented here cannot be regarded 
as a realistic description of what in fact will occur from 
one year to the next. If the projected trend in output is 
anyway correct the implications for income arising are 
for an annual average increase of about 5 per cent, not 
significantly different from the expected rate of inflation. 
Accordingly, real incomes are likely to remain un-
changed for the remainder of the decade, although a 
continued decline in numbers engaged would mean 
some slight rise in real income per head. 
OUTPUT OF INDUSTRY 
As discussed earlier the determinants of industrial 
economic activity are diverse and include international 
factors that work through several channels as well as 
domestic influences. As regards manufacturing output 
the expectation is that the volume of world trade in the 
second half of the decade will expand at over twice the 
rate on average as it did in the first five years (see Table 
2.11 and also Part I, Table 1.6). However, as discussed 
earlier the impetus to output growth from the side of 
supply emanating from additional investment has prob-
ably also been of considerable importance. In practice 
anyway, these two influences are probably related. In 
this respect the medium-term prospect appears unlikely 
to be stronger and may be less buoyant than the first five 
years of the decade. Foreign investment has weakened 
since 1981, and competition for foreign investment has 
become intense. For the next five years it is expected that 
on average the share of foreign fixed investment relative 
to GNP will remain at about the level of 1985. The fall 
in investment that has already occurred in recent years 
will have some adverse influences on output growth up 
to 1987, thereafter the continuing weak foreign 
investment envisaged after 1985 will reinforce that effect. 
However, these adverse influences are expected to be 
more than offset by the stronger demand internationally 
and the fact that both exchange rate movements and 
domestic cost factors will be improving certain aspects 
of competitiveness. An expansion of about 6 per cent 
per annum in transportable goods industries output is 
expected in the second half of the decade compared with 
4 per cent in the first five years. In addition the 
improvement in competitiveness is expected to result in 
some alteration to the pattern of output growth from 
sectors within manufacturing: of the cumulative growth 
of around 35 per cent expected in the five years to 1990 
perhaps about 12 percentage points could be accounted 
for by sectors other than Chemicals and Metals and 
Engineering; this would be in some contrast to recent 
years (see Figure 2.2). 
In previous sections the sharp rise in net factor 
payments abroad by manufacturing industry in the first 
half of the decade was noted and the implications for 
national output and the return on public investment in 
industry discussed. The view was also taken that little if 
any impact would be made to these payments over the 
next number of years as a result of changes to industrial 
policy. It remains to be considered how these payments 
might evolve over the next few years as a result of the 
trends expected in manufacturing industry output and 
other factors that may influence these flows. The great 
difficulty, of course, is that so little is understood about 
their nature. It is possible that part of the increase in these 
TABLE 2.11: Foreign Trade and Investment and Industrial Output growth 1985-1990 
(per cent change) 
1980-1985 1985-1990 1985 7986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Annual Average 
Volume of total World Trade 2.4 4% 31/z 4 4112 5 51/z 5 
Ireland's Industrial Exports 12.6 9 6 V. 7 10 11 9 9 
Output of Transportable Goods Industries 5.0 6 4 5 7 7 6 6 
Foreign Fixed Asset Investment in Industry in Ireland 
(as per cent of GNP) 1.8 1.2 1 .3 1 V4 V4 11,,(i 1 V4 1 V4 
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TABLE 2.12: Growth of Industrial Gross Output 1985-1990 (per cent) 
1980-7985 1985-1990 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Category Average annual 
Electricity Gas and Water 





payments was associated with the rise in the value of the 
US dollar. For example, if US parent companies 
measured rates of return on foreign investments in US 
dollar terms or required payments for R+ D or marketing 
services in their home currency or if subsidiaries 
accelerated payments in order to maximise their dollar 
value as that currency was rising. However, there is 
nothing that can corroborate these hypotheses so it has 
been arbitrarily assumed that net factor payments abroad 
by industry will contribute negatively to GNP by between 
1 and % per cent per annum over the next five years. 
This would amount to a small improvement in the first 
half of the decade. 
The other major category of industrial output is 
building and construction. Output in this sector has fallen 
sharply in the past five years, cumulatively the decline 
amounted to 25 per cent. Of this fal I about 7 percentage 
points arose from reductions in residential construction 
concentrated entirely in private housebuilding and re~ 
pairs and maintenance. Of the remaining reduction, in 
non-residential construction output, almost all of the fall 
was the result of lower new construction, with output 
of repairs and maintenance remaining broadly un-
changed for the period. The factors that influenced this 
pattern were falling real incomes, rising real interest rates, 
the effects of weakening domestic and international 
demand on industrial and commercial investment and 
the effects of reductions in the volume of public capital 
spending and limits on current government spending 
which reduced the demand for staff and office accom-
modation. As regards the future the conjunction of falling 
real interest rates and some recovery in real household 
disposable income is expected to result in a renewal of 
growth in demand for residential construction. Non-
residential construction is also expected to grow as roads 
expenditure rises and private investment demand makes 
some modest recovery at least. 
The prospects for output of electricity, gas and water 
completes the picture for industry. The main uncertainty 
with this category concerns the utilisation of gas after the 
coming on stream of the Moneypoint coal generating 
electricity station. It is possible that alternative users might 
be found for the gas, however, the assumption made 
here is that there will be some reduction in the rate of 
offtake from the Kinsale field. The various elements of 
the industry projection are summarised in Table 2.12. 
Th is shows a steady rate of growth in industrial output 
for most of the rest of the decade. Overall the growth 
rate is expected to be twice as fast as the first five years, 
largely because of the projected turnabout in building 
and construction. 
2.3 
\12 10 -2 1 1 1 
2\/i --4\/2 1 \/2 2 2 3 3 \/2 
6 4 5 7 7 6 6 
51/4 3 4 53/4 53/4 5 5 
OUTPUT OF SERVICES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
AND DEFENCE 
In the national accounts the output of this sector is 
measured in terms of the pay of employees, of central 
and local government engaged in administration or 
regulatory activities and employees in the Army and 
Gardai. Such figures as are available, for the numbers 
employed in these categories, are not by themselves an 
adequate indicator of the trend in volume of output. 
Changes in composition both within and across 
categories of employees, can result in shifts in the average 
pay of a category. In 1981 and 1982 numbers grew faster 
than the volume of output of Public Administration and 
Defence. However, in 1983 there was a fall in numbers 
engaged but output rose. The pattern suggests that the 
growth in numbers in 1981 and 1982 were at relatively 
low pay levels while in 1983, although in aggregate 
numbers fell, the effect of shifts within categories was 
to increase the proportions engaged at the top of scales 
and on higher scales. The assumption made in relation 
to the implementation of budget policy in the second 
half of the 1980s is that numbers engaged will continue 
to decline. However, the effect of this on measured 
output may be mitigated by shifts in composition; these 
effects are not, however, predictable, particularly at the 
level of aggregation at which these projections are being 
constructed. It would be consistent with the projected 
thrust and manner of implementation of fiscal policy for 
output of this sector to decline by about \/2 per cent per 
annum on average over the next five years. 
OUTPUT OF SERVICES 
The marketed services sector relies predominantly on 
domestic demand and the strength of the tradable goods 
sector. An important exception is the tourism industry 
which relies on foreign demand and there are certain 
categories of service that are increasingly becoming 
tradable internationally. However, in framing the 
projection contained in Table 2.13 the predominant 
?eterminant of growth has been the strength of activity 
1n the tradable goods sector. Demographic factors will 
continue to apply upward pressure for services of health 
and education. However, the demand for increased 
output from these sectors is not Ii kely to be met fu I ly 
because of the requirements to contain public expendi-
ture. 
GROSS NATIONAL OUTPUT 
The projections of output for the various sectors are 
drawn together in Table 2.14. In summary Gross National 
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TABLE 2.13: Growth of Output of Marketed Services, 1985-1990 (per cent) 
1980-1985 1985-1990 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 7990 
Average 
Distribution Transport and Communications 0.3 314 314 314 1 314 3 
Other Services 1.9 2 2 2 2 2 21/2 21/2 
TABLE 2.14: Growth in Output by Sector of Origin 1985-1990 (per cent) 
1980-1985 1985-1990 
Average 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 3.5 1 314 
Industry 2.9 5% 
Distribution, Transport and 
Communication 0.3 314 
Public Administration and Defence 0.5 -112 
Other Services 1.9 2 
GDP at Constant (1980) 2.1 3 
Net Factor Flows with Rest of World 1 (-2.0) (-1/2) 
GNP at Constant (1980) Factor Cost 0.2 2314 
1. Per cent contribution to GNP at factor cost. 
Product is expected to rise by about 23/4 per cent per 
annum in the second half of the decade compared with 
little or no growth in the first five years. The average rate 
of expansion of GDP will be about 3 per cent per annum 
compared with 2 per cent in the first five years. The 
negative contribution of net factor payments is expected 
to be very much smaller. 
7. The Implications for Employment and 
Unemployment 
During the first half of the decade total employment 
fell by 1 per cent per year on average (Table 2.15). At 
the same time the labour force increased by 1 V2 per cent 
per annum; as a consequence unemployment (as a per 
cent of the labour force) rose from 10 to 16 per cent. 
The experience across sectors was not uniform. 
Employment in industry was hit by far the severest; it fell 
by 3V2 per cent per annum. By contrast employment in 
the services sector rose by 1 V2 per cent per annum; the 
secular decline of employment in agriculture continued. 
The trends within industry are examined more closely 
in Figure 2.11. The fall in employment in building and 
construction (Figure 2.11, Panel A) follows closely the 
reduction in output of that sector. There was some slight 
tendency for productivity to rise (equivalent to about 1 V2 
per cent per annum). However, the increases were fitful 
and would be consistent with the effects of the elimina-
tion of small low productivity firms in difficult trading 
conditions rather than to continuous adjustment to the 
structure of production within the industry as a whole. 
Taking the total of manufacturing industry (Figure 2.11, 
Panel B) the trend in the past five years has been for rapid 
growth of output (6 per cent per annum) to occur along 
side a decline in employment in that sector of 3V2 per 
cent per annum; the corollary is that measured 
productivity in manufacturing has risen by 9V2 per cent 
per annum. 
1986 1987 1988 1989 7990 
314 21/2 2 1 2 
4 5314 53A 5 5 
314 314 
-1/2 -1/2 -V2 -1/2 -V2 
2 21/2 2 21/2 2 
2 314 3 % 3 3 3 
(-1/2) (-112) (-%) (-%) (-%) 
21/2 2314 3 3 3 
FIGURE 2.11: Employment, Output & Productivity 
Growth in Industry 1980-1985 (Base = 100) 
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1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Sources: Industrial Production Index, CSO Dublin 
Industrial Employment & I-lours Worked, CSO Dublin 
Construction Industry in Ireland Review o( 1984 and Outlook 
for 1985, Department of the Environment. 
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TABLE 2.15: Labour Force Growth, Employment and Unemployment 1980-1985 (per cent change) 
7980-7985 
Average 7987 7982 7983 7984 7985 
Employment in: 
Mining, Quarrying & Turf Production -2 0 0 -9 0 0 
Manufacturing industries -3V2 -2V2 -13/4 -5V2 -3314 -3V2 
Building and Construction -7 -2 -5 -20 -3V2 -3V2 
Electricity, Gas and Water rn 0 7 0 0 0 
TOTAL INDUSTRY -3V2 -2 114 -2:/.i -6314 -3314 -3:/.i 
Public Administration & Defence V2 1 V2 4:/.i -2 314 0 0 
Commerce, Insurance & Finance rn 2V2 11/2 1 0 0 
Transport, Communication & Storage 0 0 0 0 -1Vz 1 V2 
Other Service Activities 2 2:/.i 3 2 lV2 2 
TOT AL SERVICES 1 V2 2 2 V4 314 V2 1114 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing -2314 -6114 -1V2 -2 -3314 -
TOT AL EMPLOYMENT -1 -1 114 -2 -1Vz -114 
LABOUR FORCE lV2 2 2 1 V2 1 V2 
UNEMPLOYMENT (as per cent of Labour Force) 13% 10 11 V2 14 15V2 16 
(OOOs) 161 126 148 184 204 213 
Source: Review and Outlook, Summer 7985, Stationery Office Dublin. 
TABLE 2.16: Employment in Service Industries 1975-1984 (000s) 
7975 7977 7979 7987 7983 7984 
Wholesale and Retail Distribution 154.5 158.6 161.2 163.7 166.1 168.1 
Insurance Finance and Business Services 27.6 29.6 36.6 43.3 45.9 43.7 
Transport, Communication and Storage 69.3 67.1 68.5 70.0 69.9 69.4 
Public Administration and Defence 60.0 62.6 70.1 72.0 72.7 72.6 
Professional Services 126.8 140.4 148.5 164.1 177.7 179.7 
Personal and Other Services 46.8 47.6 57.1 73.9 56.4 57.9 
TOTAL 498.2 518.5 558.8 587.0 605.3 608.1 
Note: The 1981 estimates are derived from the Census of Population but they have been adjusted to coincide with Labour Force Survey concepts. 
Source: Labour Force Surveys, CSO, Dublin. 
A number of factors account for this trend. The 
principal ones are thought to be first, that output growth 
has been concentrated al most exclusively in sectors that 
have a low labour requirement, namely chemicals and 
office and data processing machinery and instrument 
engineering. Second, there appears to be a trend towards 
greater specialisation and vertical disintegration in 
manufacturing industry. 
As a consequence functions previously undertaken 
within the manufacturing enterprise such as cleaning, 
catering and certain administrative functions are now 
being performed on contract by specialised enterprises 
located outside the manufacturing sector. Third the cost 
price squeeze experienced by industry especially during 
the earlier years of this decade has resulted in shedding 
of labour and substitution of capital. 
As regards the nature of the output employment 
relationships within the services sector and its behaviour, 
rather little is known. Data from the EEC Labour Force 
Surveys are contained in Table 2.16. 
The largest contribution to growth in services 
employment in the past ten years has come from 
professional services. This category is dominated by 
public services such as health and education. Between 
1983 and 1985 there is evidence of a considerable 
slowdown in the rate of expansion reflecting the 
tightening of Government current expenditure. For the 
same reason expansion of employment in Public 
Administration and Defence has come to a halt. Outside 
the public sector it appears that employment in 
Transport, Communication and Storage has been static 
for a decade and that little growth has occurred over this 
decade in employment in Insurance and Financial 
Services, even though this category made a significant 
contribution to employment growth in the 1970s. The 
sectors that have proved most resilient, surprisingly 
perhaps, are those which rely on the household sector: 
wholesale and retail distribution and personal services. 
With respect to future growth of employment in the 
services sector it is almost inevitable that employment 
in "public services" (comprising Public Administration 
and Defence and large elements in the "professional 
services activities") in the second half of the 1980s will 
be much weaker than in the first half because of the 
pressure to restrain public expenditure. In addition, 
although output of services is expected to grow faster 
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Mining, Quarrying & Turf Production -2 -2 
Manufacturing industries -3V2 1 
Building and Construction -5 0 
Electricity, Gas and Water 114 0 
TOTAL INDUSTRY -3% 1/2 
Public Administration and Defence V2 -14 
Commerce, Insurance and Finance 1 1 
Transport, Communication and Storage -114 V2 
Other Service Activities 2 1 V2 
TOT AL SERVICES 1 V2 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing -23,4 -2114 
TOT AL EMPLOYMENT -1 114 
LABOUR FORCE 1 V2 3,4 
UNEMPLOYMENT (as per cent of Labour 
Force) 13V2 1 7314 
(OOOs) 161 236 
FIGURE 2.12: Employment Output & Productivity Growth 
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than in the first half of the 1980s, employment growth 
in the rest of the services sector is expected to be 
negatively influenced by the introduction of more 
technology and, in our belief, by the fact that some of 
the adjustments between the manufacturing and services 
sector in the first half of the decade may have been "once 
off". In summary services employment is expected to 
grow by about 1 per cent per annum, or 6,200, in the 
next five years compared with 11/2 per cent per annum 
or 8,000 in the 1980-1985 period (see Table 2.17). 
Employment in industry is expected to grow by about 
1/2 per cent per annum in the next five years in contrast 
to the annual fall of 31/2 per cent recorded in the last five 
years. The expected trend within industry (Figure 2.12) 
is for employment in building and construction to 
stabilise after 1986 and to rise with the modest recovery 
projected in output towards the end of the decade. In 
manufacturing industry employment increases are also 
projected. However, these will be tempered by a 
continuation of productivity growth though not perhaps 
at quite the same pace as in the early years of the decade. 
Notwithstanding the projected improvements the gains 
in total employment will be unspectacular, as continuing 
losses of employment from agriculture will dissipate the 
modest gains in other sectors. The consequences for 
unemployment will depend on how much of the 
potential labour force growth is realised but the factors 
that determine this, migration and participation rates, 
cannot be predicted accurately. In our view the weakness 
of domestic labour markets wi 11 resu It in faster net 
emigration and possibly to a stabilising of participation 
rates. It has been estimated elsewhere (Population and 
Labour Force Projections 1986-1991, CSO) that net 
emigration of 15,000 per annum in the 1986-1991 period 
would be consistent with an annual growth of 10,800 
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or 314 per cent in the labour force. However, even with 
this rate of increase, which is half that in the first half 
of the decade, the rate of unemployment would continue 
to edge upwards for the rest of the decade and by 1990 
would amount to 18V2 per cent of the labour force 
compared with 16 per cent in 1985. 
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Non-agricultural wages, salaries and pensions reflect the 
expected growth of average earnings and the expected 
changes in employment in the non-agricultural sector. 
The assumption in respect of earnings is that there will 
be a gradual slow down (equivalent to about V2 per cent 
per annum) in the rate of increase from 6 per cent in 1986 
to 5 per cent in 1990. Growth in interest dividends and 
rent are projected to accelerate sharply in the latter years 
of the decade. The tendency for greater reliance to be 
placed on domestic sources for funding of public sector 
borrowing is a primary reson for this. A second is that 
dividend income is boosted as the profitability of industry 
rises. Further details may be found in the statistical 
Annex. It is expected that professional earnings will 
8. The Expected Distribution of Income Growth and 
Pattern of Expenditure on National Output 
The expected development of household income and 
expenditure on GNP is summarised in Tables 2.18 and 
2.19 respectively. Income from agriculture, forestry and 
fishing is related directly to the expected evolution of 
output in that sector and is discussed in detail earlier. 
TABLE 2.18: Household Disposable Income, Expenditure and Savings 1985-1990 £ million 
7985 7986 7987 
Income from Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 1,365 1,433 1,500 
(Per cent change) (51,4) (43,4) 
Non-Agricultural Wages, Salaries and Pensions 9,420 10,010 10,660 
(Per cent change) (61,4) (61/2) 
Interest, Dividends and Rents 799 852 797 
Income from Professional Earnings 1,195 1,289 1,395 
(Per cent change) (73,4) (8114) 
Transfer Incomes 3,183 3,422 3,575 
(Per cent change) (71/z) (41/i) 
PERSONAL INCOME 15,962 17,006 17,927 
Less Taxes on Personal Income 3,334 3,550 3,780 
PERSONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME 12,628 13,456 14,147 
(Per cent change) (61/2) (5) 
Personal Consumer Expenditure 10,151 10,862 11,550 
Personal Savings 2,477 2,594 2,597 
Personal Savings Ratio (Per Cent) 19.6 19.3 18.3 
Personal Savings as Per Cent of GNP 15.5 15.4 14.2 
TABLE 2.19: Expenditure on GNP at Current Market Prices 1985-1990 
1988 7989 7990 
1,600 1,600 1,765 
(61/2) (33,4) (61,4) 
11,400 12,140 12,930 
(61/2) (61/2) (61/z) 
1,072 1,120 1,127 
1,550 1,690 1,770 
(11) (9) (5) 
3,750 3,910 4,065 
(5) (41,4) (4) 
19,372 20,460 21,657 
4,075 4,320 4,580 
15,297 16,140 17,077 
(73,4) (51/2) (53,4) 
12,253 13,000 13,720 
3,044 3,140 3,357 
19.7 19.4 19.7 
15.4 14.6 14.5 
1985 Per cent change 1986 Per cent change 1987 Per cent change 1988 Per cent change 1989 Per cent change 1990 
£ million Volume Price £ million Volume Price £ million Volume Price £ million Volume Price £ million Volume Price £ million 
Personal Consumer 
Expenditure 10,151 21/2 41/z 10,862 21/2 4 11,550 2 4 12,253 2Yz 31/2 13,000 21/2 3 13,720 
Pu bi ic authorities 
net current 
expenditure on 
goods and services 3,283 5 1/2 3,480 - 4 3,620 4 3,775 41/2 3,980 1 41/2 4,200 
Gross Domestic 
fixed capital 
formation 3,677 31/2 41/2 3,974 31/2 4 4,278 3\4 4 4,595 4 3 4,920 5Yz 3 5,321 
Stock changes 70 (1,4)* 115 (1,4}* 175 (- 1,4)* 200 (+ Yz)* 320 (1)* 550 
Exports of Goods 
and Services 10,813 53,4 3 11,780 7,,4 3 13,208 81/2 41/z 14,973 7 4 16,665 71/i 41/2 18,638 
FINAL DEMAND 27,994 31,4 4 30,211 41/2 4 32,831 43,4 4 35,796 4Yz 4 38,885 5 4 42,434 
Imports of Goods 
and Services -10,331 51,4 2 -11, 192 61,4 3 -12,248 61/2 31/2-13,500 71/2 3Yz-15,020 8 31/i-16,700 
Gross Domestic 
Product at 
Market Prices 17,663 23,4 4114 19,019 31/z 41/2 20,583 31/i 41/2 22,296 3 4 23,865 3 41/2 25,644 
Net Factor 
Payments 1,970 (-1/2)* -2, 137 (-1/z)* -2,266 (- 1,4)* -2,330 {- \4)* -2,400 (-1,4)* -2,475 
GNP at current 
market prices 15,693 21/i 43,4 16,882 31,4 5 18,317 31/z 5 19,966 3 43,4 21,465 3 43,4 23,169 
*Contribution to growth of GNP. 
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benefit from the higher level of economic activity and 
will rise in real terms. Transfer income comprises Govern-
ment transfers and international transfers. The former will 
rise in value as a result of a continuation in the growth 
of numbers unemployed and increases (predominantly 
demographically determined) in the base for other 
Government transfers; the rate of transfer payments has 
been assumed to be indexed to consumer prices. 
International transfers have been assumed arbitrarily to 
rise and stabilise from about 1988. Revenue from taxes 
on personal income has been derived on the assumption 
that tax rates, bands and allowances are indexed. These 
developments would lead to an expansion in household 
disposable income of just about 6 per cent per annum 
on average over the next five years. This would be 
sufficient to generate growth in the volume of personal 
consumption of about 2V2 per cent per annum. 
A higher rate of growth might be possible if the 
personal savings ratio stabilised or declined. However, 
it is not expected that this in fact will occur. Indeed there 
may be a tendency for some further increases to occur. 
The reasons for believing this relate to the expected effect 
of higher national debt interest payments domestically. 
To a very considerable degree these payments will 
accrue to financial institutions. Pensions funds would be 
expected to account for a significant share of the income 
and the consequent growth in their funds would manifest 
itself in higher personal savings. If there was a tendency 
for pension contributions to be adjusted downwards over 
the next five years, the likely beneficiary would be the 
corporate sector, whose savings might rise. There would 
not appear to be a significant prospect that by the end 
of the decade the growth of these funds wou Id be passed 
back to the household sector. 
Gross domestic fixed capital formation is expected to 
rise steadily. A primary contributing factor to this is the 
expected recovery in investment in building and con-
struction which would be facilitated both by the tend-
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ency for interest rates to continue to decline and by the 
upward trend in real household income. In addition this 
tendency would be reinforced, especially towards the 
end of the decade, with an expansion of investment in 
machinery and equipment. This expansion is, of course, 
predicated on the projection that export growth recovers 
and is sustained. An effect of this is tc, raise capacity 
utilisation and allow corporate savings to return to more 
normal levels (see Annex 1) facilitating an increase in the 
desired capital stock of industry. 
A feature of the expected pattern of expenditure on 
GNP is that it is accompanied by a diminution in the 
current balance of payments deficit to zero and the 
emergence of a surplus towards the end of the decade 
of perhaps 2 per cent of GNP. This development could 
occur notwithstanding the rise in the marginal propensity 
to import as domestic demand accelerates. An important 
contributing factor to this development is the more 
modest rise in net factor payments prompted by the 
switch towards domestic financing of public sector 
borrowing and the reduction which is expected to occur 
in interest rates. A second contributing factor is that the 
terms of trade shows steady improvement. This hinges 
on the outlined development in oil prices and the 
assumed domestic policy stance of LDCs, (see Part I). 
The coincidence of a current balance of payments 
surplus with a continuing large PSBR raises a number of 
questions about the likely evolution of the capital 
account of the balance of payments. It has been assumed 
here that there will be a continuation during the 
remainder of the decade of large capital outflows on non-
Government account. (See Annex 1 for details). 
However, if this tendency were to diminish then it is 
likely that domestic interest rates would decline faster 
than envisaged, in that case domestic demand might be 
higher and the current balance of payments weaker than 
shown here. This question is returned to briefly in Part Ill. 
Ill. THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY TO 1990: 
Al TERNA TIVE SCENARIOS 
1. Introduction 
In this Part some alternative scenarios to the main 
projections are presented. First (Section 2) there is a brief 
discussion of some of the issues to which regard must 
be had in attempting to determine an appropriate level 
of public sector borrowing. Related to this is the question 
of the speed with which that level should be achieved. 
Some of the issues which arise in this context are also 
addressed. Then a number of different adjustment paths 
for the public finances to that contained in Part II are 
set out and the effects that might follow from pursuing 
them are explored (Sections 3-6). Additionally we discuss 
what might be the implications for the domestic 
economy of significantly different developments in the 
international economy to that assumed in determining 
the bench mark projections of Part 11. 
2. Alternative Paths of Adjustment 
It is extremely difficult to establish what should be the 
most appropriate level of public sector borrowing. In the 
context of medium-term economic management we 
believe that deficits on current Government spending 
should be balanced over the economic cycle and other 
borrowing should be undertaken only if a stream of 
resources can be generated to meet the interest cost of 
the borrowing. There are many who would disagree with 
this principle and in practice it is very difficult to say what 
level of borrowing precisely would be consistent with 
it. Such estimates as have been suggested 1 have been 
regarded generally as excessively high. In the context of 
the 1985 outturn for public sector borrowing of 15% per 
cent of GNP of which about 8V4 percentage points is due 
to borrowing for current purposes, a reduction of the 
order of 6-8 per cent of GNP at least might be required. 
However, regardless of what principle should be applied 
it seems clear that a substantial reduction in public sector 
borrowing from the present level would be the outcome 
required. A second question is over what time horizon 
should the required adjustment be carried out? There is 
an apparent contradiction in statements which proclaim 
that order must be restored to the public finances if 
output and employment are to grow but that restoring 
balance will reduce employment. The paradox can be 
resolved at a conceptual level though not uniquely by 
including a time dimension. For example, it is often 
contended that in the "short term" reducing the fiscal 
1. An attempt to apply this principle in practice was made by the 
National Planning Board. See Proposals for Plan, April 7984,p. 49. There 
it was estimated that a deficit on current spending of 5 per cent of GNP 
would be needed and that borrowing for capital purposes would have 
to fall sharply. 
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imbalance will reduce both output and employment 
because demand in the economy is reduced as the deficit 
is closed. However, failing to reduce the imbalance now 
means more rapid accumulation of debt leading to higher 
national debt interest payments and higher taxation or 
lower spending in the future to pay the extra interest. 
The longer adjustment is postponed the greater becomes 
the future burden of taxation and the larger the effect 
of growth and employment in the long term. 
While there are many possible outcomes we believe 
that the specific output response, in the course of a fiscal 
adjustment, and its trend subsequent to the adjustment 
having been made will depend upon (a) the magnitude 
of fiscal adjustment that is required, (b) the speed within 
which it is accomplished, (c) the manner in which the 
fiscal adjustment is accomplished and (d) the stance of 
other economic policies and the expected outlook for 
world demand. Specifically, the greater the required 
adjustment to the public finances, and the more rapidly 
it is implemented the larger will be the short-term 
reduction in output. And the narrower the scope for 
enhancing the effectiveness of other policies to promote 
growth during a fiscal deflation the greater will be the 
slowdown or fall in output. Provided the fiscal deflation 
is warranted by economic considerations as when 
deficits and national debts are increasing persistently in 
relation to national output and where there is widespread 
resistance to additional taxation, then the long-term trend 
for output will be almost certainly higher than without 
the fiscal adjustment. The only circumstances in which 
this might not be the case would be where the fiscal 
adjustment was carried out in a manner that undermined 
the underlying competitiveness of the economy or 
resulted in the destruction of significant productive assets. 
In conclusion the more swiftly the adjustment is carried 
out the higher will be the short-term cost. It is even 
conceivable that too swift an adjustment would lead to 
long-term damage. Accordingly, a gradual reduction in 
deficits is sometimes advocated on the grounds that it 
allows all parts of the economy to adjust to the changes 
that are being made. Notwithstanding this we would 
favour a "short-sharp shock" to a gradual path of 
adjustment. The latter approach has tended to be the one 
favoured in Ireland but it has often resulted in no 
adjustment and sometimes, even reversals. The principal 
difficulty with the gradual path, in our view, is that 
markets find it difficult to see that policy has been altered; 
in these circumstances expectations fail to adjust, 
demands upon the Exchequer are pursued continuously 
and it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the pace 
of even the most gradual adjustment. In these 
circumstances it is easy for all semblance of direction in 
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policy to break down. Against this we feel that the "short-
s harp shock" shows clearly that policy has altered. The 
short-term costs may be higher but the prospect is offered 
of attaining a faster growth path when the adjustment 
is complete. These points are illustrated in the following 
two scenarios. 
3. Alternative Scenario I: More Rapid Adjustment of 
the Public Finance Imbalance 
There is no real prospect of significantly mitigating the 
short term deflationary effects of reducing public sector 
borrowing more quickly by altering the stance of other 
macro economic policies. The instruments that might be 
attempted to be used are incomes policy; exchange rate 
policy; and monetary policy. However, it is difficult to 
see how these could be marshalled in a way that might 
give significant impetus to growth above that which is 
contained in the benchmark projection of Part II. 
Accordingly, the assumptions with respect to these 
policies are as follows: 
(i) earnings of non-agricultural employees are projected 
to grow at approximately the same rate as those in 
trading partners. 
(ii) The effective exchange rate adjusted for relative 
inflation will remain about constant. 
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(iii) Debt management will be directed at financing a 
growing proportion of public sector borrowing from 
the domestic market. 
As regards other "sectoral" or "supply side" policies, 
undoubtedly there exists the scope to operate more 
favourable conditions for promoting faster economic 
growth. However, as these policies are, almost invariably, 
concerned with achieving structural change, they can 
take a long time to implement. Moreover, it is impossible 
to evaluate precisely their quantitative significance. Yet 
it is obvious that the efficiency of the entire economy 
could be impaired by, for example, muddled transport 
or energy policies, or by restrictive practices in relation 
to professional or other services whether supplied by the 
public or private sectors; or bad policies in relation to 
major economic sectors like industry or agriculture. In 
preparing this scenario it has been assumed that changes 
are made to policies at a sectoral level and that some 
positive influences begin to take effect by the end of the 
decade as' a resu It of the changes. 
The precise pattern of adjustment to the public finances 
which has been assumed in constructing this scenario 
is shown in Table 3.1. The PSBR is reduced to a level 
equivalent to 10 per cent of GNP in 1987, compared with 
over 12 per cent in the bench mark projection, it is 
maintained at this level for a number of years and then 
TABLE 3.1: Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 1986-1990: Alternative Scenario I 
Benchmark Scenario Alternative Scenario: I 
Attributable to 
PSBR As% of PSBR As% of Capital As% or Surplus on As% of Interest As% of 
£ million CNP £ million CNP borrowing CNP current CNP Payments CNP 




1985 2,457 15.7 2,457 15.7 -1, 173 7.5 +548 3.5 1,832 11.7 
1986 2,375 14 2,000 12 -900 51/i + 790 43/i -1,890 111/4 
1987 2,265 121/i 1,785 10 -800 41/2 +945 51/2 -1,930 103/i 
1988 2,155 11 1,925 10 -855 41/2 +870 4 -1,940 10 
1989 2,100 10 2,100 10 -1,030 5 +940 43/i -2,000 91/2 
1990 2,150 91/i 2,150 91/i -1,200 51/i + 1,150 5 -2, 100 9 
TABLE 3.2: Growth of Output by Sector 1986-1990: Alternative Scenario I (Per Cent Changes) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 7990 
B A B A B A B A B A 
Agriculture 3f.i 3A 2Vi 21/z 2 2 1 1 2 2 
Industry 4 2 53/i 41/z 5% 53/i 5 6 5 61/2 
Distribution, Transport and communication 1 1 1 1/z 3A 3A 1 11/2 3A 11/2 
Public Administration -Vi - 1/2 -1/2 -1/z -1/2 -1/2 1 -1/2 2 
Other Services 2 1 21/i 2 2 2 21/z 21/z 2 3 
GDP 2% PA 31A 3 3 3 3 4 3 41/2 
Net Factor Payments* ( -1/i) ( - 1/z) (-1/2) (-1/2) (-1,4) (-) (-1A) (-) {-1/i) (-) 
GNP 21/2 11/2 2% 21/z 3 3 3 4 3 41/2 
*Contribution to GNP growth 
B: Benchmark; A: Alternative Scenario I 
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follows the pattern of the benchmark. The bulk of the 
additional adjustment is achieved by reducing borrowing 
for capital purposes faster than in the benchmark 
projection but the surplus on current spending (excluding 
interest) is also raised to a higher level than in the 
benchmark projection (to 51/2 per cent of GNP compared 
with 4 per cent in 1987). The basis for allocating the 
additional reduction in borrowing is rather arbitrary: if 
there is a margin of borrowing for capital purposes which 
is uneconomic there is little point in giving a higher 
priority to maintaining capital spending over current 
spending; furthermore, the scope for actually achieving 
the adjustment within the time scale allotted might be 
greater if spending on capital projects is required to bear 
the brunt of the fall because expenditures in this category 
tend to be lumpy. 
4. Alternative Scenario I: Features of Projection 
The consequences for growth in output that might 
follow such a path of adjustment are summarised in Table 
3.2. In 1986 there is much slower growth than in the 
benchmark projection and growth remains below the 
benchmark in 1987 also; output of industry is 
considerably weaker and the demand for services is also 
slower. Against this the scope for relaxing the budgetary 
stance begins to widen from 1988, without expanding 
the overall level of borrowing from 10 per cent of GNP. 
Activity regains sufficiently to enable the national debt 
to be stabilished in proportion to GNP and after 1988 
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the economy grows faster than in the benchmark 
projection. Indeed for the remaining years of the decade 
there would be a tendency for the debt to fall relative 
to GNP. The profile of demand that might be associated 
with this alternative output path is indicated in Table 3.3. 
Relative to the benchmark there is a greater contribution 
to growth from the foreign sector up to 1988 due mainly 
to the more depressed state of domestic demand. During 
the remaining years, however, this pattern is reversed 
as domestic demand increases relative to the benchmark 
projection. 
In summary, while the initial impact of a more rapid 
adjustment to the public finance imbalance would be to 
lower economic growth it is possible that even within 
as short a period as five years, the cumulative growth 
in output would be as great as if a much slower path were 
pursued. Moreover, the growth path on which the 
economy would be might also be faster so that while 
there would not be a significantly different outcome for 
employment under either of the scenarios for the next 
five years the likelihood is that gains would be greater 
in the longer term from being on the higher path. 
5. Alternative Scenario II: Sluggish Adjustment of the 
Public Finance Imbalance 
Even though there could be faster growth within five 
years from implementing a more rapid adjustment to the 
public finances than that contained in the benchmark, 
it is obvious from past experience that Government find 
TABLE 3.3: Expenditure on GNP 1986-1990: Alternative Scenario I (Per Cent Contribution to Change in GNP) 
7986 1987 1988 1989 7990 
B A B A B A B A B A 
Household Consumption 11/z 11/i 1 \4 1114 l 1/2 l 1/2 11/z 2 
Public Consumption \4 114 114 \4 
Physical Capital Formation -1/2 - 1/2 3A 11/2 2 2 21/2 
Domestic Demand 21/2 1/2 21/2 l 1/2 2 2114 314 3% 3% 4% 
Foreign Sector + 1/2 3,4 1 11/i 1114 -14 3,4 -% -114 
GNP 21/2 3 21/2 31/2 31/2 3 4 3 41/2 
B: Benchmark; A: Alternative Scenario 1 
TABLE 3.4: Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 1985-1990: Alternative Scenario II 
Benchmark Scenario Alternative Scenario: II 
Attributable to 
PSBR As% of PSBR As% of Capital As% or Surplus on As% of Interest As% of 
£ mi/lion CNP £ mi/lion CNP borrowing CNP current CNP Payments CNP 




1985 2,457 15.7 2,457 15.7 -1,173 7.5 548 3.5 1,832 11.7 
1986 2,375 14 2,710 16 1,370 8 +610 3% -1,950 111/2 
1987 2,265 12114 2,740 15 -1,370 71/z +650 31/2 2,020 11 
1988 2,155 11 2,910 141/2 -1,470 71/z +660 31/z -2,100 11 
1989 2,100 10 2,960 14 -1,470 7 + 730 31/2 - 2,200 10% 
1990 2,150 9114 3,150 14 -1,575 7 +775 31/2 -2,350 101/2 
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it difficult to sustain adequate deflationary steps 
regardless of what benefits might or might not accrue 
over the medium term. Accordingly, it is appropriate to 
consider what economic prospects might be with a 
slower speed of adjustment to the public finances than 
that contained in the benchmark projection. It is unlikely 
that such a slower path would be deliberately adopted 
as Government policy. Instead it could emerge as a 
consequence of not adhering rigorously to a more 
deliberate path. In the dilatory environment in which 
policy would proceed in this manner it would be too 
much to assume that there would be a painstaking review 
to increase the efficiency of sectoral and micro policies 
and the responsiveness of the economy to them. The best 
that might be hoped for is that other macro policies might 
be held on the same course as in the benchmark (and 
alternative I) scenarios. 
The evolution of the public finances, relative to the 
benchmark which has been assumed for this scenario 
is set out in Table 3.4. In effect, there is a marginal 
reduction in borrowing for capital purposes (from 7V2 per 
cent of GNP to 7 per cent of GNP); the surplus on current 
(non-interest spending) is kept at a constant share of 
GNP; and a minor reduction occurs in interest payments 
relative to GNP as interest rates ease, though not by as 
much as in the benchmark projection. At the end of the 
decade the public sector borrowing requirement is 14 
per cent of GNP and conditions have not been 
established that would result in a stabilising of the ratio 
of national debt to GNP. 
MEDIUM-TERM OUTLOOK: 1986 ~ 1990 
6. Alternative Scenario II: Features of Projection 
The main difference between this scenario and the 
benchmark projection is that demand is higher for a time 
as a result of larger public borrowing. However, the 
stimulatory effect weakens as time goes on because the 
interest payments absorb a larger share. More 
importantly perhaps, the economic environment is 
sluggish and inimical to expansion as fiscal policy 
throughout the period continues to be deflationary, 
notwithstanding the higher level of borrowing. The 
expected pattern of output relative to the benchmark is 
shown in Table 3.5. Industry output and demand for 
services grow faster initially, but the effect on GNP is 
partly diminished by the fact that interest and other factor 
payments abroad are higher than the benchmark. 
Growth soon becomes slower, the prospect of not seeing 
a revival of demand dampens confidence and industrial 
output. Throughout the period, factor payments reduce 
growth compared to the benchmark. 
Domestic demand would almost certainly be greater, for 
a time, in these conditions than in the benchmark (see 
Table 3.6). However, part of this margin would be 
dissipated through the balance of payments, both 
through higher imports and larger net factor payments. 
In effect this scenario represents a continuation of the 
type of conditions experienced in the early part of the 
1980s, with some mitigating factors such as stronger 
growth of world trade and lower real interest rates. 
However, a slow grinding deflationary fiscal policy 
stultifies the prospects of generating self sustained 
TABLE 3.5: Growth of Output by Sector 1986-1990: Alternative Scenario 11 (Per Cent Changes) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 7990 
B A B A B A B A B A 
Agriculture 3.4 % 21/2 2112 2 2 2 2 
Industry 4 6 5% 6 5% 5% 5 4 5 4 
Distribution, Transport and Communication 1 1 1 1 % 1 314 % % 
Public Administration -1/2 1/2 
Other Services 2 21/2 21/2 21/2 2 21/2 2\11 2 2 1 \12 
GDP 2% 31/2 314 31/2 3 314 3 21/2 3 21/2 
Net Factor Payments* (-1/2) (- 1/2) (- 1/2) (- 314) (- 14) (- 1/2) (- \4) ( \12) ( 114) (- 1/2) 
GNP 21/2 31/2 2% 3 3 31/4 3 2 3 2 
*Contribution to GNP growth 
B: Benchmark; A: Alternative Scenario II 
TABLE 3.6: Expenditure on GNP 1986-1990: Alternative Scenario II (Per Cent Contribution to Change in GNP) 
1986 1987 7988 1989 7990 
B A B A B A B A B A 
Household Consumption 11/2 21/2 1 1/2 2 l \4 2 11/2 11/2 11/4 
Public Consumption 1/2 1/2 l/2 \4 \12 114 11/2 
Physical Capital Formation 11/2 1 314 11/2 \12 '(2 2 1 
Domestic Demand 21/z 31/2 21/2 31/2 2 31/2 3\4 21/2 3% 2114 
Foreign Sector 1 3A - 114 l - 1/2 % -3/4 
GNP 21/2 21/2 3% 31/4 31/2 3\12 3 2 3 2 
B: Benchmark; A: Alternative Scenario 11 
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growth, in the long run and under this scenario, it is 
inevitable that gains in employment would be small and 
unemployment would rise continuously. 
A summary of the two scenarios is contained in Table 
3.7. It is clear from this that a time horizon of five years 
minimum is required before the benefits from pursuing 
a more rapid course of action to that contained in the 
benchmark would become apparent. Indeed with a 
perspective of up to three years there would appear to 
be gains both in terms of output and employment from 
pursuing the slower path. 
TABLE 3.7: Alternative Scenario I Relative to Benchmark 
Deviation from Benchmark Projection (Percentage Points) 
Change in Change Change in 
PSBR as % in CNP Employment 
of CNP (Output) % % 
1986 -2 - 1/2 
1987 -314 1/4 
1988 + 1 \4 
1989 +1 + 1/2 
1990 l 1/2 +% 
Alternative Scenario 11 Relative to Benchmark 
1986 +2 +1 + 1/2 
1987 + 31,i \4 + \4 
1988 +314 11,i 
1989 + 1/2 -1 - 1/2 
1990 + 1/2 1 -% 
7. Different Circumstances m the International 
Economy 
FALLING OIL PRICES 
Towards the end of 1985 it became clear that the 
growing pressures in OPEC from budget and international 
payments balances coupled with excess capacity would 
lead to a breaching of the production ceilings which were 
being adhered to. It now appears possible that in the 
coming years considerable fragmentation could occur in 
the structure of the oil market. Indeed the prospect that 
this may occur rapidly and result in a sharp fall in the 
$US price of oil deserves to be considered. 
For illustrative purposes we assume that a reduction 
to about $20 per barrel will be sustained, compared with 
$27% on average in 1985, and $25 in December 1985. 
In such an eventuality there would be a number of 
problems as well as potential gains. The problems 
concern the effect which such instability would have on 
the financial balances of oil producers and the effects 
of that on financial institutions in industrial countries. A 
second set of problems concerns the possibilities of a 
rekindling of inflation if domestic demand in industrial 
countries were to be given a significant sharp boost. 
Another issue that would be of importance for Ireland 
is the effect which such changes might have on sterling. 
It is likely that, if oil prices remain at or below the $20 
per barrel mark for the remainder of 1986, that some oil 
exporting countries wi 11 find themselves with quite 
serious financial imbalances. These pressures might 
indeed be sufficient to lead to a strengthening of the 
OPEC organisation and a recommitment to a co-
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operative strategy to maintain the real price of oi I. In the 
context of the five year time horizon being taken here 
this turn of events would mean that in effect the evolution 
of oil prices over the period as a whole would not be 
significantly different to that assumed in preparing the 
benchmark projections. 
The issue of a rekindling of inflation in industrial 
countries as a result of booming demand conditions 
following a sharp fall in oil prices, if it occurred, could 
actually result in weaker medium-term economic 
prospects for the Irish economy than those projected in 
the benchmark scenario. The direct impact on the Irish 
economy of a price of $20 per barrel for oil would not 
be insignificant an addition to GNP of about 1 per cent 
and inflation of under 4 per cent compared with 41/2 per 
cent or about 11/2 percentage points off the PSBR as a per 
cent of GNP. However, the indirect impact could be 
much more significant, although whether this influence 
would be positive or negative would depend upon the 
response of industrial countries to the change. While 
there are high rates of capacity underutilisation in 
industrial countries, it is likely that bottlenecks in supply 
would quickly emerge if demand were to suddenly surge 
as a result of the gain in terms of trade of industrial 
countries. Undoubtedly the pick-up in activity would 
result in faster growth in the short term but the likelihood 
that inflation would revive would be considerable. In the 
medium term the higher inflation would lead again to 
policies to deflate economic activity. Against this, lasting 
benefits would emerge if the industrial countries 
especially the Europeans, responded by initially 
absorbing some of the price reduction in higher taxation. 
Then, if it emerged that the fall in price was being 
sustained the scope for engaging in a concerted set of 
policies to bring forward strong growth into the medium 
term could be exercised. In this set of circumstances it 
might be possible for Ireland to achieve a sustainable 
balance in the public finances and the beginning, at least, 
of a downward trend in unemployment by the end of 
the decade. 
The effects on the value of sterling of a sustained fall 
in oil prices to $20 per barrel is another variable which 
might have economic consequences for Ireland. It is 
likely that the effect would be to cause sterling to weaken 
on international exchange markets and perhaps for UK 
inflation to rise. Of course these effects might be 
mitigated or totally offset if the UK found itself benefitting 
from stronger international demand. Nevertheless, the 
likelihood remains that, in the circumstances envisaged, 
sterling might tend to weaken over much of the 
remainder of the decade. It is difficult to predict what 
the medium-term consequences of this might be for 
Ireland. In a situation in which UK inflation tended to 
rise there might be no direct economic effects. But there 
might continue to be financial effects beyond the short 
term which would be disruptive. There is a strong though 
- in our view perverse tendency for capital outflows 
to occur from Ireland and for upward pressure to gather 
on domestic interest rates when sterling weakens against 
all currencies including the Irish pound. The fact that the 
fall in sterling is to do with a decline in that economy's 
capacity to earn foreign currency does not seem to us 
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to be a logical reason to assume that the Irish pound 
should be moved within the EMS to reflect the change 
in sterling. Indeed it is quite possible that over a period 
of years financial markets here might adjust to a situation 
in which sterling fell towards parity with the Irish pound, 
without giving rise to disruptive capital flows. However, 
in the short term at least these flows are likely to occur 
if sterling shows signs of depreciation. This would give 
rise to periodic tendencies for interest rates here to rise. 
Depending on how long it takes for financial markets to 
adjust it is conceivable that such bouts would tend to 
offset possible benefits to Ireland of reduced oil prices. 
In conclusion, while lower oil prices than those 
assumed in the benchmark scenario might prevail over 
the coming years there is no assurance that these would 
result in faster economic growth although they would 
in certain circumstances offer such a prospect. The brief 
discussion here has highlighted that the precise effects 
would depend on the interplay of a wide number of 
variables. Accordingly, we feel that it would be unwise 
to significantly modify the main scenarios presented here 
for the next five years u nti I it becomes clearer that the 
reductions which are currently taking place will in fact 
be sustained and until the policy response of industrial 
economies becomes known. 
SLOWER ADJUSTMENTS OF INTEREST RATES 
In developing the main scenario for the Irish economy 
it was assumed that the international economy would 
develop along the lines of the "baseline" scenario 
contained in the IMF medium-term assessment of the 
world economy, see Part I Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 for 
details. Variants of this "baseline" scenario were 
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presented which considered the effects of "better" or 
"worse" (see Part I for details) policies being applied 
compared with the baseline. We see little prospect of 
the so called "better" policies being applied; but there 
is a risk that the "worse" policies may in fact be the ones 
pursued. 
In effect that scenario wou Id resu It in little or no further 
adjustment occurring to the imbalances in industrial 
cou ntr.ies. For exam pie, there wou Id be no adjustment 
to the fiscal imbalance in the US; no progress on 
structural policies to reduce unemployment in Europe 
and a trend towards further trade protection. An 
important consequence of this policy stance would be 
that real interest rates internationally would not decline 
below their present level. Output growth in industrial 
countries would be significantly slower and the expected 
expansion of world trade would not occur. There is no 
doubt that in these circumstances the progress that is pro-
jected for the domestic economy would be severely 
curtailed. Two highly significant influences which 
underly the expected development of the economy in 
the benchmark projection is the fall in real interest rates 
and the pick-up in world trade. Were these influences 
not to develop the likelihood is that growth would be 
severely restricted and adjustment of the public finance 
imbalance would be even slower to occur. 
In conclusion while there are prospects that certain 
aspects of the international economy might develop 
more favourably that assumed in the benchmark scenario 
there are also downside risks related to the assumed 
policy stance in industrial countries. The most likely 
pattern we believe is that contained in the benchmark 
projection. After that it would appear that the downside 
risks are rather more heavily weighted than the prospects 
for a more favourable outturn. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In Part II a scenario to the year 1990 was constructed 
which portrays the economy gradually returning to 
balance, in many respects, during the next five years: 
there is a renewal of economic growth, a stable rate of 
inflation which is low by previous experience and 
comparable to that in our trading partners, a modest 
growth in living standards generally, equilibrium in the 
balance of payments, and a tendency for the national 
debt to stop growing faster than national output. Yet there 
are important respects in which adjustment is 
disappointingly incomplete. By the end of the decade 
the rate of unemployment is even higher than now. 
Public sector borrowing is still equivalent to more than 
9 per cent of GNP of which the deficit on current 
spending accounts for 4 percentage points - a 
magnitude which some would regard as intolerably high. 
The living standards of those in employment at the end 
of the decade are no higher on average than they were 
at the beginning. Even these limited improvements are 
critically contingent upon a particular line of 
development occuring in the international economy. It 
is, of course, possible that the international economy will 
grow faster: the recent development in oil markets, if 
sustained, could create such a prospect. However, as 
discussed, the durability of these trends and the 
international responses which might occur to them are 
by no means unique, or necessarily beneficial to 
medium-term growth prospects. Additionally, while the 
main scenario is based on a development of the 
international economy which is felt to be most likely, 
there are risks, rather more heavily weighted on the 
downside, in our view, that a less encouraging set of 
circumstances might prevail externally. If that became 
the case there is little doubt that the progress noted above 
would be more curtailed. 
Regardless of what set of circumstances present 
themselves in the international economy, there are issues 
which will need to be addressed by domestic policies. 
A feature which emerges strongly in the projections is 
a continuation of the reduction in the balance of 
payments deficit which has been occurring for some time 
now. Indeed, it is possible that before the end of the 
decade there will be a surplus on the current account 
of the balance of payments. While an important 
constraint on the growth of economic activity may thus 
be waning, there is unlikely to be any scope for relaxing 
the fiscal stance before the end of the decade. The task 
of securing even a stabilised national debt with respect 
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to national output requires considerable further 
restriction in borrowing. 
Indeed the co-existence of a continuing large PSBR 
with a situation in which there is a prospective surplus 
on the current balance of payments is one that is 
likely to establish forces that will cause adjustment. We 
must admit that we are quite uncertain as to what 
channels these adjustments are likely to follow or, 
indeed, the strength which they might assume over the 
medium term. A corollary of the expected swing in the 
balance of payments, along with the public finance 
imbalance is a tendency for savings in the corporate and 
househoJd sectors to rise. This might result in interest 
rates falling faster than we have envisaged; such a 
tendency would relieve the public finance position and 
lead to higher domestic economic activity and a smaller 
improvement in the balance of payments. An alternative 
path would be for private capital outflows to occur 
persistently on a considerable scale. 
Whatever the tendency in this regard we feel that the 
appropriate response would be to pursue vigorously a 
course of correction to the public finance imbalance. 
Even on the basis of our benchmark scenarios the PSBR 
in 1990 will amount to over 9 per cent of GNP, of which 
over 4 percentage points is attributable to the deficit on 
current spending. In our discussions of the appropriate 
speed of adjustment to the public finances we have 
concluded that there are likely to be greater gains, in 
terms of both output and employment, taking a five year 
view, from pursuing a more rapid adjustment than that 
which appears in prospect, even though the short-term 
costs taking, say, a three year view might be greater. 
It has also become increasingly apparent from the 
analyses that if a balanced outcome is to be achieved 
in economic performance then the establishment of 
conditions that will enable the economy to respond 
rapidly to increased world demand and growth are vitally 
important. The setting of macro-economic policies has 
a significant part to play in this process. However, there 
may exist considerable scope for raising the productive 
potential of the economy by pursuing supply oriented 
policies at the micro and sectoral level and by relieving 
structural rigidities, where they exist. We have been 
unable to focus on these subjects in this issue. It is our 
intention to focus more closely on the role which they 
might be given in promoting economic growth and 
employment creation in our next issue. 

ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSALS FOR 
CHANGES IN THE COMMON 
AGRICULTURAL POUCY 
Robert O'Connor* 
Since the inauguration of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) in January 1962 there have been widespread 
demands from all quarters for its modification, but 
somehow it has managed to survive in more or less its 
original form. This is amazing considering the varying in-
terests of the different members and the trenchment at-
tacks made upon it from time to time. As Josling et al 
(1981) say "it [the CAP] stumbles from one crisis to the 
next rescued mainly because of fear, well founded or not, 
that a collapse of the policy would bring about the 
demise of the Common Market itself." 
Attacks on the CAP have taken various forms but it 
would be true to say that the major problem stems from 
the fact that among the member states there are gainers 
and losers. In particular the balance of contributions in-
to, and receipts from, the budget is a critical political fac-
tor. The price of food is another. The UK which in pre-
EEC days operated a cheap food policy now finds that 
food prices have increased considerably, while at the 
same time, it has to pay budgetary contributions to main-
tain these prices. So also have the Germans who are the 
largest contributors to the budget. (See Table 1.) 
The main criticism levied against the CAP are: 
(1) The high prices generate surpluses which are expen-
sive to dispose of; 
(2) these surpluses and the cost of disposing of them 
*Professor Robert O'Connor is a Consultant to the ESRI, Dublin. 
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have grown at an alarming rate compared with a 
static level of consumption; 
(3) the CAP does not achieve income equity as between 
different farmers or different regions. Because of high 
prices those who produce the most receive the 
highest income, i.e., the larger farmers on the bet-
ter soils; 
(4) the disposal of surpluses on the world market is 
disruptive of world trade; 
(5) too high a proportion of the total EEC budget is spent 
on agriculture and too little on other projects; 
(6) the new members, Spain and Portugal, will be net 
beneficiaries from the CAP placing further pressure 
on limited budgetary funds. 
Over the years attempts have been made to deal with 
these problems. In 1968 quotas and co-responsibility 
levies were placed on sugar production and this has eas-
ed the problems associated with the sugar beet crop. In 
1977 what is known as a "prudent" price policy was 
adopted, whereby agricultural prices were not increas-
ed in line with inflation, and since then, except for 1982, 
real producer prices in the EEC declined every year at 
an average annual rate of about 3 per cent. The decline 
was much greater than this in Ireland because of our high 
inflation rate which was not reflected in the exchange 
rate of the IR£ within the EMS. The Prudent Price Policy 
TABLE 1: Budget Contribution by Member States in Selected Years 1980-19861 
198s2 
Country 1980 7983 estimate 
Million ECU 
Belgium 929.8 1,263.1 1,441.6 
Denmark 346.6 484.3 614.0 
Germany 4,440.3 6,436.7 8,061.1 
Greece4 379.7 490.7 
France 2,872.7 4,615.1 5,830.7 
Ireland 137.8 253.0 311.6 
Italy 1,859.7 2,991.1 4,009.9 
Luxembourg 19.0 35.5 53.5 
Netherlands 1,249.6 1,580.9 1,859.5 
United Kingdom 3,146.1 5,161.1 5,238.6 
Total 15,001.6 23,200.5 27,911.2 
1. Does not include adjustments made in subsequent years. 
2. 1985 and 1986 exclude inter-government agreement. 
3. Related to GDP at market prices. 
4. Greece's contribution is calculated on a GNP basis. 
5. The estimated contributions by Spain and Portugal are 3,015.5 and 343.3m ECUs respectively. 
Source: Department of Agriculture, Dublin. 
19862 1983 as % of COP 














together with a co-responsibility levy of 1.5 to 2.0 per 
cent failed to halt the increase in milk production and 
in 1984 the milk super levy had to be introduced. This 
levy has succeeded in regulating milk production, but 
the beef and cereal surpluses sti 11 remain and there is 
strong pressure to bring them and other surpluses into 
line with consumption. 
TABLE 2: Degree of EEC Self-Sufficiency for Some Products 
7973 1982 7990 
% 
Cereals* 90 105 127 
Sugar 92 154 122 
Beef/Veal 85 102 103 
Pigmeat 101 101 101 
Sheep meat 61 72 89 
Poultry Meat 103 112 108 
Milk Products 108 118 113 
*Cereal substitutes are not included in making the calculations, though 
they affect the results by lowering the internal consumption of cereals. 
Source: The Agricultural Situation in the Community, 1984. 
The figures in Table 2 show the degree of self sufficien-
cy within the EEC in selected agricultural products for 
the years 1973 and 1982 with projections for 1990 on 
the basis of present policies. In the nine-year period the 
degree of self supply has increased considerably. Most 
products are now in surplus, or near surplus, and the beef 
position would be much worse if concessionary imports 
under the GATT were taken into account. Clearly, the 
Community is faced with a serious problem of surplus 
disposal. 
The effect of over production has led to large stockpil-
ing by the Community and in September of 1985 most 
stocks were higher than at the same time in any previous 
MEDIUM-TERM OUTLOOK: 1986 - 1990 
year. At that time there were in intervention or in aided 
private storage, 18 million tonnes of grain, 1.2 million 
tonnes of butter (much of it quite inedible due to age), 
500,000 tonnes of skim milk powder, 700,000 tonnes of 
beef, 2.05 million tonnes of sugar, 50,000 tonnes of olive 
oil and 18 million hectolitres of wine. There would be 
much more of these commodities in storage were it not 
for the fact that during the year large amounts were ex-
ported with the aid of export refunds varying from about 
30 per cent of the intervention price for cereals to about 
70 per cent of this price for milk products. 
The composition of FEOGA Guarantee1 section 
payments for different products in 1984 given in Table 
3 shows that 29.6 per cent of total payments went for 
the disposal of milk products, 9.2 per cent for cereals, 
8.9 per cent for sugar, 13.9 per cent for beef and veal, 
7.9 per cent for fruit and vegetables, 6.7 per cent for wine 
and 9.5 per cent for oils and fats. These payments, after 
allowing for levies of various kinds, came to over 60 per 
cent of the total EEC budget in that year and when struc-
tural payments and MCAs are included, total agricultural 
spending took over two-thirds of the total budget. 
The trend in total guarantee section expenditure and 
that on the main products of interest to Ireland si nee 1975 
is given in Table 4. 
The Present Crisis and Proposed Solutions 
In 1984 the CAP faced what was probably its most 
serious crisis so far. The EEC budget became exhausted 
and attempts were made by the Commission to increase 
1. Guarantee section payments relate to support price payments of 
various kinds as distinct from Guidance Sector Payments which relate 
to structural programmes. 
TABLE 3: HOGA Guarantee Expenditure by Sector in 1984 (million ECUs*) 
Intervention Total 
Export 
Product Refunds Storage Other Total Amount % 
Cereals and rice 945.2 314.3 438.3 752.6 1,697.8 9.2 
Milk and milk products1 1,943.4 1,710.4 1,787.9 3,498.3 5,441.7 29.6 
Oils and fats 8.5 68.7 1,674.8 1,743.5 1,752.0 9.5 
Sugar2 1,190.0 429.8 11.7 441.5 1,631.5 8.9 
Beef and veal 1,392.7 814.5 339.6 1,154.1 2,546.8 13.9 
Sheepmeat 433.5 433.5 433.5 2.4 
Pigmeat 157.0 38.9 38.9 195.9 1.1 
Eggs and poultry 69.8 69.8 0.4 
Fruit and Vegetables 58.6 1,396.0 1,396.0 1,454.6 7.9 
Wine 18.6 135.6 1,068.4 1,204.0 1,222.6 6.7 
Tobacco 36.5 28.2 711.7 739.9 776.4 4.2 
Fisheries 0.9 14.7 14.7 15.6 0.1 
Other 375.1 375.1 375.1 2.0 
Processed products 382.4 382.4 2.1 
Total Agricultural Expenditure 6,203.6 3,540.4 8,251.7 11,792.1 17,995.7 98.0 
MCAs and ACAs 376.2 2.0 
Total Guarantee Section 18,371.9 100.0 
*1 ECU - !Rf0.714 
1. After adjustment for co-responsibility levy. 
2. Before adjustment for co-responsibility levy. 
Source: 14th Financial Report on EACCF for the year 1984. 
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TABLE 4: FEOGA Guarantee Section Expenditure 1975-1984 (000 Million ECUs) 
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Total expenditure Net 
expenditure 
as% of EEC 
Year Cross Net 7 GDP 
1975 4.5 3.9 0.35 
1976 5.6 4.4 0.34 
1977 6.8 4.7 0.33 
1978 8.7 6.4 0.40 
1979 10.4 8.3 0.46 
1980 11.3 9.3 0.46 
1981 11.0 9.2 0.42 
19822 12.4 10.2 0.42 
19832 15.8 13.5 0.52 3 
19842 18.3 15.9 0.573 
1. Gross expenditure less levies including co-responsibility levies. 
2. Including Greece. 
3. Provisional. 
Source: The Agricultural Situation in the Community, 1984. 
the member states' VAT levy from 1 .0 to 1.4 per cent. 
This proposal ran into considerable opposition from the 
larger member states and was only agreed on conditions 
that constraints be placed in future years on the amount 
of the budget which would be available for agricultural 
purposes. Article 2 of the Conclusions on Budgetary 
Discipline stipulates that "the Commission ensures that 
the growth in the net cost of supporting agricultural 
markets in future years is less than the growth in 'own 
resources' except in special circumstances such as Com-
munity enlargement" (Com. (84), 83). How strict or ef-
fective this constraint will be is a matter of opinion, but 
what is clear is that the funds available to support 
agriculture will be determined in future on an on-going 
basis. Open-ended commitments as in the past will hard-
ly be permitted. Indeed, the Commission says (Green 
Europe, 1985) that an increase between 1985 and 1986 
in agricultural expenditure of seven per cent in real terms 
(equal to the average annual increase during the past 10 
years) would already in 1986 lead to a transgression of 
the new limit of 1.4 per cent of VAT which comes into 
effect in that year. 
In order to cope with the new budgetary situation the 
Commission has now issued a Green Paper entitled 
"Perspective for the Common Agricultural Policy" (July 
1985). This paper discusses the issues facing the Com-
munity and makes suggestions for policy directives in 
future years. It states that up to now the CAP has been 
characterised by an emphasis on the instrument of price 
support, that the limits of this approach have now been 
reached and that complementary instruments should be 
developed. The paper does not say that price supports 
should be withdrawn entirely, but it does say that market 
prices must be given a greater role in guiding supply and 
demand within the agricultural policy. This means adop-
ting a much more restrictive price policy than heretofore. 
According to the Commission the sector most urgently 
in need of adjustment is that of cereals and though the 
paper does not say so, it is obvious that if cereal prices 
could be reduced most other prices would be affected. 
Prices of white meat (pigmeat and poultry) which are not 
supported to any great extent would be reduced 
automatically through increased production, and red 
Expenditure on main products 
Beef & Cereals Sugar 
Milk Veal exc/. rice (net exp.) 
1.2 0.9 0.6 0.2 
2.3 0.6 0.7 0.1 
2.9 0.5 0.6 0.3 
4.0 0.6 1.1 0.5 
4.5 0.7 1.6 0.5 
4.8 1.4 1.7 0.1 
3.3 1.4 1.9 0.3 
3.3 1.2 1.8 0.4 
4.4 1.7 2.4 n.a. 
5.4 2.5 1.7 n.a. 
meats would have to follow suit in order to compete on 
the market. Sooner or later milk prices would also be 
affected because of the large amount of grain used in 
milk production. At least a reduction in grain prices could 
be used as an argument against increasing real milk prices 
(Sheehy, 1985). 
The extension of quotas is not favoured. The paper 
states that it cannot be in the long-term interest of Europe 
to extend the empire of quotas. If this were to happen 
the Community would be drawn into a labyrinth of ad-
ministrative measures for the quantitive regulation of pro-
duction, while if higher prices were envisaged within the 
framework of quotas there would be the risk of resistance 
from consumers and of the development of substitute 
products. It concludes by saying that "there can be no 
alternative to pursuing a price policy more adapted to 
the realities of the internal and external markets but tak-
ing account of the Community's obligations to the 
agricultural community." 
The paper tries to sweeten the pill somewhat by mak-
ing statements about agriculture as a protector of the en-
vironment, the need to keep people on the land in the 
poorer regions and the better integration of agriculture 
in regional development. Towards this end it suggests 
giving direct income aids to the poorer farmers and states 
that an essential element of any system of income aids 
would be a financial participation by the Community. 
The level of this participation is not stated, but if it is to 
be on the same lines as most existing schemes, a par-
ticipation by the member states will also be expected. 
Indeed, judging by the estimated costs to the Commis-
sion, fairly substantial national contributions will be 
necessary if the scheme is to have any impact at all. 
The Income Aids Suggested 
The first income aid option put forward is a pre-pension 
scheme. Under this option, aid would be paid to farmers 
between 55 and 65 years of age who would abandon 
their agricultural activity. 2 On reaching 65 the 
2. The White Paper does not say what would be done with the land 
but we assume it would be devoted to some recreational or other non-
agricultural activity - perhaps forestry on some of it. 
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beneficiaries of this scheme would be integrated into the 
normal national pension schemes. It is estimated that the 
scheme would cover 15 per cent of whole-time farmers 
in the Community; each would receive about £50 per 
week from the EEC and the total cost would be about 
IR£250 million for the Community as a whole. On the 
basis of this take-up, Ireland's share would be about 
IR£15 million. The pre-pension scheme is almost iden-
tical to the farm retirement scheme introduced in the 
1970s which did not work and had to be abandoned. 
The second option suggested is to give aid to profes-
sional farmers3 whose agricultural incomes fall below a 
certain percentage of the comparable regional income 
(average gross wage income for the region). The aid 
would be temporary, limited to a five-year "period of 
transition" giving the farmer a financial relief during these 
years in order to allow him decide on his future and make 
the necessary adjustments. It is stated that in order to 
avoid too abrupt a cut-off at the end of the transitional 
period the aid would need to be degressive (reduced in 
the final years). According to a first estimate, some 1.9 
million farmers would be concerned by such a scheme. 
The cost would be about IR£700 million per annum for 
the EEC as a whole or about IR£370 per farmer. It is 
estimated that Ireland's share would be about IR£60 
million. 
To simplify the administration of the scheme the aid 
would be calculated as a flat rate allowance per unit of 
production (hectare or livestock unit). It would thus be 
similar to the current disadvantaged area payments 
scheme, but the Green Paper does not say whether or 
not the new proposal would be additional to, or a 
substitute for, the latter. It is presumed that it would be 
additional. 
The third option is similar to the second, except that 
in this case part-time as well as whole-time farmers would 
be aided. Only the very poor, however, would be in-
cluded, those whose total incomes fall below 50 per cent 
of the comparable income at the regional level. The 
amounts payable would be the difference between cur-
rent income (agricultural plus non-agricultural) and about 
50 per cent of the comparable income, but deductions 
from amounts payable would be made for family 
members living in the farm household who have gainful 
off-farm employment. This scheme would not be 
degressive, but it would probably be limited to the pre-
sent generation of farm holders and would thus be self 
eliminating. According to the first estimate, about 1.25 
million farmers would be concerned in the EEC as a 
whole and the costs wou Id be in the order of I R£700 
million per annum for a start or about IR£560 per head. 
Ireland's share in this scheme would be about IR£50 
million. 
A fouth option is a payment for taking land out of pro-
duction. Costings on this are not worked out, but if we 
can judge from the other options the amount paid per 
acre would not be very large. Under this option the land 
made available could be bought or rented on a long-term 
3. Farmers who get 50 per cent of their total income from farming 
and who work more than half their working time in this sector. 
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basis for non-agricultural use, e.g., the creation of 
ecological refuges and reserves, leisure parks, afforesta-
tion, etc. The Paper states that every farmer could par-
ticipate in such a scheme although it may be expected 
that farmers with marginal land or poor production struc-
tures would be mainly interested. However, the aid 
would be fixed in proportion to the volume of produc-
tion abandoned. Since the aim is to reduce output there 
would be little point in making high payments for land 
which is currently producing very little anyhow. 
For all the options put forward, the fixing of the amount 
of aid to be granted would be a crucial question. 
However, it is obvious that the aids would have to be 
kept small since they must come directly out of the 
agricultural budget which will be severely limited over 
the coming years. Price increases, on the other hand, 
come from consumers through their food purchases, they 
do not affect the budget directly except for export 
refunds, and are thus invisible a reason why farmers 
prefer them to direct payments. 
Comments on the Green Paper 
The first responses of Community members to the 
Green Paper proposals are now beginning to come 
through and it seems that there will be strong resistance 
from countries like Ireland. The income aids proposed 
are very small, while the price reductions which would 
be effective in reducing surpluses would have to be very 
substantial. Also, since these reductions could not be off-
set by similar cuts in input prices, the position would be 
very serious for even the most efficient farmers. A high 
proportion of farm input prices are not related to output 
prices - oil, machinery, transport, etc., and to some ex-
tent fertilisers. 
It is doubtful, of course, if any realistic price package 
can do what has to be done, namely, to bring supply 
into line with demand. Between 1978 and 1984 real 
agricultural prices in Ireland (output prices deflated by 
the Consumer Price Index) fell by 37 per cent, yet over 
the same period, the volume of agricultural output in-
creased by 17 per cent. There was a slight fall in output 
in the first three years and a rise thereafter. Something 
similar happened in the United States in the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Though prices received by 
farmers declined by 53 per cent between 1929 and 1933 
the volume of output dropped by only 4 per cent. In 1934 
output declined severely, but it picked up again after this 
and in 1937 it was 11 per cent higher than in 1929 while 
prices were 18 per cent lower (Heady, 1952, pp. 
692-697). Figures for price changes and output growth 
in the USA in the 1930s and in Ireland from 1979 to 1984 
are given in Table 5. 
It could be argued that these experiences are special 
cases and that theories relating to supply responses can-
not be based on them. However, the literature on this 
subject indicates that aggregate supply elasticity in 
agriculture is very low and that large price drops would 
be necessary in order to cause a substantial decline in 
the volume of farm output (see Sheehy, 1982-83; NESC, 
1977; O'Connor and Kelly, 1978). A price decline for an 
individual product will cause a reduction in the amount 
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TABLE 5: Indices of Real Agricultural Prices and Output Volume in the USA in the 1930s and in Ireland 1976-1984 
United States3 lre/andb 
Year Farm Volume of Year Farm Volume of 
Pricesc Cross Output Pricesc Cross Output 
1929 100 100 1976 88.4 85.8 
1930 84 98 1977 95.4 93.9 
1931 59 107 1978 100 100 
1932 44 104 1979 93.8 99.2 
1933 47 96 1980 76.3 98.6 
1934 61 81 1981 74.6 98.3 
1935 74 99 1982 69.3 104.5 
1936 77 88 1983 66.4 107.8 
1937 82 111 1984 63.0 117.0 
Source: (a) Heady, E.O. (1952), pp. 692 and 697. 
(b) CSO, Dublin. 
(c) Irish Prices deflated by Consumer Price Index, US prices are actual. 
of that commodity produced and probably an increase 
in some other one, but if all prices are reduced farmers 
are stuck; they must go on producing. Once resources 
such as land and capital are employed in farming they 
are fixed and cannot easily be moved elsewhere. 
Machinery is likely to be used until it wears out and land 
indefinitely. Labour might move if it could, but in the 
present era of high unemployment it has no place to go 
except on to the dole queues. The Green Paper in its 
introduction averts to this fact when it says that, in the 
present conditions of high unemployment an accelera-
tion of the rural exodus would be intolerable, yet in 
another section it suggests policies which could well 
cause such an acceleration. 
Another danger is that severe price cuts would create 
intense pressure throughout the Community for the rena-
tionalisation of agricultural supports and could mean the 
end of both the CAP and the Common Market itself. If 
agriculture cannot be protected to some reasonable ex-
tent within the Community there will be little desire to 
have free trade in non-agricultural products. The Green 
Paper mentions the avoidance of re-nationalisation as a 
priority, but for some reason it fails to realise that price 
reductions of the magnitude envisaged may cause this 
to happen, particularly in states with small agricultural 
sectors. Finally, as stated above, a reduction in cereal 
prices will lead to an increase in the production of mQst, 
or perhaps all, livestock products. 
The above discussion indicates that the policies sug-
gested in the Green Paper will not solve the EEC farm 
problem and indeed it wou Id be dangerous to try them. 
By the time it was discovered that price policies were 
not effective in reducing supply irreparable damage 
would be caused. During that period the demands by 
farmers for re-nationalisation could hardly be resisted. 
What then can be done to bring supply and demand 
into line within the EEC? It would appear, despite what 
the Commission says, that the only solution is some kind 
of a quota system for many of the products in surplus 
supply. Already we have quotas for milk and sugar beet 
which are working well. Restrictions have also been plac-
ed on wine production and it is expected that these will 
prove effective also. 
For products like cereals and beef the situation is more 
difficult. In the case of cereals, acreage limitations for the 
different crops could be imposed, based on a survey of 
existing acreages. Beef would be much harder to cur-
tail. Quotas for dead meat and live fat animals could be 
operated on a country by country basis by limiting the 
total amounts eligible for intervention and for exports 
refunds, but it would be impossible to operate an 
equitable quota system for beef at the farm level. It 
seems, however, that it will not be necessary to put any 
direct constraints on beef production. Since the introduc-
tion of the milk super-levy there has been heavy 
slaughtering of cows and the latest projections are for 
a very large reduction in beef output within the Com-
munity over the coming years (Riordain 1985). Indeed 
there could well be a scarcity of cattle4 in a few years 
time because the beef surplus, (though expensive to 
dispose of), is small relative to total production. The pro-
portion of world beef production traded on the world 
market is only about 4 per cent compared with 15 per 
cent for cereals and 9 per cent for butter, while EEC ex-
ports of beef are only about 6 per cent of world market 
trade supplies compared with 60 per cent each for but-
ter and skim milk powder (Comm. (81) 608). 
To summarise the discussion, it has to be said that the 
proposals in the Green Paper, though put forward in 
good faith, will not solve the financial problems of the 
Community. The income aids suggested are so small as 
to be insignificant and it will be impossible to increase 
them to any great extent. The restrictive price policies 
hinted at will be of little help either. Even large reduc-
tions will not change aggregate supply very much in the 
medium term. The main effect will be to lower farm in-
comes and that should hardly be a policy aim per se. In-
deed when the issues are fully discussed it is unlikely that 
there will be much enthusiasm for drastic price cuts in 
most EEC states. The likelihood is for small real price 
reductions each year on a trial basis in order to see what 
happens. 
What is likely to happen is that the present constraints 
on milk, sugar and wine will be tightened up further. 
4. Table 2 projects an increase in self supplies of beef by 1990 but 
the heavy slaughtering of cows in 1985 indicates that this projection 
may be incorrect. 
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Cereal production will probably also be curtailed and 
prices will be reduced somewhat. Beef production will 
not be constrained by quota, but there will be limits on 
intervention buying and probably on export refunds. 
These will put a break on price rises and limit the pro-
duction of intensive high cost beef. In these cir-
cumstances it is hoped that Irish producers should have 
an advantage. We can produce grass better than any 
other country in Europe and with good management our 
beef output could expand while that in other countries 
was declining. That, at least, must be our hope. There 
are few other avenues available. 
Outlook for Irish Agriculture in the Medium Term 
Regardless of whether we have quotas or a very "pru-
dent" price policy the outlook for Irish agriculture in the 
medium term is not exceptionally bright. The impact of 
the milk quota has had, and will have, a serious effect 
on output growth. In the period 1975-1983 milk produc-
tion accounted for nearly 90 per cent of the increase in 
the volume of output and with this outlet curtailed, there 
is no effective substitute in the medium term (Kearney, 
1985). 
The Irish weather has always placed a severe constraint 
on grain growing. Modern machinery and the introduc-
tion of winter cereals have ameliorated this constraint 
to some extent, but the recurrence of years like 1985 
show that we cannot expect any substantial growth in 
this enterprise. The proposed lowering of grain prices will 
not help either. 
With reduced cereal prices the pig sector should be 
expected to grow, and is doing so in many other states 
in the Community, in response to the increased pig meat 
consumption. In Ireland, however, we seem to be mak-
ing no progress in this direction. Pig production in this 
country is probably as efficient as in any other country 
in the world except Denmark, yet pig numbers are 
declining in recent years because we have failed to sort 
out the processing and marketing problems. 
There is intense competition for the home market 
where profits are directly related to the amounts of salt 
and water which can be pumped into the bacon and 
ham. Only a few firms are interested in maintaining the 
standards required for the export market. This state of 
affairs cannot continue. With medical opinion now so 
strongly against salt it is likely that hard cured bacon will 
cease to be consumed in significant quantities by the end 
of the decade. When that happens the Irish processors 
will have difficulty in competing with imports and 
nobody can be too happy about the outcome. The pro-
spects for growth in the pig sector in the short term are 
therefore not very good. In the medium to long term, 
on the other hand, the processing industry will probably 
sort itself out if the Government introduces legislation 
to bring factory standards up to those in operation in 
other EEC countries. To be competitive, we need a small 
number of large hygienic slaughtering plants supplying 
carcases to satellite cutters who will supply the home and 
export market with a product that consumers require. 
This is the direction which the industry has taken in other 
countries. It will go the same way here. 
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It must be realised, of course, that pig production is 
no longer a traditional farm enterprise. Seventy per cent 
of pigs are now produced in about 300 units and this 
degree of concentration will intensify. The same is true 
for the poultry industry. Concentration has grown con-
siderably in recent years and will continue to do so, but 
the enterprise is too small to be of any great overall 
significance. Nevertheless, both the poultry and pig in-
dustry must be developed to the maximum extent pos-
sible. Every avenue must be explored in these trying 
times. 
The area where most growth can be expected over the 
coming years is the sheep and lamb sector. This enter-
prise has expanded by 30 per cent si nee 1980 after many 
years of decline, and with milk production blocked off 
it can be expected to continue growing under the im-
petus of the EEC sheep meat policy. The ewe premium 
in 1985 (which is based on the difference between the 
guide price for lambs and the market price) was I R£16.00 
per head while in the disadvantaged areas there was a 
further payment of IR£9.50 per head on the first 150 ewes 
in every mountain breed flock. Unfortunately sheep and 
wool production (including headage payments) account 
for only about five per cent of agricultural output so that 
a very rapid increase would be needed to make any 
significant contribution to overall growth. The main pro-
blem is that sheep production is a difficult enterprise re-
quiring specialist skills and is therefore not favoured by 
a large proportion of farmers at the present time. Younger 
farmers, however, are likely to become interested as 
other channels of expansion become closed off but it will 
take time to bring about a significant increase in output. 
In the circumstances where dairying is curtailed and 
sheep production is not widely favoured, cattle produc-
tion is the only grass-based enterprise of any conse-
quence available in the immediate future. Indeed, 
regardless of price, cattle will continue to be produced 
on every grassland field in the state and the Government 
must see to it that this enterprise is given every oppor-
tunity to expand. 
The main constraint to expansion will be supply of 
calves. With dairy cows declining, calves are already in 
short supply and so it is imperative that we expand the 
beef cow herd as quickly as possible. The forthcoming 
grants of about £100-£122 each for beef cows and calves 
in the disadvantaged areas should contribute to the re-
quired expansion, but this scheme will need to be 
publicised widely and seminars arranged to stress the na-
tional importance of beef production. Efforts should also 
be made to prevent the slaughter of dairy cows and 
schemes should, if possible, be introduced to have 
surplus dairy cows sold to beef producers. ACOT advisers 
are already pressing ahead with programmes for better 
beef producing systems using continental breeds. It is 
hoped that this work will be intensified. 
Growth Projections 
Kearney (1985) has predicted a volume output growth 
of about 1 per cent per annum between 1984 and 1990. 
This is a reasonable projection on the basis of his assump-
tions. If, however, we can get an increase in the beef 
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cow herd it should be possible to push growth up to 
about 1 V2 or possibly 2 per cent per annum. Farm in-
comes, however, are a different matter. If prices are cur-
tailed seriously we can expect a fall in real incomes. 
On the basis of a price/cost squeeze of 1 V2 per cent 
per annum (real output prices increasing by V2 per cent 
and real input prices by 2 per cent per annum), Kearney 
estimates a probable real decline in incomes of 3 per cent 
per annum between 1984 and 1990. A different study 
Sullivan, (1985) is more optimistic. On the basis of a 
model of the agricultural sector which keeps CAP expen-
diture within Community guidelines and the present 
price/cost ratio constant, Sullivan projects an income fall 
of about 0.9 per cent per annum between 1982 and 
1990. He says however that if the reduction in the farm 
labour force is taken into account the results could show 
gains in per capita incomes. 
Sullivan's projections appear to be somewhat op-
timistic, but everything depends on how prices go. If EEC 
prices are maintained through quotas, those lucky 
enough to have quotas will benefit through higher in-
comes, but those without quotas will be excluded from 
the table and there will be little growth in overall out-
put. If, on the other hand, the quota regime is relaxed 
and prices are cut, everybody can compete but incomes 
will be reduced. My own judgement is that the quota 
regime will dominate and that incomes will be maintain-
ed at the expense of growth. Furthermore, if there is an 
alignment within the EMS as now seems inevitable, there 
is likely to be a devaluation of the Irish green£, which 
could be the equivalent of a fairly substantial price 
increase. 
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FOREIGN-OWNED INDUSTRY IN 
IRELAND: PERFORMANCE AND 
PROSPECTS 
Eoin O'Malley* 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Ireland experienced 
strong growth in manufacturing industry based very large-
ly on investment by foreign multinational companies. 
While the formerly protected indigenous industries 
struggled to adapt to free trade conditions after the 
mid-1960s, hundreds of foreign firms set up new sub-
sidiaries in Ireland. This growth of foreign-owned industry 
played a vital role in Ireland's transition from a 
predominantly agricultural economy to what is now con-
ventionally recognised as a developed industrial coun-
try. The first half of the 1980s, however, has been a more 
difficult period for manufacturing, and even the foreign 
industries have experienced a continuous decline in 
employment, in marked contrast to the previous two 
decades. 
This article reviews developments in the foreign-owned 
manufacturing sector and considers its likely contribu-
tion to the economy over the next five years. It is timely 
now to consider whether this sector is merely experien-
cing temporary difficulties because of recession or 
whether there are deeper problems with longer-term 
implications. 
Phases of Foreign Investment 
Most foreign-owned industries in Ireland can be roughly 
classified into three types, according to the period when 
they were established, their motivation for investing here 
and the nature of their products. First, those established 
up to the 1950s were motivated mainly by a desire to 
sell to the Irish market. Since the policy of protection 
against imports at that time made it difficult for them to 
export to Ireland they overcame the protectionist bar-
riers by setting up production here. They were mostly 
British firms involved in industries such as motor vehicles, 
processed foods, detergents and other consumer goods, 
and they have mostly declined under freer trade condi-
tions. By 1980, they employed about 17,000 people or 
one-fifth of the total in foreign industries. 1 
Second, from the late 1950s to about the end of the 
1960s, new foreign investment in Ireland was largely in 
production of technologically mature and often labour-
intensive products for export markets. The industries con-
cerned included clothing, footwear, textiles, plastics, and 
light engineering. As Vernon (1966) suggested, these 
mature industries, with standardised products, were most 
capable of locating in industrially undeveloped countries 
because they no longer depended on the specialised 
*Dr Eoin O'Malley is a Research Officer at the ESRI, Dublin. 
1. This was the number employed in foreign-owned firms which had 
not received a New (or Small) Industry grant under the scheme first 
introduced in the 1950s. 
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technologists, skills, suppliers and services found in ad-
vanced industrial centres. And si nee they are generally 
quite labour-intensive they had a motivation to move to 
relatively low-wage locations once they were sufficient-
ly "mobile" 1 or free from the need for close contact with 
advanced industrial areas. The international dispersal of 
such industries occurred quite early in relatively low-
income countries on the periphery of the developed 
world, such as Puerto Rico and Ireland. Then, from about 
the mid-1960s, such mobile multinational industries in-
creasingly went to poorer less-developed countries with 
much lower wages. 2 Grants and tax concessions which 
were often introduced in the host countries (including 
Ireland) added to the attraction of low wages. 
The third type of foreign industry to come to Ireland, 
from about the late 1960s (overlapping in time with the 
second group), has involved newer, more technologically 
advanced products, such as machinery, pharmaceuticals, 
instruments and electronics, again primarily for export. 
Typically these industries involve only certain stages of 
production which are usually not the most demanding 
on local technological inputs, skills and high-quality sup-
pliers. Again there is some parallel here with the type 
of mobile industry which has been able to go to less 
developed countries since the late 1960s (Helleiner, 
1973), although the industries coming to Ireland include 
some more highly skilled activities, particularly in elec-
tronics, even if they have usually lacked the key 
technological and business functions of the firm. The ma-
jority of them are American-owned companies aiming 
to produce primarily for European markets and they have 
selected I re land as a suitable relatively low-cost, virtual-
ly tax free site within the EEC. 3 Thus Ireland's main 
competitors in attracting such industries would usually 
be other European countries. 
Employment and Output 
While the first group of formerly protected foreign in-
dustries has shown little dynamism si nee the early 1960s, 
the other two groups of new export-oriented firms con-
tributed substantially to employment growth. Table 1 
shows that these new grant-aided foreign industries were 
wholly responsible for the increase in industrial employ-
ment in 1966-73, while growth in indigenous and older 
2. Teeling (1975, Ch. 1) found that the composition of new foreign 
industries in Ireland up to 1971 bore a close resemblance to those found 
in more conventionally recognised Less Developed Countries. 
3. A survey of foreign firms reported in the Allied Irish Bank Review, 
April 1981, found that two-thirds of them (and presumably even more 
of the most recent arrivals) regarded a site within the EEC as an impor-
tant or a necessary attraction, since their main purpose is exporting 
to Europe. 
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TABLE 1: Manufacturing Employment in New Foreign 
Industry and the Rest of Industry, 1960-73 (Thousands) 
New Foreign 
Industry 














Note: New Foreign Industry is defined as majority foreign-owned firms 
which received New or Small Industry grants. 
Source: Derived from Trend in Employment and Unemployment, Survey 
of Grant-Aided Industry (1967) and IDA Employment Survey. 
TABLE 2: Predominantly Foreign Manufacturing Sectors 
Sector 
Computers & Office 
Machinery 








1 Includes "Healthcare Products". 
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foreign industries came to a halt under freer trade con-
ditions. Figure 1 shows trends in manufacturing employ-
ment since 1973, distinguishing between indigenous and 
a// foreign firms. Again, the foreign companies were the 
main source of growth until 1980, but their employment 
then fell in four consecutive years from 1981 to 1985. 
Unfortunately there is no regular data series on in-
dustrial output distinguishing foreign from indigenous 
firms. It is possible, however, to gain an impression of 
output and labour productivity trends in foreign industry 
by examining the data on sectors which are mainly com-
posed of foreign firms. Table 2 lists these sectors, show-
ing the percentage of their employment accounted for 
by foreign companies. The sectors in the table account 
for 57 per cent of employment in all foreign industries, 
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Source: IDA Employment Survey. 
the remainder being widely spread across other sectors, 
with fairly substantial amounts in clothing, textiles and 
food processing. 
The growth of employment, output and labour produc-
tivity in the foreign-dominated sectors is outlined in Table 
3. 
As the table shows, the employment record of all these 
sectors deteriorated in 1979-84 as compared with 
1973-79, although the growth rate in Computers and Of-
fice Machinery was still very high. And in most sectors 
the rate of change in output also showed signs of 
weakness, being negative in four of them in 1979-84, 
with three of the remaining five recording lower rates 
of growth than in 1973-79. Taken as a whole, however, 
the rate of growth of output in this group of industries 
TABLE 3: Average Annual Percentage Rates of Change in Predominantly Foreign Sectors, 1973-84 
Employment Volume of Output Labour Productivity 
1973-79 1979-84 1973-79 1979-84 1973-79 1979-84 
Computers & Office Machinery 23.3 18.5 42.9 40.6 15.9 18.7 
Chemicals & Artificial Fibres 3.3 0.5 14.1 8.1 10.4 7.6 
Electrical Engineering 3.2 1.3 3.7 6.4 0.5 5.1 
Instrument Engineering 17.2 2.6 7.2 8.2 -8.6 5.4 
Mechanical Engineering 7.3 -2.0 9.4 0.7 2.0 2.9 
Motor Vehicles and Parts -2.3 -8.9 4.0 -11.2 -1.7 -0.4 
Rubber Products 1.0 8.4 3.7 -4.6 4.8 4.2 
Footwear -4.5 -9.1 -5.9 -5.0 -1.5 4.6 
Metals 7.0 8.4 2.9 -0.1 4.4 9.0 
Weighted Average 3.1 -0.1 9.6 12.1 6.4 12.2 
Sources: Census of Industrial Production and monthly industrial inquiries. 
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accelerated, which was almost entirely an effect of 
changing composition due to the increasing weight 
of the relatively fast-growing electronics industry (Com-
puters and Office Machinery and part of Electrical 
Engineering). Most sectors also show an increase in 
growth of labour productivity, with the overall increase 
being very marked, again partly an effect of the increas-
ing weight of electronics which had particularly rapid 
productivity growth. Thus, taken sector by sector, both 
weakness in output growth and unprecedented labour 
productivity growth aided by technological change 
generally played a part in the deterioration in employ-
ment trends. The overall acceleration in output growth 
in this group of industries taken as whole was due to 
rapid growth in electronics, the weight of which was in-
creasing within the group. 
The deterioration in growth of most foreign-owned in-
dustries in the early 1980s was, of course, quite largely 
an effect of recession in the EEC markets where they sell 
most of their products. But recession alone did not pro-
duce such a marked deterioration in 1974/76 and there 
is reason to believe thatthere are also other, more lasting 
factors at work. 
For one thing, the earliest generation of (mostly British-
owned) formerly protected foreign industries, which 
came to Ireland before the 1960s, has been in persistent 
decline for a long time past. 4 Many of the companies 
concerned probably ran down or closed their Irish plants 
following the removal of the protectionist barriers which 
had originally motivated their establishment. Quite com-
monly, the Irish plants would have been too small in 
scale for efficient production and therefore non-viable 
under free trade. The clearest example of this was the 
car assembly industry which has now disappeared. The 
decline of these formerly protected industries, however, 
was already under way in the 1970s and it did not pre-
vent overall rapid growth in foreign industry then, since 
the newer generations were growing quickly. 
The Life-Cycle Effect 
Another factor which is probably now affecting the 
overall growth of foreign-owned industries is the 
emergence of a life-cycle effect among the new grant-
aided firms. It appears that new foreign plants common-
ly experience rapid employment growth in their early 
years as they build up to initial target size, followed by 
periods of slower growth, stagnation and eventually 
decline or closure. This life-cycle factor was in evidence 
before the recession of the 1980s, as is seen in Table 4 
which shows employment change from 1973 to 1980 in 
foreign-owned New and Small Industry plants which 
were al ready established before 1973. 
Employment in the whole group of firms established 
prior to 1973, and in most sectors within the group, 
declined over the following seven years at a time when 
Ireland had the fastest growing manufacturing sector in 
the EEC. Thus the rapid overall growth of employment 
4. Employment in older foreign-owned industries wh'1ch did not receive 
a New or Small Industry grant declined by 15 per cent between 1973 
and 1980. 
TABLE 4: Employment in Foreign New and Small Industries 
Established Prior to 1973 (Numbers) 
Per cent 
7973 7980 change 
Food 2,246 2,514 11.9 
Drink & Tobacco 376 548 45.7 
Textiles 3,829 3,419 10.7 
Clothing & Footwear 3,095 2,168 -30.0 
Wood & Furniture 562 448 -20.3 
Paper & Printing 1,402 1,209 -13.8 
Chemicals 3,490 5,493 57.4 
Clay, Glass & Cement 938 941 0 
Metals & Engineering 15,017 14,063 -6.4 
Other Manufacturing 7,223 6,486 -10.2 
Total 38,178 37,289 -2.3 
Source: Derived from IDA Employment Survey. 
TABLE 5: Employment in Foreign New and Small Industry, 
by Date of Establishment in Ireland (Numbers) 
Date of Percentage 
Establishment 7973 7980 Change 
Up to 1952 8,015 6,675 -16.7 
1953-60 6,413 5,935 -7.5 
1961-64 4,662 4,771 2.3 
1965-68 8,748 7,658 -12.5 
1969-72 7,740 10,473 35.3 
Note: The precise date of establishment of some firms is not available. 
These employed 2,600 in 1973 and 1,777 in 1980, a decline of 31. 7 
per cent. They are included in Table 4 but not in Table 5 since they 
cannot be allocated to age cohorts. 
Source: Derived from IDA Employment Survey. 
in foreign industry at that time was sustained only by the 
continuing and growing inflow of new first-time foreign 
investors. Th is is consistent with the suggestion that 
foreign firms tend not to grow much after reaching their 
initial target size but rather tend to decline after some 
time. 
Table 5 shows employment change by date of 
establishment in Ireland and it provides further evidence 
of this tendency. With the very slight exception of the 
1961-64 age cohort, employment declined in the older 
cohorts. The most recent cohort, for 1969-72, which 
would have included many firms still in the phase of ex-
pansion to initial target size, is the only one with substan-
tially growing employment. Leaving out this cohort, 
employment in plants established before 1969 fell by 12 
per cent in 1973-80. (Incidentally, the exceptional growth 
in Chemicals in Table 4 is almost entirely due to relatively 
new firms established in 1969-72.) 
The trends revealed in Tables 4 and 5 would not have 
been evident in the earlier stages of the inflow of new 
foreign industries, since the overall picture would at first 
have been dominated by the expansion phase of relative-
ly new plants. Thus McAleese and McDonald (1978) 
found that foreign New Industries established prior to 
1966 had increased their employment up to 1974 by over 
40 per cent. However, as time passed, with the average 
age of plants increasing and the proportion of relatively 
new expanding plants declining, the situation changed 
to that shown in Table 4. 
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FIGURE 2: Employment in Grant-Assisted Industries in 
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Note: This chart includes new indigenous industries, but a substantial 
majority of the employment is in overseas firms. 
Source: Northern Ireland Economic Council (1983). 
Employment data for new industries in Northern 
Ireland illustrate the likely pattern more clearly since they 
cover a much longer period, going back to the late 1940s. 
Figure 2 shows the trends there, broken down by age 
cohort. It is clear that each cohort grows rapidly at first, 
followed by stagnation and decline, and the data for the 
Republic of Ireland are consistent with the suggestion that 
a similar pattern has occurred here, although the ex-
perience of decline seems less severe than in the North. 
If such a pattern persists, the overall trend is increasing-
ly influenced by the large stock of relatively old declin-
ing plants, so that an ever greater inflow of new first-time 
investors is needed to maintain any specified growth rate. 
If there is a falling rate of new first-time investment, the 
overall trend can eventually turn to decline. The 
deterioration in the performance of foreign industries in 
the Republic in the first half of the 1980s was caused by 
a combination of international recession, the growing in-
fluence of this life-cycle factor and (as will be shown 
below) a decline in new first-time investment. And un-
precedented labour productivity growth contributed 
substantially to the worsening employment trend. 
In order to judge whether eventual decline of each 
generation of new firms is likely to be a persistent pat-
tern, one must consider why it has occurred in the past. 
But in the absence of more detailed research, answers 
to this question must be rather tentative. In the case of 
the technologically mature, labour-intensive foreign in-
dustries, which were typical of those established in the 
1960s, the production process would have been quite 
settled and the products, such as textiles, clothing and 
footwear, quite standardised. These industries thus ar-
rived in Ireland at a relatively late stage of the industry 
life-cycle, so that they would have tended to face weak 
growth in demand, as is typical with mature industries. 
In addition, because they were technically mature, plants 
in the same sectors could locate in less advanced in-
dustrial areas. Thus at about the same time or soon after 
the time when such industries could be set up in Ireland, 
they could also be established in low-wage less-
developed countries. As Teeling (1975) suggested, this 
meant that each generation of these industries could tend 
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eventually to come under competitive pressure from 
lower cost producers, and this too could have created 
difficulties for some of the plants in Ireland. In essence, 
therefore, the life-cycle of such foreign industries in 
Ireland would have been a truncated version of the life-
cycle of the industry internationally, consisting only of 
the late growth or mature phase before stagnation or 
decline set in. 
The newer, more technologically advanced generation 
of products, such as chemicals, instruments and elec-
tronics is a somewhat different matter, however, since 
many of these industries were established in Ireland 
much earlier in the life-cycle of fafrly new industries with 
rapidly growing sales. But usually only certain relatively 
technologically undemanding stages of production are 
carried out (i.e., compared with the activities carried out 
in their home countries). Thus in some cases, at least, 
further dispersal of such activities to lower-cost countries 
may again tend to occur. Such industries also tend to 
undergo a process of concentration, as the smaller and 
weaker firms which prospered in the initial upsurge of 
new products succumb to stronger competition. This 
"shake-out" process may tend to be damaging eventually 
for some of the companies which established plants in 
Ireland, since these companies have tended to be 
relatively small by the standards of multinational corpora-
tions. Perhaps most important, the life of individual pro-
ducts in new high-technology industries tends to be 
relatively short since developments in product 
technology lead to rapid obsolesence. Thus Irish plants 
without a strong product development capability may 
be vulnerable unless new products are continually in-
troduced by the parent company. Finally, although these 
newer industries face faster growth in demand, they are 
still past the early growth phase and drawing closer to 
the expected phase of slower growth. 
All in all, one might expect the newer, high technology 
industries to have a somewhat longer period of growth 
in Ireland than the mature labour-intensive industries, 
but they would still have a truncated life-cycle compared 
with the same industries internationally. Table 3 indicated 
that chemicals and mechanical engineering are already 
showing some signs of weakness, or at least they have 
not had sufficient dynamism to over-ride the effects of 
a general recession. Since the strongest growth has been 
in electronics (which includes most of Computers and 
Office Machinery and part of Electrical Engineering), it 
is worth examining the electronics industry in more detail 
to see if the life-cycle effect is in evidence there \et. 
Table 6 shows employment changes in foreign el~c-
tronics firms, by date of establishment in lreland.5 Thete 
is consistent evidence of a life-cycle effect. Employment 
in the two oldest cohorts, of firms established up to 1968, 
was already declining in the 1970s, and the next cohort, 
of firms established between 1969 and 1972, grew rapidly 
at first but this growth flattened out in the 1980s. And 
the two following cohorts grew a good deal faster in the 
1980s, but the more recent of the two had a far higher 
5. The electronics industry is definetj somewhat more narrowly here 
than the IDA's usage of the term. It includes most of Computers and 
Office Machinery and part of Electrical Engineering. 
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TABLE 6: Employment Change in Foreign-Owned Electronics Firms, by Date of Establishment in Ireland 
Employment Average Annual 
(Numbers) Percentage Change 
Date of Establishment 7973 7980 7985 7973-80 7980-85 
Up to 1964 1,810 1,347 807 -4.1 9.7 
1965-68 1,560 1,064 773 5.3 -6.2 
1969-72 381 1,589 1,744 22.6 1.9 
1973-76 0 2,231 3,309 8.2 
1977-79 0 1,203 3,705 25.2 
Note: Only companies still in existence in 1985 are included. If companies which closed before then were included, the rates of growth would 
be somewhat lower, or the rates of decline would be greater. 
Source: Derived from IDA Employment Survey (see footnote 5). 
rate of growth. Evidently, even the electronics industry 
does not escape the effect of the life-cycle factor. The 
rapid overall growth of recent years masks this underly-
ing trend only because most of the industry is so new, 
but the logical outcome of persistence of the trends il-
lustrated in Table 6 is a slower rate of growth before very 
long. The IDA recognises, however, that it is important 
to attract strong firms and research and development 
facilities to Ireland. Increased attention has been focus-
ed on these factors in recent years and it could result 
in longer life cycles for companies coming to Ireland. 
New Industries 
Since it seems that the inflow of new first-time foreign 
investment must play the major role in sustaining the ex-
pansion of foreign-owned industry as a whole, it is worth 
briefly reviewing recent trends in the establishment of 
new industries. Table 7 presents three indicators of these 
trends, since there is no single ideal indicator. IDA Ap-
proved New Foreign Investment (i.e., the total investment 
expected in projects which are approved in the year in-
dicated), in Column 1, peaked in 1981, then fell substan-
tially until 1983 before recovering in 1984. However, by 
far the largest project approved in 1984 had not actual-
ly gone ahead by the end of 1985. Furthermore, these 
figures are in current Irish pounds, so the real value of 
investment would have fallen by more and recovered 
by less than it appears because of inflation. Measured 
in constant (1980) prices, IDA-approved new foreign in-
vestment fell from £285m in 1981 to £64m in 1983 and 
£202m in 1984. 
Column two shows American firms' capital investment 
in Ireland, in current dollars, indicating a peak around 
1979-81 followed by decline. 6 Although it shows no 
recovery in 1984, an increase to $151 m was forecast for 
1985. Job gains in new and expanding foreign industries, 
in Column 3, have also declined from the peak level 
reached at the end of the 1970s. Again there was no sign 
6. This series, based on surveys carried out in the USA, shows actual 
investment in the year indicated, whereas the JOA series in Column 
1 shows the investment expected in projects approved for grants in 
the year indicated. This makes the IDA series more volatile because 
actual investment in large projects may be spread over more than one 
year although it is all announced at one time and therefore is concen-
trated in one specific year in the IDA series. Also, the American series, 
unlike the IDA series, includes capital expenditures by established firms 
although it mainly consists of investment in new projects. 
TABLE 7: Capital Investment and Job Gains in New Foreign 
Industry 
New Foreign US Firms' 
Investment Capital Job Cains in 
Approved 7 Expenditure Foreign Firms2 
(£million) ($million) (Numbers) 
1978 150.1 102 9,263 
1979 208.8 213 10,189 
1980 279 207 8,712 
1981 327.2 229 7,633 
1982 196.3 146 6,665 
1983 86.5 124 7,333 
1984 284.1 123 5,936 
Notes: 1 New foreign investment approved is the total investment 
intended in new projects which are approved for grants by the JOA 
in the year indicated. Not all of this investment necessarily occurs in 
fact, and it may be spread over the year of approval and later years. 
2Job gains are the sum of employment increases in expanding foreign 
firms and new first-time foreign projects. They do not represent the 
net employment change in foreign industry, which would be the 
difference between gains and losses. 
Sources: IDA Annual Reports for Column 1. US Department of 
Commerce, Survey of Current Business, March 1985 and previous issues 
for Column 2. IDA Employment Survey for Column 3. 
of a recovery in job gains in 1984, but this may be partly 
because employment increases follow investment after 
some time lag. Although the three indicators in Table 7 
are rather different, they all show that the inflow of new 
foreign industries weakened in the early 1980s. There 
were some signs of recovery in 1984 or 1985, but not 
to the level reached some years earlier. As was already 
mentioned, this weaker inflow of new foreign invest-
ment, in combination with a tendency for established 
firms to decline eventually, resulted in relatively low 
growth in most sectors which, together with an accelera-
tion in labour productivity, led to the overall decline in 
employment in the 1980s. 
To turn to the question why the inflow of new invest-
ment declined, it was partly a reflection of a general fall 
in US investment in Europe and partly a result of a fall 
in Ireland's share of this investment. US manufacturing 
investment in Europe peaked at 11.1 billion dollars in 
1980 and fell to 7.8 billion in 1983 and 7.9 billion in 1984 
(all in current prices). And Ireland's share of US invest-
ment in Europe ranged between 1.9 per cent and 2.3 per 
cent in 1979-81 but declined to 1.5 per cent in 1982 and 
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1.6 per cent in 1983 and 1984.7 The general fall in 
American investment was no doubt largely an effect of 
recession, particularly in EEC markets. And the fall in 
I re land's share reflects increasingly intense competition 
from other European countries to attract mobile in-
dustries because they have experienced high unemploy-
ment. Britain, in particular, has competed more vigorous-
ly for mobile investment, Spain has successfully attracted 
more American industry too, perhaps due to the benefit 
of its recent entry to the EEC, and other countries have 
introduced more aggressive schemes to attract foreign 
industries. 
In addition, investment in Ireland from other European 
countries fell substantially, from £76.6m in 1980 to 
£22.Sm in 1984 ODA Annual Reports), which represented 
a decline from 27 per cent of foreign investment in 
Ireland to 8 per cent. This is again no doubt largely a 
reflection of the European recession, as well as the 
relative weakness of European firms in the major growth 
industry, Electronics. Prospects for the recovery of foreign 
investment in Ireland would appear to depend quite 
heavily on a sustained European recovery from reces-
sion, although strong competition for mobile investment 
would still make it difficult to regain the peak inflow of 
new industry experienced around 1979-81. 
Value of Output Retained in the Irish Economy 
Official statements of industrial policy in recent years 
have stressed that the objective is not only to maximise 
the number of sustainable jobs in industry, preferably in 
high-skilled activities, but also to raise the output of in-
dustry and to maximise the proportion of the value of 
this output retained in Ireland. Wealth generated by in-
dustry is retained in Ireland in the form of wages and 
salaries, purchases of Irish goods and services as inputs, 
and reinvestment of profits. In this way, too, further 
employment and incomes are generated indirectly in this 
country. On the other hand, part of the value of industrial 
output leaves the country, in the form of payments for 
imported materials and services and profit outflows. 
There has been no regu Jar series of data on the pro-
portion of the value of output retained in the Irish 
economy by industry, but the IDA initiated an annual 
survey to fill this gap in 1984. Table 8 gives a breakdown 
of the cost structures of a number of categories of industry 
in terms of percentages of sales, distinguishing items 
which clearly involve expenditures retained in the Irish 
economy from other items which involve expenditures 
abroad or a potential outflow of factor payments. 
The table shows that expenditures in the Irish economy 
are a much higher proportion of the sales of Irish in-
digenous industry (at 79 per cent) than of foreign-owned 
industry (at 44 per cent). All the individual items of Irish 
economy expenditure are a higher proportion of sales 
among Irish firms, but the main difference from foreign 
7. These figures are from the US Department of Commerce, Survey 
of Current Business, various issues. Note that much US investment in 
Europe is in re-equipment of established industries, whereas a larger 
proportion of the investment in Ireland is in new "greenfield" pro-
jects. Thus Ireland's share of investment in new projects is larger than 
the figures suggest, but there is little doubt that Ireland's share has fallen 
somewhat. 
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TABLE 8: Industry cost structure 1983 (per cent of sales) 
Irish Foreign Non- Food 
Food 
Wages & Salaries 18.85 16.22 21.84 11.28 
Irish Materials 45.84 16.38 11.43 64.95 
Irish Services 14.1 11.56 15.8 8.58 
Irish Expenditures 78.79 44.16 49.07 84.81 
Imported Materials 13.45 29.43 27.68 9.87 
Imported Services 1.04 6.87 5.6 .71 
Profit 1.07 16.07 11.72 1.85 
Depreciation 3.02 2.45 3.42 1.78 
Interest 2.63 1.02 2.51 0.98 
21.21 55.84 50.93 15.19 
Source: Industrial Development Authority (1985), Table 1. 
firms is the higher proportion spent on Irish material in-
puts. This is balanced mainly by the higher proportion 
of the value of foreign industry's output accounted for 
by imported materials and profits. Th~ir profits do not 
al I necessarily leave the country but the evidence sug-
gests that most of them do eventually; we return to this 
issue below. 
Part of the reason for the relatively high Irish economy 
expenditures of indigenous industry is because most of 
the food industry is Irish-owned, and Irish materials ac-
count for a very high proportion of the value of its sales, 
as is also shown in Table 8. But even leaving out the food 
sector, Irish economy expenditures account for 69 per 
cent of sales of indigenous non-food industries compared 
with 38 per cent in foreign non-food industries ODA, 
1985, Chart 6). Thus, on average, a pound's worth of out-
put from Irish non-food companies means about 80 per 
cent more spent on Irish inputs than the same output 
from foreign companies. 8 It may be concluded that 
growth of foreign industries generally contributes pro-
portionally less to the economy than growth of in-
digenous industries. As foreign-owned firms have grown 
increasingly important in the industrial sector over the 
past twenty-five years, the contribution to economic 
growth arising from a given increment to total industrial 
output would therefore have tended to decline. For out-
put growth has been accompanied by an increase in the 
proportion of its value accounted for by imported inputs 
and, as we will see below, exported profits. 
To take this point a step further, the composition of 
the foreign-owned manufacturing sector itself has been 
changing so that the fastest growing sectors, which have 
become increasingly important, tend to be those with 
the lowest Irish economy expenditures in relation to 
sales. Table 9 illustrates this point, showing average an-
nual growth rates and Irish expenditure as a percentage 
of sales in the predominantly foreign-owned sectors. The 
figures indicate that the contribution to economic growth 
8. Note that Irish economy expenditures are not equivalent to value-
added in the economy since there are secondary leakages, in the sense 
that material and service inputs purchased in Ireland contain some 
imported inputs. But Irish economy expenditures give an indication 
of the relative contribution to the economy of the output of different 
sectors. 
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TABLE 9: Growth Rates and Irish Economy Expenditures in Predominantly Foreign Sectors, 1973-84 
Sector 
Computers & Office Machinery 
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Sources: Census of Industrial Production and monthly inquiries for Column 1. IDA (1985), Appendix V for Column 2. 
TABLE 10: Trading and Investment Income and Profit Outflows, 1980-84 (£ million) 
Net Trading & Investment Income 
Trading & Investment Income - Outflow 
Of which:- Profits, Dividends, Royalties 
Profits, etc., as per cent of GDP 
Source: Balance of International Payments 1984, CSO. 
arising from a given increment to the output of foreign 
industries has probably been declining, because most of 
the growth has come in sectors with low Irish economy 
expenditures.9 Largely as a result of these trends, it has 
been possible for Ireland to have the highest rate of 
growth in industrial production in the OECD over the 
period 1980-84 while industrial employment slumped 
and the economy grew a good deal more slowly than 
in many other countries (see OECD, 1985, Table 18). 
It is worth focusing on the question of profits of foreign 
companies and profit outflows, since this has become 
an important issue recently. Following revisions to the 
balance of payments accounts in 1984, it became clear 
that the outflow of profits of foreign companies has grown 
very quickly in the 1980s and is now quite significant in 
relation to GDP. Profit outflows are identified in the 
balance of payments accounts as part of the Debit or 
outflow side of Trading and Investment Income flows and 
the trend in these items is shown in Table 10. "Trading 
and Investment Income - Outflow" represents the gross 
outflow of interest payments plus profits, dividends and 
royalties of foreign companies. The outflow of profits, 
dividends and royalties shown in the table includes non-
9. The proportion of material input needs of foreign companies sourced 
in Ireland has, however, been increasing (IDA, 1985, Section 5.3), but 
this need not mean that their expenditure in Ireland as a percentage 
of output has increased. For in the fastest growing sectors, profits ac-
count for a relatively high proportion of sales while wages and/or total 
material purchases account for relatively low proportions. Thus even 
a steady increase in the proportion of materials sourced in Ireland can 
be insufficient to stop an overall decline in Irish economy expenditure 
as a percentage of sales, as the composition of output shifts towards 
this type of industry. 
7980 7987 7982 7983 7984 
-367.5 -515.9 -938.3 -1,196.3 -1,622 
-832.1 -1,083.1 1,522.9 -1,745.4 -2,240 
-258 -361.7 -498.7 -658.6 -940 
2.8 3.2 3.8 4.5 5.8 
manufacturing companies but estimates of the amount 
arising from manufacturing suggest it accounts for bet-
ween 78 per cent and 92 per cent of the total. 10 The 
IDA (1985, Section 5.5) estimates that between 75 per 
cent and 80 per cent of profits of foreign manufacturing 
firms left the country in 1983. 
It is not particularly surprising that foreign companies 
should want to withdraw their profits but there is some 
question as to why the outflow of profits rose so sharply 
in the 1980s, considering that foreign investment has a 
long history in Ireland going back decades before this. 
The main reason is because the profits themselves in-
creased very quickly, rather than because of a greater 
propensity to withdraw a higher proportion of profits. 
The profits of American companies in Ireland, for exam-
ple, grew by an average of 3 per cent a year in 1977-80, 
rising to 47 per cent a year in 1980-83, measured in Irish 
pounds. The acceleration in the growth rate was less 
marked when measured in dollars, at 9 per cent a year 
in 1977-80 and 25 per cent in 1980-83.11 Since the com-
panies concerned may tend to seek their return in terms 
of dollars, the fall in the value of the dollar up to 1980 
followed by a rise after that may be part of the explana-
tion of the sharp acceleration in profit growth in terms 
of Irish pounds. 
What is even more significant, however, is the fact that 
most of the fastest growing foreign-dominated sectors 
(listed in the top half of Table 9) are exceptionally 
10. See OECD (1985), pp. 47, 48 and IDA (1985), Section 5.5. 
11. US Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, various 
issues. 
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profitable.12 Profits as a percentage of sales in 1983 
were 42 per cent in Pharmaceuticals, 32 per cent in 
Healthcare Products, 22 per cent in Computers & Office 
Machinery, 20 per cent in Instrument Engineering, 13 per 
cent in Mechanical Engineering and 11 per cent in Elec-
trical Engineering as compared with an overall average 
for manufacturing of 8 per cent (IDA, 1985, Appendix 
111). A good deal of these industries are relatively new, 
established in the second half of the 1970s and early 
1980s, with the peak in new foreign investment occurr-
ing around 1979-81. As the new industries came on 
stream, continuing to build up their output for some years 
after the initial investment, profits would have increas-
ed rapidly as well. 
The Chemicals sector, which includes Phar-
maceuticals, was particularly influential. Chemicals is 
capital-intensive and it earns a high rate of return on 
capital investment so that the absolute amount of its pro-
fits is very large. Investment in Chemicals by US firms 
peaked in 1979/80 and by 1982-84 American Chemical 
companies in Ireland were making profits of $380m. to 
$451 m a year, representing about 60 per cent of total 
profits of US manufacturing firms in Ireland in those 
years. In fact, the Chemical companies in Ireland ac-
counted for over 14 per cent of all US manufacturing pro-
fits in Europe in the three years 1982-84 and between 
6 per cent and 8 per cent of all US manufacturing profits 
outside the USA itself. In Irish pounds, US Chemical 
firms' profits were £295m and total US companies' pro-
fits were £438m in 1982, while the total profit outflow 
was £499m. It is possible, therefore, that something 
around half of the recent outflow of profits has come from 
quite a small group of American Chemical companies. 
(There are just 34 American firms in the Chemical in-
dustry, and only 11 sizeable ones employing over 100 
people). More recently, too, the outflow from the Elec-
tronics industry has probably been growing in 
· importance. 
It is worth noting, incidentally, that despite the large 
profit outflow from foreign companies and their high 
levels of expenditure on imported inputs, they are still 
significant net contributors of foreign exchange to the 
Irish economy because they export a very high propor-
tion of their output. Exports account for 82 per cent of 
sales of foreign industries, and over 95 per cent in the 
fastest growing sectors (IDA, 1985). So although their im-
ported inputs and outflow of profits amounts to close to 
55 per cent of their sales on average (Table 8), the value 
of their exports is significantly greater. Their net foreign 
exchange earnings, however, are only about 45 per cent 
of the value of their exports. Since most of recent ex-
ports growth has come from the newest foreign in-
dustries, with the lowest proportions of Irish economy 
expenditures, net foreign exchange earnings would have 
represented a declining proportion of total exports. 
12. See O'Leary (1984) for a discussion of factors which may underlie 
their high profitability. In particular, note that "profits" recorded by 
foreign plants in Ireland would represent the difference between sales 
revenue and costs to the Irish plants only, whereas additional costs 
may well have been incurred elsewhere, particularly in research and 
development which precedes production in an Irish subsidiary. Thus 
the true profitability of research-intensive projects could commonly 
be lower than actually recorded in Ireland. 
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The Medium-Term Outlook 
One of the main factors affecting the future outlook 
for the foreign-owned manufacturing sector is the likely 
rate of growth in international demand, particularly in 
western Europe which is the major market for the sec-
tor. As discussed elsewhere in this volume, some modest 
increase in growth rates in European industrial countries 
may be expected in the second half of the 1980s, perhaps 
to something over 3 per cent a year, which would be 
a welcome improvement over the first half of the decade 
although scarcely dramatic in its effects. In the light of 
this expected improvement, the prospects for foreign-
owned industry can be considered. 
First, on the employment front, changes in employ-
ment can be considered as the net outcome of job losses 
and job gains. Job losses in foreign industry averaged 
5,500 a year in the period 1975-79, rising to 8,200 a year 
in 1980-84, which meant average rates of job loss (in rela-
tion to employment) of 7 .6 per cent in 1975-79 and 9 .5 
per cent in 1980-84. Ordinarily, one might assume that 
recovery in demand in the second half of the 'eighties 
would mean a return to lower rates of job loss, perhaps 
similar to the late 1970s. However, as was shown in 
discussing the life-cycle effect above, at least part of the 
deterioration in employment in the early 1980s could be 
regarded as structural in nature rather than purely an ef-
fect of recession. There is probably an underlying tenden-
cy for job losses to rise gradually. For this reason rates 
of job loss in the future probably will not return to the 
level of the 1970s although they should improve com-
pared with the early 1980s under the influence of better 
demand conditions. Perhaps a reasonable assumption is 
that the rate of job loss would average about 8.6 per cent 
a year, the average for the past ten years. 
Job gains, on the other hand, can be more realistically 
thought of, not in terms of a rate in relation to existing 
employment because relatively little expansion comes 
from established firms, but as absolute additions to the 
existing stock coming primarily from new projects. Gains 
averaged 9,100 a year in 1975-79, falling to 7,300 a year 
in 1980-84, with only 5,900 coming in 1984. Job gains 
probably tend to lag behind investment, so that part of 
the gains in recent years reflect high investment around 
1979-81. But investment has been lower in recent years 
and the immediate prospects for the next year or two 
suggest little increase over 1984. Thus the main source 
of stimulus to job gains up to about 1987 looks rather 
weak. More bouyant demand conditions should improve 
matters after that, but intense competition for mobile in-
vestment in Europe means that it will be difficult to regain 
the peak level of investment recorded around 1979-81. 
Probably a reasonable assumption is that job gains in the 
second half of the 1980s will be much the same as in 
the first half, i.e., about 7,300 a year. 
Under the assumptions of an average rate of job loss 
of 8.6 per cent a year and average job gains of 7,300 a 
year, employment would increase slightly, by about 0.4 
per cent per year or a total of 1,600 jobs over the period 
1985-1990. This would leave employment in foreign-
owned industry still about 6,000 below the peak level 
reached in 1981 - an outcome which would put the 
FOREIGN OWNED INDUSTRY IN IRELAND: PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECTS 53 
employment experience of foreign industry in the 1980s 
as a whole in sharp contrast to the 1960s and 1970s. The 
outcome could be somewhat more favourable,if new in-
vestment picks up and life cycles begin to lengthen. If 
these effects were substantial net gains of perhaps 1,000 
per annum might occur. But in order to regain the 1981 
level of employment by 1990, with the assumed rate of 
job loss of 8.6 per cent a year, average net gains of 1,500 
a year and gross gains of 8,900 a year would be required. 
This is almost the same as the amount recorded in the 
second half of the 1970s, and while it is not impossible 
it looks rather unlikely at present. 
It is rather more difficult to assess the prospects for out-
put growth in foreign-owned manufacturing since the 
available data on past output trends do not distinguish 
foreign from indigenous firms. Thus there is no solid basis 
for comparison in past experience although it was possi-
ble to look at the experience of a number of pre-
dominantly foreign sectors (see Table 3). It is reasonably 
clear that most foreign industries had negative or reduc-
ed rates of growth in the first half of the 1980s, with the 
principal exception of Electronics where growth remain-
ed very high, at least until 1985. This high growth rate 
in Electronics had a major influence on the overall rate 
of growth. 
In the second half of the 1980s, if there are better de-
mand conditions, growth rates should improve in most 
foreign-owned industries. But the performance of Elec-
tronics, and to a lesser extent Chemicals, cannot 
realistically be thought of in terms of a response to de-
mand conditions. For the recent rapid growth in these 
sectors came primarily from a substantial inflow of new 
companies which grew quickly in their early years, 
resulting in high rates of growth in relation to the relative-
ly small existing base. As these companies age, their 
growth should slow down, and the inflow of new firms 
will represent a declining influence relative to the larger 
base existing now even if the inflow is as strong as 
in the past in absolute terms. Thus slower rates of growth 
may be expected in the new high-technology industries 
in the second half of the 1980s and subsequently. 
If the growth rate of Computers & Office Machinery 
falls to an average of 20 per cent a year, if Chemicals 
simply continues at the same rate as in 1979-84, and if 
all other foreign-dominated sectors included in Table 3 
improve by 2 per cent a year, the overall outcome to 
1990 would be no improvement over the first half of the 
1980s despite an improvement in most sectors. If the 
growth of Computers & Office Machinery averages 10 
per cent a year (still a very respectable rate), the overall 
outcome in the predominantly foreign-owned industries 
would be a decline from 12 per cent a year in the first 
half of 1980s to 8 per cent in the second half. Such figures 
are merely illustrative but they suggest that perhaps the 
best to be hoped for is a continuation of the same overall 
rate of growth, although slower growth would be a more 
realistic expectation over the next five years and almost 
invevitable in the long run. Since the fastest growth is 
still expected in Electronics and Chemicals, which have 
relatively low Irish economy expenditures in relation to 
output, the contribution to the economy will probably 
grow more slowly than output. And because these sec-
tors appear to be the main source of profit outflows, the 
outflow should continue to increase, but probably at a 
diminishing rate particularly in view of the decline of in-
vestment in Chemicals since 1979/80. 13 
Conclusion 
Ireland's industrialisation since the early 1960s has 
depended heavily on rapid growth of foreign-owned in-
dustries, but much of the multinational sector has shown 
signs of weakness in the first half of the 1980s. One pro-
blem appears to be the life-cycle effect, whch means that 
foreign companies tend to grow more slowly and often 
to decline some years after their establishment in Ireland. 
This means that the growth of foreign-owned industry 
as a whole depends largely on the inflow of new first-
time foreign investors. But this inflow appears to be in-
sufficient, in relation to the now substantial existing stock 
of slow-growing or declining companies, to sustain high 
overall rates of growth for much longer. 
A major implication for industrial policy is that we must 
seek a better performance from indigenous industry. This 
conclusion has, of course, been taken on board in of-
ficial statements of industrial policy, but there remains 
room for doubt as to whether the task is being approach-
ed with sufficient urgency or an adequate strategy. 
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ANNEX 1 
Detailed Tables Underlying Benchmark Projection 
This Annex is included to illustrate and elucidate the 
consistency of the overall framework presented in the 
main text. Individual figures should not be regarded as 
"forecasts". 
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TABLE Al: Public Sector Borrowing, Domestic Credit Expansion and the Balance of Payments, 1985-1990. £ million 
7985 7986 7987 7988 7989 7990 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) 2,457 2,375 2,265 2,155 2,100 2,150 
Less Non-Monetary Financing 1,051 1,000 1,150 1,300 1,300 1,350 
Monetary financing of PSBR 1,406 1,375 1,115 855 800 800 
of which Foreign (944) (650) (350) (250) (200) (150) 
Domestic Banking System (462) (725) (765) (605) (600) (650) 
Change in Commercial Bank Lending to Private 
Sector -50 50 56 60 100 100 
DCE (Government Accounts) 1,356 1,425 1,171 915 900 900 
Adjustment 142 -89 -65 -8 30 -50 
DCE (Banking Statistics) 1,498 1,336 1,100 907 930 850 
Less Change in Net Non-Monetary Liabilities 50 100 100 150 175 200 
Less change in M3 (%) 400 500 500 600 650 650 
Equals basic balance of payments -1,048 -736 -506 -157 -105 
of which: current balance -498 -449 -206 243 345 450 
private non bank capital flows (and 
balance of payments residual) -550 -287 -300 -400 -450 -450 
TABLE A2: Balance of Payments Financing 1985-1990. £ million 
7985 7986 7987 7988 7989 7990 
Current Balance of Payments -498 -449 -206 +243 +345 +450 
Exchequer Foreign Financing 889 600 300 280 150 100 
State Sponsored Bodies Capital Flows 55 50 50 50 50 50 
Other Official Capital 95 75 80 75 50 50 
Capital Inflows Through Banks 180 100 150 50 50 -100 
Private Capital and Residual Items -550 -287 -300 -400 -450 -450 
Change in Official External Reserves 171 129 74 218 195 100 
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TABLE A3: Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost and Gross National Product at Market Prices, 1985-1990. £ million 
1985 7986 7987 1988 1989 7990 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
Income from self employment 1,233 1,298 1,350 1,440 1,490 1,585 
Wages and Salaries 132 135 150 160 170 180 
Non-Agricultural Income 
Wages, Salaries and Pensions 9,420 10,010 10,660 11,400 12,140 12,930 
Trading Profits of Companies (including P.O. (POSB)) 2,485 2,800 3,040 3,350 3,685 4,192 
Other Trading Profits, Professional Earnings 1,195 1,289 1,395 1,550 1,690 1,770 
Rents 303 330 360 390 415 440 
Adjustment for Stock Appreciation -133 -162 -60 -60 -100 -120 
Adjustment for Financial Services -760 -840 -860 -800 -825 -875 
Depreciation 1,786 2,017 2,224 2,400 2,550 2,717 
GDP at Factor Cost 15,661 16,877 18,258 19,836 21,215 22,819 
Plus Taxes on Expenditure less Subsidies 2,002 2,142 2,325 2,460 2,650 2,825 
GDP at Market Prices 17,663 19,019 20,583 22,296 23,865 25,644 
Net Factor Income -1,970 -2, 137 -2,266 -2,330 -2,400 -2,475 
GNP at Market Prices 15,693 16,882 18,317 19,966 21,465 23,169 
TABLE A4: Company Income, Appropriations and Savings 1985-1990. £ million 
1985 7986 7987 7988 1989 7990 
Trading Profits of Companies and Income of Post 
Office 2,485 2,800 3,040 3,350 3,685 4,192 
Less Government Trading and Investment Income 510 450 500 520 550 575 
Private Company Profits before Interest Payments 1,975 2,350 2,540 2,830 3,135 3,617 
Less Adjustment for Financial Services -760 -840 -860 -800 -825 -875 
Private Company Profits after Adjustment for 
Financial Services 1,215 1,510 1,680 2,030 2,310 2,742 
Less Dividends 612 783 900 1,050 1,100 1,150 
Undistributed Profits 603 727 780 980 1,210 1,592 
Less Tax on Undistributed Profits 230 240 245 250 265 275 
Company Savings 373 487 535 730 945 1,317 
Stock Appreciation -133 162 -60 -80 -100 -120 
Company Savings net of Stock Appreciation 240 325 475 650 845 1,197 
as per cent of GNP 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.2 4.4 5.2 
TABLE AS: Public Authorities Income, Expenditure and Savings 1985-1990. £ million 
7985 1986 7987 1988 7989 7990 
Taxes on Income and Wealth 3,564 3,790 4,025 4,325 4,585 4,855 
Taxes on Expenditure Less Subsidies 2,002 2,142 2,325 2,460 2,650 2,825 
Net Trading and Investment Income 510 450 500 520 550 575 
TOTAL INCOME 6,076 6,382 6,850 7,305 7,785 8,255 
National Debt Interest 
Paid to Residents 1,057 1,134 1,051 1,222 1,271 1,300 
Abroad 775 742 752 739 734 712 
Transfers 2,193 2,322 2,475 2,650 2,810 2,965 
Net Current Expenditure on Goods and Services 3,283 3,480 3,620 3,775 3,980 4,200 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 7,308 7,678 7,898 8,386 8,795 9,177 
SAVINGS -1,232 -1,296 -1,047 -1,081 -1,010 -922 
As per cent of GNP -7.9 -7.5 -5.7 -5.5 -4.7 -4.0 
TABLE A6: Exports, Imports and the Balance of Payments, 1985-1990. 
1985 Per cent change 1986 Per cent change 1987 
£ million Volume Price £ million Volume Price £ million 
1. EXPORTS 
- Agricultural 1,790 4 2 1,897 2 3 1,990 
- Manufacturing 6,340 6\12 3314 7,006 10 4 9,850 
- Other Industrial 1,542 4 0 1,604 
- Other 128 5 4 141 0 4 146 
- Merchandise 7,800 5314 2314 10,648 31;. 4 11,986 
- Top Adjustment -205 -190 -195 
- TOTAL MERCHANDISE 7,595 6 2314 10,458 11,791 
- Tourism Exports 712 4 41;. 773 3 411, 832 
- Other Invisible Exports 506 4 41;. 549 2 4\12 585 
TOT AL EXPORTS 10,813 5314 3 11,780 7% 4 13,208 
2. IMPORTS 
- Merchandise -9,370 51,(, 2 -10,159 
- Services -961 5 V. 3 -1,042 
TOT AL IMPORTS -10,331 51,(, 2 -11,192 6 \14 3 -12,248 
3. TRADE BALANCE (1 -2) 482 588 960 
4. FACTOR PAYMENTS 1,970 -2, 137 -2,266 
5. TRANSFERS 990 1,100 1,100 
6. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (- 3+4+5) -498 -449 -206 
As Per Cent of GNP -3.2 -2.7 1.2 
--
Per cent change 1988 Per cent change 
Volume Price £ million Volume Price 
2 2\12 2,085 1 2\12 
11 4\12 11,425 9 4 
0 4\12 153 0 4 
9 4\12 13,663 7\12 4 
-200 
13,463 
2\12 4 887 3 \12 3 
2\12 4 623 3 3 
8\12 4/4 14,973 7 4 






1989 Per cent change 
£ million Volume Price 
2,160 2 3 
12,950 9 4\12 
159 0 4\12 
15,269 71/2 41/2 
-210 
15,059 
915 4 3 
600 2\12 3 
16,665 7Y4 41;. 
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TABLE A7: Savings and Capital Formation. (As Per cent of GNP) 
1980- 1985-
1985 7990 1986 1987 1988 1989 7990 
Savings of 
Personal Sector 14.3 14112 151/2 14112 151/2 141/2 141/2 
Companies 0.5 31/2 2 21/2 3114 41/2 5% 
Public Authorities -8.0 -51/2 -71/2 -53/4 -5112 -43/4 -4 
Balance of Payments Deficit 8.3 23/4 1114 -1114 -11/2 -2 
Net Physical Capital Formation 15.1 121/2 121/2 12% 12 12 3/4 13% 
ANNEX 2 
The Relationship between the National Debt/GNP ratio 
and the interest rate paid by Government 
Let D = National Debt 
Y Nominal GNP 
and I = Interest payments on the national debt. 
In the steady state D /Y D + AD 






AD = DAY y 
AD DAY 
=--
y y y 
Now I = D.i where i is the interest rate. 
AY AD I So if i = - then from (B) - = -
y y y 
However if i < A y 
y 
then E = (AD-I) = Q_(AY - i) > 0 
y y y y 
(A) 
(B) 
where E is borrowing over and above that required to 
finance national debt interest. 
Similarly if: 
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